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Abstract 
The Optimal Currency Invoicing for Oil: 
The Case of the Countries of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
Saif S. Alsowaidi 
Stability in exchange rates has been the objective of several international mone-
tary agreements since the early twentieth century. Thus the par value of currencies 
was determined in terms of a specified amount of gold, under the gold standard, 
whilst, the Bretton Woods agreement and the Smithsonian agreement defined the 
value of each currency in terms of the dollar, where the dollar was defined in terms 
of gold. Nevertheless, all these various systems have failed to eliminate the argu-
ments between the proponents and the opponents of flexible and fixed exchange 
rate regimes. Although the major industrial countries have adopted a relatively 
flexible exchange rate regime, most developing countries have held their currencies 
pegged to the currency of a major industrial country, or a basket of currencies, 
with the aim of meeting a particular macroeconomic criterion. 
The choice of pegs tends to be influenced by trade shares, however, adopted 
according to the objective function the domestic "authorities" aim "to fulfillr The -
literature has defined several macroeconomic objectives of a peg but found no 
particular peg to be universally adopted by all developing countries. 
An examination of the contract invoicing literature shows that, international 
trade involves incurring of risk by firms, exporters and importers. This risk is partly 
determined by the choice of currency denomination of contracts, which firms are 
expected to seek means of minimizing. With respect to currencies used to invoice 
contracts, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that it is the currency of the 
exporter which tends to be used to denominate trade contracts. However, on an 
ad hoc basis, certain commodities and raw materials were found to be invoiced in 
vehicle currencies, such as the dollar. Moreover, the choice of currency invoicing is 
found to be influenced by many factors. In particular, inflation differentials were 
essential. Low inflation currencies are generally preferred by trading partners. A 
major issue of concern discussed in the literature is the potential effect of exchange 
rate fluctuations on the volume of international trade. The evidence on this has 
gone both ways. Some have argued that these fluctuations are of less concern 
because firms can use the forward market as means of reducing their impact. 
The analytical framework presented in the present thesis deals with an impor-
tant issue for the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). These 
economies depend on oil revenues as the main source of income. Consequently, 
both government and private spending rely heavily on the oil sector. However, 
analyzing this invoicing policy without considering the behavior of the exchange 
rates between the currencies of these countries and those of their major trading 
partners, would be misleading. Thus, the present model adopts an integrative 
approach aimed at choosing a currency or a basket of currencies for invoicing oil, 
and determining how the choices of the same arrangements or alternative arrange-
ments adopted for pegging the domestic currencies can affect the welfare function 
adopted for the choice of currency(s) for invoicing oil. This welfare function, as it 
is argued in the thesis, is based on stabilizing the real, rather than the nominal, 
value of oil revenues. 
The historical perspective has demonstrated close correlations between inflation 
rates, money growth rates and oil revenues in the GCC economies. Moreover, the 
dependence of these economies on oil revenues as the major source of income, 
has been argued to be the decisive factor that has resulted in their currencies 
being pegged to the dollar. The results from the estimation, however, do not 
support a peg to the dollar, nor invoicing oil in dollars. Nonetheless, other single 
currencies have failed to fulf i l l the optimality condition, thus favoring pegging to a 
trade-weighted basket of currencies, and an invoicing scheme for oil which is based 
on a basket of currencies. Trade shares prove to be important, since deviations 
i i i 
from purchasing power parity are passed via them. Despite the different levels 
of stability resulting from alternative combinations of peg and invoice choices, 
statistical evidence concludes that there are no significant differences amongst 
the resulting variances of the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic 
currencies of the GCC member states. Accordingly, it may be argued that if the 
sole objective of the authorities in these countries is to stabilize the real value of 
oil revenues, any choice of the alternatives considered in the present thesis would 
yield the same result in terms of stability. 
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L Int roduct ion 
The growth of international trade has led to an increase in the degree of in-
terdependence in the world, which has imposed a greater degree of uncertainty 
in both the goods and the money markets. The interdependence of nations has 
undoubtedly caused foreign decisions to have implications on the domestic econ-
omy of a given country. The repercussions of foreign supply or demand shocks 
may affect the domestic demand for imports and import substitutes, while domes-
tic exports can be affected as foreign demand for the domestic country's export 
changes. However, since for many countries the demand for currencies is mostly a 
function of trade transactions, the relative price of currencies w i l l be affected by 
trends in the goods market. Such interdependence has to be recognized as a fact 
once trade crosses the national borders of a country. Furthermore, i t has imposed 
a need to implement a balance between the internal and the external sectors of 
the economy, which requires the adoption of a dynamic process of adjustments as 
domestic and foreign environments vary. Indeed, a major source of variations may 
originate in the exchange rates market. Thus, several attempts have been made to 
reduce the instabili ty in the exchange rates. 
However, the problem facing most nations has not l imited itself to either the 
goods or the money ( foreign exchange ) market; rather i t has manifested its spirit 
in both areas. This makes the cause of the problem diff icult to define, and the 
diagnosis of potential solutions rather imperfect. 
I t may be the case that a conflict may arise between suggested policies de-
signed to countering disequilibrium in the goods market, and to those tailored to 
affect the exchange rates market. Such a conflict is expected to be even worse 
for countries w i th l imited economic power to affect the world markets. Such a 
situation is a characteristic of the major i ty of developing countries. While they 
may have control over their supplies of raw materials, output , exports and imports, 
this control is severely confined to quantities rather than prices. Changing world 
supply of and demand for a developing country's imports and exports introduces 
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uncertainty in the expected costs of its imports and in the expected revenues f rom 
its exports. However, having l imited power to affect the market, many developing 
countries have sought refuge in trade barriers, exchange control, tariffs and quotas, 
capital flow control and other similar impediments to trade and foreign exchange. 
Nevertheless, these distortions have not alleviated the potential costs on the do-
mestic economies of changes in world markets, although they may have succeeded 
in diverting the costs and the benefits f rom one sector of the economy into another. 
Alternatively, some developing countries have aimed to reduce exchange rate 
risk by fixing the value of their currencies relative to other major currency(s). This 
is viewed as an alternative to capital controls and is designed to diminish poten-
t ia l risks associated w i t h trade flow. Although this determination on the part of 
the official monetary authorities may f u l f i l l its objectives in the foreign exchange 
market, by stabilizing the relative price of the domestic currency, i t has l i t t le effect 
on curtailing the transmission of foreign policies and on shocks originating in the 
goods market. Pegging ( f ixing ) the value of the domestic currency to another 
currency or a basket of currencies, would have l i t t le effect on the foreign supply 
of goods and demand for domestic products, as long as demand and supply are 
affected by factors other than exchange rates. For example, a real price shock 
originating in a foreign country which trades w i t h the domestic country wi l l have 
effects on domestic prices, whatever the exchange rate arrangements adopted do-
mestically. Moreover, for developing countries which depend on a single source 
of foreign exchange, i.e. a country exporting a single commodity, the problem is 
rather serious. Trends in the market for that product constrain revenues, impose 
constraints on domestic expenditure, hinder development plans, reduce growth and 
may cause political unrest. Since revenues are a function of quantity, price and the 
exchange rates between the domestic currency and the currency(s) in which the 
export is invoiced, the authorities would have to deal w i t h a wider range of issues 
than when there is a single potential source of uncertainty. Indeed, even though 
unexpected price and quantity changes by exporters who have market power ( mea-
sured as a percentage of their market share ) tend to have impact in the short run, 
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market forces have been shown to prevail and to curb monopolistic behavior in 
the international market. Thus cartel behavior wi l l not protect such an exporter. 
Accordingly, i t is necessary to investigate the possible arrangements available to a 
single-commodity based economy wi th respect to the currency in which its export 
is invoiced. 
As economies which depend on oil as their major source of income, member 
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have experienced the consequences 
of declines in both the nominal and the real values of oil revenues. Af te r the peri-
ods of rising revenues f rom oil exports which dominated much of the second half of 
the 1970's and the early few years of the 1980's, both the dollar receipts of exports 
and the purchasing power of these receipts have shown a similar downward trend. 
In contrast to the years of rising oil revenues, the governments' budgets currently 
suffer f rom deficits, which have forced these governments to be frequent borrow-
ers in the money market. Furthermore, reduction in governments' spending and 
investment has rippled through the domestic economies wi th increasing negative 
effects. This has raised questions about the continuing dependence on the public 
sector to uphold, rather than stimulate, the economy. The authorities have blamed 
their inabil i ty to sustain the expenditure patterns they long have adopted on the 
decline in the purchasing power of oil revenues. 
I t can be argued that the authorities are concerned w i t h the real value of oil 
revenues, expressed in terms of the domestic currencies. However, there are four 
major factors which may influence this value. Firstly, the share of the quantity 
of oil exported. This is assumed to be determined by either official or unofficial 
agreement between the member states. Secondly, the world market's price of oil , 
which has been shown to be a funct ion of the world supply of and demand for oi l , 
and thus exogenous to the GCC economies. Thirdly, the exchange rates between 
the currencies of the GCC member states and the currency in which oil is invoiced. 
Fourthly, a price index which can be used as a proxy to determine the real value 
of oil revenues, i.e. the purchasing power of those revenues. 
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Since the GCC economies rely heavily on imports to f u l f i l l domestic aggregate 
demand, a method of relating oil revenues to the currencies which are used to 
denominate imports could prove to be v i ta l to minimize fluctuations in the real 
value of oil revenues. Moreover, f ix ing the value of the domestic currencies in terms 
of the currency in which oil is invoiced wi l l eliminate the exchange risk attached 
to the domestic currencies' nominal value of oil revenues. However, as long as 
there exist channels which allow imports to be denominated in other currencies, 
the above peg would be unable to eliminate problems arising f rom exchange rate 
changes between the domestic currencies of the GCC member states and the cur-
rencies of the countries f rom which they import . This would therefore leave the 
real value of oil revenues vulnerable to potential changes in the exchange rates. 
I t is the purpose of this thesis to provide a framework wi th in which a method 
is developed that relates the exchange rate arrangements adopted by the GCC 
member states to the currency in which oil is invoiced. Explicit ly, an analytical 
model is constructed in which the objective function is to f ind the optimal currency 
invoicing for o i l , based on minimization of the variance of the real value of oil 
revenues. I t is argued that this value is a function of a weighted price of imports, 
where this price index is a function of the relationship between the exchange rates 
of the domestic currencies of the GCC member states and those of their trading 
partners. Indeed, a main feature of the model is its integrative approach to two 
issues relevant to the GCC economies, namely the decision to choose a currency 
or-a basket of currencies to which the domestic currencies are to be pegged, and 
the determination of that choice in relation to stabilization of the real value of oil 
revenues, i f oil is invoiced in alternative currencies as well as baskets of currencies. 
I t is hypothesized in this thesis that the currency invoicing scheme for oil , 
where the dollar is used, constitutes a non-optimal choice, according to the welfare 
function proposed. This may be at tr ibuted to the fact that trade is not entirely 
invoiced in dollars, but in a range of currencies. Accordingly, i f oi l is invoiced in 
a trade-weighted basket of currencies, and the domestic currencies of the GCC 
member states are pegged to a basket as well, stability in the domestic currencies' 
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real value of oil revenues may be achieved. 
Reviewing the literature reveals no trace of a model which has made a similar 
attempt, although there has been an extensive discussion of the question of the 
optimal currency peg. A major assumption proposed by the analysis is that oil 
may be invoiced in another currency than the U.S. dollar, or in a basket of curren-
cies. The thesis does not investigate the practical day to day mechanism of such 
invoicing. Nonetheless, i t may be argued that , once the assumption of rationality 
is postulated, i t may not be unwise to expect exporters to demand other types of 
payments if the alternative proves to be superior according to a particular welfare 
funct ion. However, their abili ty to implement such a payment scheme would de-
pend on many factors, such as their market power and the reaction of their trading 
partners. 
Nonetheless, this model may be extended to evaluate the performance of the 
same objective function by countries exporting a single commodity other than oil , 
and i f the exchange rates between their currencies and other currencies in the world 
are fixed to some extent, the present model w i l l be of greater relevance. 
Throughout the thesis, references are made to interviews conducted by the re-
searcher in the six GCC member states. These interviews were carried out in the 
period f rom the 10th of February 1990 to the 10th of March 1990. Examples of 
people interviewed include bankers, foreign exchange advisors both at the commer-
— c i a l banks and the central banks, officials_at central banks, such as the governor of 
the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, the governor of Qatar Monetary 
Agency, the deputy governor of Bahrain Monetary Agency, and the directors of 
the economic and research departments at the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, the 
Central Bank of Oman and the Central Bank of Kuwait . 
Af te r this introductory Chapter, the rest of the thesis is divided accordingly. 
Chapter I I wi l l review the development of the international monetary system, w i t h 
emphasis on the emergence of the currency pegging arrangements. The review wi l l 
examine the major features of the international monetary agreements such as the 
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Gold Standard, the Bretton Woods Agreement and the Smithsonian Agreement. 
The advantages and disadvantages of flexible and fixed exchange rates w i l l be dis-
cussed. The proposal of a unified peg is analyzed in the literature on the Opt imum 
Currency Areas, where several countries may establish a joint peg between them. 
Chapter I I I examines the issue of the optimal currency peg, reviews the literature, 
and further examines the welfare functions of a currency peg proposed by each 
model. The impact of changes in prices and exchange rates on trade and potential 
effects on importers and exporters wi l l be examined in the Chapter I V . I t is shown 
there that the choice of the currency denomination of international contracts can 
have impacts on the parties involved. I n general, they would attempt to mini-
mize the potential negative impacts, by choosing to denominate contracts i n their 
own national currencies. However, for exporters of particular commodities, such 
as internationally traded raw materials, the currency of invoicing is determined 
on an ad hoc basis. Af ter these theoretical chapters, the model is presented in 
the Chapter V . A distinctive feature of this model is embodied in its integrative 
approach to the problem, where the choice of the optimal currency invoicing for 
oi l is designed to be related to the optimal currency peg of the domestic currencies 
of the GCC member states. The findings obtained f rom estimating the model are 
presented and analyzed in Chapter V I . A summary of the thesis and its major 
findings are cited Chapter V I I , where recommendations are also presented. To-
ward the end of the thesis, Appendix 1 provides tables of the data used in the 
estimation, whereas Appendices at the end of particular chapters provide some 
explanations and derivations of certain technical aspects of the model. 
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IIo Historical Development of International Monetary 
Systems 
Long before recent times, traders in goods and financial assets sought stabil-
i ty for the value of an exchanged currency. Throughout history, precious metals 
have been used to provide a form of assurance, a policy which was adopted by 
nations un t i l the th i rd decade of the present century. The gold standard, as i t 
is known, dominated the fixed exchange system which was adhered to by major 
trading countries in the world. I t may be argued that this was helped by the con-
t ro l of a vast part of the globe by a l imited number of countries, who controlled 
resources and implemented policies that were effective at the international level. 
However, the emergence of statehood which started to spread over the world after 
the First World War, and the growth of a more sophisticated trade, together w i t h 
the emergence of wage and price inflexibili ty, contributed to the demise of the gold 
standard. 
Later, i n 1944, there was an attempt to restore order in the international mon-
etary arena, and the Bretton Woods agreement came about. I t proved capable of 
surviving the emergence of even more sophisticated trade, as well as the growth 
of greater interdependence in the world economy. However, the system collapsed 
in 1971. Several attempts were made to salvage its spirit; nonetheless, they were 
deemed to fa i l . One of those attempts was the Smithsonian Agreement, which 
finally collapsed as a result of "its abandonment by "the major industrial countries. 
Since then, the currencies of these countries have been floating, although not freely, 
while small developing countries have in general chosen to f ix their currencies in 
terms of the currencies of the industrial country(s). 
This chapter w i l l explain the mechanism of the gold standard, and summarizes 
the factors which contributed to its abandonment. Then, in the second section, 
a review of the adjustable peg of the Bret ton Woods wi l l be presented, w i th a 
discussion of its mechanism and its major weaknesses. I n the th i rd part, a brief 
look at the Smithsonian agreement w i l l be given. In the four th section, the fixed 
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and flexible exchange rate regimes are discussed. An analysis of the opt imum 
currency area theory w i l l be presented in the f i f t h section. Finally, a look at the 
pegged exchange rate regime and the available schemes wi th in this regime w i l l be 
presented. 
I L L T h e G o l d S t a n d a r d 
The era before the First World War was characterized by gold as the numeraire 
to which countries fixed the value of their currencies. Under this standard, the 
participating countries fixed the value of their currencies in terms of a specified 
amount of gold and stood ready to exchange their currency units for gold. Conse-
quently, the exchange rate was determined as the rate between any two currencies 
plus transportation costs of gold. This fixed exchange system insulated the rel-
ative price of currencies f rom changing; however, i t left the balance of payments 
to absorb changes in prices as well as in the demand for imports and supply of 
exports. 
The fixed exchange rate ensured interdependence in the world economies. For 
example, a decline i n the price level in , say, country A, would encourage demand 
for its exports. Thus, gold w i l l flow into country A to pay for the rising demand 
for its exports. However, as the inflow of gold occurs, money supply in country 
A increases, put t ing upward pressures on the price level un t i l equilibrium in the 
balance of payments is restored. Conversely, a deficit would result i n gold outflow 
as demand"for foreign goods rises. ~However,~the outflow of gold reduces domestic 
money supply and price would decline unt i l equilibrium in the balance of payments 
is achieved. 
The proceeding analysis depends crucially on the assumptions embodied in the 
classical monetary model. Real money supply is hypothesized to depend on the 
reciprocal of money velocity, V , and income, Y . That is: 
Ms/P = (1/V)Y 
where l/V is assumed to be constant and income is expected to fluctuate around 
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its long run equilibrium level. Thus, if the right hand side of the equation is stable, 
then for the equality to hold, a rise in money supply would lead to a proportionate 
increase in the price level. Consequently, i f the money supply rises, the price level 
w i l l rise as well. This would be the case i f demand for exports i n a country increases. 
Under the gold standard, gold wi l l flow into the surplus countries, increasing the 
money supply, thus raising the price level. However, the opposite occurs in the 
deficit countries, where gold flows out of the country contracting the money supply 
and reducing the price level. 
This role of the price level, known as the price-specie flow mechanism, assures 
that gold wi l l cease to flow as prices are equated internationally. However, for the 
mechanism to operate efficiently, certain conditions must be met. Firstly, in order 
to react to price changes, there must be no barriers to trade. Secondly, the elastic-
ities of imports and exports would have to be sufficiently high so that producers 
and consumers respond to price changes, i.e. the Marshall-Lerner condition must 
be met. Thirdly, for the flow of gold to affect the domestic and the foreign price 
levels, the central banks must not sterilize those flows. For example, on the one 
hand, in an attempt to keep the interest rate low, a deficit country may increase 
the money supply so as to offset the outflow of gold. On the other hand, a surplus 
country, w i t h rising reserves of gold, may t r y to avoid increasing the growth of 
the money supply, impeding the rise in its price level. Fourthly, prices and wages 
have to be flexible in both directions. This is essential since the whole operation 
of the gold standard-depends on the mechanism of the price level. Indeed, i f prices 
do not respond to the outflow and the inflow of gold, the chain of t ransmit t ing 
disequilibrium and ini t ia t ing equilibrium is lost, and deficits and surpluses would 
continue to persist. 
On the other hand, there were some noted advantages associated wi th the 
gold standard. The stabili ty of the exchange rates amongst the countries in the 
world was recognized by far as the most important advantage of the system. I t 
is often argued that such a stability would encourage trade through its reduction 
of exchange rate risk. Furthermore, i f the rules of the system were adhered to by 
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all participating members, there would be an incentive for countries to have stable 
money growth rates, because instability may mean a demand for gold in exchange 
for currencies. Consequently, as the classical equation of money supply implies, 
prices would be stable. 
These advantages, however, failed to insulate the system f rom collapsing in the 
early 1930's. I t was abandoned by the U.K. in 1931 and by the U.S. in 1933. 
Basically, i t can be argued that the participating countries could no longer honor 
the sweeping demand of currency holders to exchange their currencies for the 
equivalent value of gold. 
I L 2 . T h e B r e t t o m W o o d s S y s t e m 
Toward the end of the Second World War, an agenda to reform the international 
monetary system was introduced. The aim of the system was to organize and 
monitor rules via which exchange rates would be determined, as well as to establish 
a mechanism by which incentives to engage in competitive devaluations may be 
curbed. However, as was the case under the gold standard, member states were 
expected to adhere to the rules established by the International Monetary Fund, 
the I M F . Mainly, surplus countries were expected to alter the fixed exchange rates 
for their currencies in an upward direction, whilst deficit countries would devalue 
their currencies, after consulting the I M F . The mechanism was so delicate that 
the relevant authorities at the I M F were-supposed to distinguish a situation-of 
a ' fundamental disequilibrium ' amongst many situations where countries were 
eager to change or to preserve the relative values of their currencies. 
The participating members who met in Bretton Woods in the U.S., agreed in 
1944 to fix the value of the dollar in terms of gold, while the other members fixed 
the value of their currencies in terms of the dollar. Although the system allowed for 
bands of the exchange rates wi th in one percent ( up or down ), and the operation 
of the system was supplemented by the International Monetary Fund, the Bretton 
Woods agreement was abandoned in 1971. 
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The collapse of this agreement may be at tr ibuted to many factors, but the 
growth of the U.S. outstanding dollar liabilities was the major one. By the late 
1960's, the U.S. deficit had grown at an alarming rate relative to the U.S. holdings 
of gold reserves. The U.S. ratio of debt to its gold stock accelerated f rom 0.39 in 
1950 to 1.18, 2.10, and 4.24 in 1960, 1965 and 1970, respectively 1. Consequently, 
doubt was cast on its abili ty to honor the foreign holding of dollars, which were 
increasingly being exchanged for gold. Moreover, the growth in the U.S. deficit, 
which was financed through international borrowings, was seen to export inflation 
to surplus countries. This was an undesirable consequence of the Bretton Woods 
agreement. Many countries resisted this inflationary impulse; they accused the U.S. 
of using the rest of the world as an absorber of its fiscal and monetary policies. 
One may add that the special status awarded to the dollar under the Bret-
ton Woods agreement has contributed to its eventual decline. Being the country 
of the reserve currency, the U.S. was in the position to receive seigniorage, the 
difference between the costs and the benefits of creating money. This was seen 
by many countries, especially France, as a means by which the U.S. was capable 
of maintaining deficits, w i t h l i t t le incentive to restrain its consumption pattern. 
Consequently, the French had attempted to exchange dollars for gold, therefore 
inf l ic t ing greater pressures on the U.S. gold reserves and increasing the supply of 
the dollar. For example, in 1962 France began to exchange dollars for gold, a move 
which was interpreted by many economists on both economic as well as political 
grounds-( Yeager (1976), p.-480-481. Levi (1983), p. 141 ). In 1965, France con-
verted about one bill ion of its dollar reserves into gold 2 , continuing the campaign 
to show a distaste for the U.S. status of gaining seigniorage under the Bretton 
Woods international monetary agreement. 
Although the U.S. policies may have contributed to the downfall of the ad-
justable peg system of Bretton Woods, i t may be argued that w i t h increasing 
1 Graham Bird, World Finance and Adjustment: An Agenda for Reform (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985), p. 57. 
2 LeLand B. Yeager, International Monetary Relations: Theory, History, and Policy. 2nd 
edition ( New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1976), p. 481. 
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world trade and the consequent rise in demand for a vehicle currency, the system 
of backing the U.S. dollar ( which was increasingly being used as a vehicle currency 
in trade ) w i th gold, of which the supply was fixed in the short run, was found to 
collapse. 
Despite the shortcomings of the system, an attempt was made in December of 
1971 to salvage what remained f rom the international monetary agreement of the 
Bretton Woods. 
I I . 3 . T h e S m i t h s o n i a n A g r e e m e n t 
In an attempt to rectify the principal defects of the Bretton Woods agreement, 
the Smithsonian exchange rate mechanism, agreed upon in 1971 called for a rise in 
the U.S. dollar value of gold, f rom $35.00 to $38.02 per ounce of gold. Implici t ly, 
this meant a revaluation of the domestic currencies of the participating countries 
against the dollar. Furthermore, the newly established band around the value of 
a given currency against the dollar was wider than its counterpart that character-
ized the previous international monetary agreement. The present system allowed 
for 2.25 percent movement on either side of the fixed par value. However, this 
agreement failed to restore confidence in the internationally negotiated system of 
exchange rates. B i rd (1985) argued 
Basically they [the reasons for the failure] are that the agreement was 
not only unable to restore confidence in the stability of central values, 
but also insufficiently flexible to allow exchange rates to move toward 
their equilibrium values where these had failed to be established by 
discretion. The view that the rates chosen in 1971 were inappropriate 
is supported by the observation that balance of payments disequilibria 
remained uncorrected after the agreement. Failure to select equilibrium 
exchange rates and uncertainty and instabili ty to which this gave rise 
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dictated a move towards floating as a matter of expediency 3. 
Moreover, the unique features of trading countries, their differing economic 
targets and the unequal effects of world price shocks have contributed to varying 
inflat ion rates in the world. Since inflation affects the relative purchasing power 
of currencies, there was a continuing decline in demand for weak currencies. Most 
countries found the Smithsonian remedy to be too costly and ineffective. In the 
end, the currencies of major industrial countries such as the dollar and the pound 
began to float, although not freely, ending an era of fixed exchange rate arrange-
ments. 
I I . 4 . F i x e d a n d F l e x i b l e Exchange Ra tes Reg imes 
The move toward a regime of flexible exchange rates brought forward the tradi-
t ional debate between those favoring flexible exchange rates and those advocating 
the fixed exchange rate alternative. Based on the notion that exchange rates under 
a perfectly flexible system would reflect market forces, i.e. supply of and demand 
for currencies, the proponents of this system argued that the relative values of 
currencies would be capable of correcting balance of payments disequilibria. For 
example, assuming a world of country A and country B, where their currencies 
float against each other, a reduction in demand for country A's export tends to 
result in a balance of trade deficit in this country. Under a flexible exchange rates 
regime, this w i l l affect the derived demand for currency A and currency B where" 
currency B w i l l appreciate vis-a-vis currency A. As a result, the demand for B's 
export w i l l decline and its surpluses should be eliminated. 
Alternatively, had the exchange rates been fixed, country A would have passed 
through a recession before equilibrium had been restored. Then the deficit de-
scribed above would reduce prices and real wages in country A, resulting in unem-
ployment and a reduction in output. However, country B w i l l experience a boom 
3Graham Bird, World Finance and Adjustment: An Agenda for Reform (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985), p. 59. 
in its output, accompanied by a rise in its inflat ion rates and its wages. How could 
a situation like this be corrected in a world of fixed exchange rate regimes ? The 
proponents of flexible exchange rates argue that the cost of restoring equilibrium 
under the assumption of fixed exchange rates is both high and likely to be resisted 
by many sectors in the economy. Given that the exchange rates do not adjust, 
relative prices of exports of countries A and B wi l l have to compensate for that. 
Tha t is, prices i n country A w i l l have to decline and so should wages, where this 
latter decline is expected to encounter resistance in the economy. On the other 
hand, rising prices in country B should constitute a legitimate concern for the 
authorities in country B. Thus, although equilibrium may be reached, i t is only 
through a painful process of adjustment. 
A major problem w i t h the fixed exchange rates regime stems f rom the fact 
that, under this regime, economies tend to be interdependent, so the authorities 
lose control over their monetary policy. For example, assume that the numeraire 
currency is the dollar, against which the currency of the domestic country is fixed. 
Then, if the U.S. inflates at a faster rate than the domestic price level, there wi l l 
be a tendency for the dollar to depreciate, as demand for U.S. products declines; 
while the domestic currency would be under pressure to appreciate, as demand for 
domestic output rises. But the rate is fixed. This would occur unless the domestic 
country is wi l l ing to run inflation rates equal to those of the U.S. I t is only then 
that equilibrium w i l l be restored. Thus, under fixed exchange rates, inflation can 
easily be transmitted between-countries. However, hadihe currencies been subject 
to the market mechanism, the rise in the U.S. price level w i l l result in a decline in 
the relative value of the dollar in terms of the domestic currency, thus eliminating 
the need for the domestic rate of inflat ion to be consistent w i th that of the U.S. 
The proponents of fixed exchange rates argue that the ability to have indepen-
dent monetary policy is actually a drawback of the flexible system. For countries 
w i t h an unstable monetary policy, the fixed exchange rate system wi l l enforce disci-
pline on these economies. Assume that the domestic monetary authorities increase 
the domestic money supply by expanding domestic credit. Then, under a system 
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of fixed exchange rates, the result will be a disequilibrium in the money market, 
where money supply is greater than the demand for it . This will result in a deficit 
as reserves flow out of the domestic country, as a result of people adjusting their 
desired holdings of cash balances to the new level of money supply. The loss of 
reserves will reduce money supply, thus contracting the available balances and re-
sulting in a deflationary outcome. Hence, it is more likely that the expansion of 
credit will be self-destroying under the fixed exchange rate system. Dunn (1983) 
has disputed the ability of individual countries to pursue an independent monetary 
policy in the actual world. Dunn wrote: 
The earlier belief that flexible exchange rates would free monetary pol-
icy from international constraints assumed that central banks and gov-
ernments were prepared to accept whatever exchange rates resulted 
from domestic or foreign monetary-policy shifts. That assumption no 
longer holds. Domestic monetary policy again faces an international-
payments constraint: i t must approximate the monetary policy being 
pursued abroad in order to avoid large exchange-rate movements4. 
But, as Sohmen (1961) and Mundell (1963) argued, with flexible exchange 
rates, an expansionary monetary policy by a country would not result in a deficit 
in its balance of payments; rather its currency will depreciate, thus allowing it to 
maintain equilibrium. 
Another argument-against flexible exchange rates arises from the fear that flex-
ibility will result in fluctuations and in lack of confidence in currencies. Further-
more, this will stimulate speculation, which can be destabilizing, i.e. it exacerbates 
the problems of a depreciating currency by inducing further depreciation. Fried-
man (1953) discounted the importance of this type of speculation by arguing that 
speculators would lose money if they speculate on a change in the exchange rates 
in a wrong direction, and only those speculators who guess it right will stay in 
the market. Furthermore, Friedman saw a limit to speculation in the resources 
4Robert Dunn, The Many Disappointments of Flexible Exchange Rates. Essay in Interna-
tional Finance, no. 154 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, December 1983), p. 11. 
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available to speculators, and defended the view that even speculators should not 
be expected to speculate on a change in the value of a currency greater than what 
is expected to occur in the long run. Putting it differently, speculation, if it is in 
the direction of long run equilibrium, will smooth out the expected change in the 
exchange rate over time, and thus be stabilizing. 
In addition, flexible exchange rates are believed to cause uncertainty over the 
future relative value of currencies thus deterring trade and investment. Corden 
(1972) argued that the exchange rate variations would affect the utility associated 
with having money as a store of value, because the general price level is no longer 
stable. Moreover, since domestic prices are expected to be less variable than for-
eign prices due to the exchange rate risk, a bias against foreign trade may result. 
A counter argument is put forward by the proponents of the flexible system, who 
argue that if the exchange rates can adjust, then there is no need to impose re-
strictions on trade. Furthermore, forward exchange rates can be employed to avoid 
potential exchange risk 5. 
Another argument offered by the supporters of flexible exchange rates hinges on 
the need to hold international reserves. Unlike the case of the fixed exchange rate 
system, where the authorities may have to use their holdings of foreign reserves to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market, this need is eliminated under the flexible 
exchange rate system. That is because the authorities have no policy to restrict 
the behavior of the exchange rates in certain paths. The holding of international 
reserves entails an opportunity cost to the holder. The reserves could be used to 
finance additional present consumption, but holding them foregoes this, although 
it results in receiving a yield. Lanyi (1969) has disputed the absence of the need to 
hold reserves in the practical sense, casting doubt on the reality of the total absence 
of governmental intervention in the foreign exchange market. Realistically, Lanyi 
argued, what is relevant to the argument of holding international reserves is the 
potential size and cost of this holding under the alternative exchange rate regimes. 
5 This issue is explored further in Chapter IV. 
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Bird (1985) carried the debate against fixed exchange rates further, by arguing 
that although the rates are fixed at some initial time, there is a possibility that 
the economies will undergo structural changes, which would require review of the 
pre-set parities. However, frequent alterations to the fixed exchange rates may 
actually encourage speculation. Moreover, the officially set parities are likely to 
diverge from the market-determined rates, at least over time. That is because 
the latter rates are dynamic in nature and reflect the dynamism of the underlying 
forces of supply and demand in the economies. Bird wrote: 
The main . . . [ problem ] arises when the officially fixed rate is not 
the same as the free market rate or the fundamental equilibrium rate. 
Trading will then be conducted at a disequilibrium set of relative prices. 
The wrong price signals are given to consumers and producers and the 
pattern of demand and production adapts in ways that do not make 
the best use of scarce global resources, i.e. inefficiency is the outcome. 
But is this likely to be the case ? The answer must be that it is. 
Even if authorities were initially able to identify accurately what the 
equilibrium set of exchange rates were at a particular point of time, 
these rates are unlikely to remain equilibrium ones for long 6. 
However, there is a further possibility. If a flexible exchange rate is not optimal 
and can cause any of the problems cited above, then joint flexibility of a group of 
countries may diminish the risk of being exposed to those drawbacks. Furthermore, 
the merits of fixed exchange rates may be retained if this group of countries keeps 
the rate fixed amongst their currencies. However, a joint float or flexibility can not 
be established on ad hoc grounds. What determines the optimality of establishing 
and joining such an alternative is the purpose of the contribution of Robert Mundell 
( and others ) to the literature on exchange rate systems. 
8Graham Bird, World Finance and Adjustment: An Agenda for Reform (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985), p. 246. 
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I I . 5 . O p t i m u m Currency Areas 
Based on the theoretical framework presented by Mundell (1961), a group of coun-
tries may, under certain conditions, fix their currencies with respect to each other, 
whilst floating with respect to other currencies in the world, thus creating a cur-
rency area which may or may not be optimum. Since then, a number of criteria 
upon which the optimality of a currency area may be judged, have emerged. 
Mundell argued that i f factors of production ( labor and capital ) are mobile 
between countries, the countries will benefit by a monetary union. Assume that 
there are two countries in the world, country A and country B. At time t, both 
enjoy a balance of payments equilibrium. However, at time t + 1 , demand for 
product A, produced by the first country, declines, thus leading to a balance of 
payments deficit. Country B experiences a surplus, as demand shifts away from 
A. The question is, can equilibrium be restored in both countries' balances of 
payments ? Mundell argued that, if labor and capital can and are willing to move 
between these countries, then the unemployment occurring in A will reduce wages 
and prices in country A, while the surplus in country B would raise wages and 
prices, as demand for product B increases. Then labor will move to country B, 
reducing real wages there, while increasing them in country A. In addition, the 
price level tends to rise in country B as demand for product B rises and decreases 
in country A as demand for product A declines. This process will continue until 
equilibrium is restored. I f this were thecase, _theja there would be nojieed for the 
exchange rate between currency A and currency B to change, and thus we have 
a case for a currency area, which is to be composed of both currencies fixed in 
terms of each other. Note that this argument assumes labor is homogenous and 
can move as well as is willing to move between these countries, i.e. reallocation 
costs are compensated for by expected higher wages in country B. Moreover, labor 
and capital are assumed to be used in the same technical ratios in both countries. 
If this were not the case, then even though these factors move between countries, 
there is a possibility that some labor or capital may still be unemployed in this 
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world. 
However, if factors of production were not willing to move or unable to relo-
cate so as to restore equilibrium, then this restoration must be achieved by other 
means. In the present example, assuming labor and capital immobility, relative 
prices could have adjusted to the changes in demand. That is, as demand for 
product A declined, its price should have decreased. Furthermore, wages should 
have declined in country A relative to that in country B. So, unlike the above case 
where the analysis allowed for mobility of factors of production, in the present 
one, relative price changes would restore demand and, consequently, balance of 
payments equilibrium. Alternatively, exchange rate flexibility could replace price 
flexibility. Country B's currency would appreciate relative to that of country A. 
Thus, flexible exchange rates would reflect the economic changes which country A 
and country B are undergoing. 
Mundell characterized countries between which factors of production do not 
move and relative prices are not allowed to adjust as unsuitable to form a currency 
area, because exchange rates would have to be allowed to adjust, so as to eliminate 
balance of payments equilibrium. 
The assumption of labor and capital mobility has been criticized by Lanyi 
(1969), Dunn (1971) and Fleming (1971). The latter argued that capital may not 
be sensitive to changes in the economic environment in the short run. Assume a 
balance of payment disequilibrium has occurred between two countries which are 
members of a currency area. A potential source of this disturbance may be a shift 
of demand from the product of country A to that produced by country B. The 
consequent outcome of this would be an emergence of unemployment in country 
A, compared to a rise in the level of employment in country B. A possibility of 
restoring equilibrium may be seen in the implementation of a policy which could 
reduce demand in the latter country whilst encouraging demand for product A. 
Such a policy is expected to raise the level of unemployment in country B, resulting 
in a slowdown of economic activities. On the other hand, the increase in demand 
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in country B would stimulate employment and economic activities, as the incentive 
to invest rises in country B and declines in country A. Fleming argued that the 
level of saving will decline in country A, whereas country B will experience a rise 
in its level of saving. The role of capital in affecting production and employment 
depends on the sensitivity of investors in country B to move to country A. If the 
incentive to invest in country A declines by more than the decline in saving in this 
country, and rises more than saving in country B, unemployment would persist in 
country A and inflation will rise in country B. Thus, capital will flow in favor of 
the latter country against the former. A possible outcome of this behavior is a 
worsening of the balance of payments disequilibrium. 
Another criticism was made by the other authors who argued that labor mo-
bility tended to be limited by the costs of migration and barriers of entry at the 
inter-industrial levels. Moreover, even if labor is mobile between member coun-
tries of a currency area, it must be mobile at the inter-industrial level. Lanyi 
(1969) has argued that the latter mobility is normally hindered by the downward 
rigidity of money wages, which must fall for firms so as to induce them to hire 
additional labor. In addition, one may argue that the reallocation of resources 
from the production of the commodity for which demand has declined depends on 
the adaptability of these resources to the production of the same commodity in 
the other country. 
Another criterion upon which countries may join to form a currency union was 
proposed by McKinnon (1963). A small, open economy, defined according to the 
proportion of tradable goods to total output, is likely to suffer from fluctuations in 
the domestic price of tradables, i f it adopts flexible exchange rates, in McKinnon's 
view. Furthermore, since the share of tradables is large in the domestic price index 
for most small open economies, domestic prices are expected to fluctuate. This 
will make the return on holding domestic currency uncertain and economic agents 
may substitute foreign currencies for the domestic currency. To some extent such 
currency substitution may produce further uncertainty. I t is mainly for this reason 
that countries which are small and open, in the economic sense, are likely to avoid 
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such undermining of the domestic currencies and fluctuations in domestic prices 
by joining a major currency. 
It is worth noting that, implicitly, McKinnon assumed that foreign currencies 
provide a stable alternative in terms of their relative values. Ishiyama (1975) 
argued that there is no evidence to support the assumption of stability in the 
exchange rates amongst the large trading countries in the world. Thus, even if the 
domestic currency is defined in terms of a major currency, it is very likely that 
fluctuations in the exchange rates between the domestic currency and the other 
trading partners would remain volatile ( though this may be minimized in the case 
of a basket peg as we shall see in a later section ). 
A third criterion was proposed by Kenen (1969), where he argued that a low 
degree of product diversification provides an incentive for forming a currency area. 
Countries which have concentrated trade both in terms of commodities and ge-
ography, where their economies are likely to be affected more than the diversified 
economies by exchange rates fluctuations, constitute an optimum currency area(s). 
For example, consider an economy which is diversified in terms of its imports and 
another which is not diversified. A shock originating in the external market will 
have a smaller impact on the more diversified economy, since, on average, the 
components of the domestic price index tend to rise for some goods while declin-
ing for others ( diversified source of imports ). Thus, the exchange rates do not 
need to vary to be able to accommodate the external shock. However, for the 
less diversified country, the same shock would have a greater impact on domestic 
prices and employment. Consequently, there will be greater exchange rate changes 
required to correct for the shock in the latter country. In this case, creating a cur-
rency area with respect to the currency of the trading country with winch trade is 
concentrated may diminish the severity of the shock on the domestic economy. 
A final criterion rests on the fact that similarities of macroeconomic objectives 
amongst countries tend to facilitate and encourage the creation of optimum cur-
rency areas ( Haberler 1970, Fleming 1971 ). Since such unions imply surrender 
22 
of an independent monetary policy, similarity of macroeconomic conditions and 
objectives, which raises doubts about the independence of monetary policy, en-
courages countries to enter a currency union. One may argue in addition that 
countries which face similar economic shocks have a tendency to eliminate an 
additional source of shocks, namely variations in exchange rates, thus pooling re-
sources to encounter the common shocks. For example, if country A and country 
B view variability of their currencies vis-a-vis a third currency as excessive, and 
both economies aim at reducing this variability, then a joint resistance may reduce 
the impact of the third currency on their individual currencies. One may argue 
that this has been one of the objectives of the European Monetary System (EMS), 
primarily against the dollar. 
Although the theory of optimum currency areas presents a theoretical frame-
work which may be adopted to determine the desirability of a country joining a 
currency area, it is left to that country to weigh the benefits and costs associated 
with such a decision ( Ishiyama 1975 ). The benefits side includes the elimina-
tion of exchange rate transaction costs ( these costs are not eliminated even under 
fixed exchange rates ) associated with converting currencies, and the elimination 
of speculative capital flows ( based on expected changes in the exchange rates ). 
One may argue that, for countries with limited markets, a monetary union may 
enhance the prospect of large scale industries which are encouraged by the open-
ing of markets. For example, for the Gulf Cooperation Council member states, a 
fixed currency_area with capital mobility has the potential to make many types of 
industries profitable, assuming that these industries require large demand. 
Moreover, Williamson (1974) argued that monetary integration is likely to ac-
celerate fiscal policy integration, thus moving the concerned economies toward 
economic integration. Corden (1972) maintained that a complete exchange rate 
union where there is complete pooling of foreign exchange reserves and a major 
role for a union central bank, requires coordination of both monetary and fiscal 
policies. Corden wrote: 
A common foreign-exchange pool makes an exchange-rate union pos-
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sible technically. But, in the absence of further measures, it does not 
make it practical. If each country conducted its own monetary pol-
icy, and hence could engage in as much domestic credit creation as it 
wished, surplus countries would be financing deficit countries without 
any incentives for the deficit countries to restore equilibrium. If one 
country ran a large deficit, the common exchange rate would depreci-
ate, but this might put other countries into surplus. If wage rates were 
rising in the member countries at different rates, while productivity 
growth did not differ in such a way as to offset the effects on relative 
prices, those countries with the smaller inflation of wage rates would 
be permanently financing other countries7. 
On the costs side, as mentioned above, there will be a loss of independence in 
monetary policy and the monetary authorities will lose another instrument that 
may affect the internal market, namely the exchange rate. For example, an in-
crease in the rate of growth of the money supply in a member country will involve 
a reduction in the interest rate, so that money market clears, leading to a capital 
outflow. This will result in a subsequent reduction in the money supply ( defined 
as the sum of domestic credit and international reserves ) and eliminate the ef-
fectiveness of the initial change in money supply. Another cost associated with 
a currency area is referred to by Johnson (1971), Hirsh (1972-a), Hirsh (1972-b) 
and Williamson (1973), among others. It is argued that since capital can move 
freely between countries, it is~pdssible"that some regions will prosper whilst others 
stagnate. I t seems that for this factor to have a potential effect, mobility of labor 
or the desire for mobility must be limited in the long run. However, if both labor 
and capital are mobile and there are incentives to reallocate to depressed regions 
or countries, it may be possible to overcome this problem, particularly in the long 
run. 
As 1992 is approached, the European Monetary System has emerged as a cur-
7 W . M. Corden, Monetary Integration. Essay in International Finance, no. 93 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, April 1972), p. 5-6. 
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rency area with a degree of co-ordination in monetary policies and where factors 
of production will be free to move amongst the participating countries. To some 
extent, the trade-off between unemployment and inflation has received a similar 
attention by all participating members ( especially those who participate in the 
Exchange Rates Mechanism, ERM ). However, as of October 1989, there have 
been 12 changes ( realignments ) in the exchange rates amongst the participating 
members in this exchange rates mechanism, raising the possibility noted by Bird 
earlier that even fixed exchange rates amongst a number of currencies may prove 
to be responsive to changes. Accordingly, even the creation of currency areas does 
not preclude fluctuations in exchange rates, although the evidence shows that it 
has minimized these fluctuations8. 
Currency areas of the kind established in Europe have not appealed to most 
developing countries. This may be attributed to the divergence in the policy 
objectives or simply to their rejection on the basis of political sovereignty. At least 
the latter argument has been central to the issue of potential monetary unification 
of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council9. However, many developing 
countries have chosen to peg their currencies in terms of either a single currency 
or a basket of currencies, aiming at achieving similar objectives to those hoped for 
in the optimum currency area. 
I I . 6 . Pegged Exchange Rates 
The uncertainty which surrounded the international financial community after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system has provided smaller countries with two 
major alternatives. One is to adopt the newly emerging floating exchange rate 
scheme. The second is to fix the value of their respective currencies in terms of a 
major world currency, or a basket of currencies. Central banks play a prominent 
8Policy Coordination in the European Monetary System. IMF Occasional Paper, no. 61 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, September 1988). 
9Personal interview with Abdel-Malik Al-Hamer, Governor, Central Bank of the United Arab 
Emirates, Abu-Dhabi, 3 March 1990. 
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role when a pegged exchange regime is adopted. Compare the situations depicted 
in the next three figures. Figure (1) depicts an equilibrium at the fixed exchange 
rate E*, with the demand for and the supply of foreign exchange reflected by Di 
and Si, respectively. Assume that demand has increased to a new level, D2, thus 
resulting in an excess demand for foreign exchange at the fixed exchange rate, E", 
which equals the distance X± — X2. This excess demand must be fulfilled by either 
the domestic central bank or the foreign banks, so as to maintain the exchange 
rate at its initial point. Note that market forces tend to raise the relative value of 
the foreign currency, i.e. pressure is put on the domestic currency, h, to depreciate 
relative the foreign currency, f. I t may very well be the case that, although the 
equilibrium exchange rate is moving over time, the authorities maintain the initial 
rate, thus forcing them to intervene frequently in the foreign exchange market. 
Figure (2) shows the role of the central bank in the case where the equilibrium 
exchange rate is lower than the rate at which the domestic currency is fixed in 
terms of a foreign currency. At E\ there is an excess supply of foreign exchange 
and there is a tendency toward the equilibrium exchange rate, E". However, the 
authorities stand ready to exchange the overvalued foreign currency in terms of the 
undervalued domestic currency. Thus there is intervention in the foreign exchange 
market by supplying the excess foreign exchange, X2 — Xz, with the aim of keeping 
the domestic currency undervalued. Alternatively, had the market forces been 
allowed to operate freely, the exchange rate would have moved to the equilibrium 
rate, E*y leading to an-appreciation in-the domestic currency. 
Figure (3) depicts a situation in which the equilibrium exchange rate, E*, is 
higher than the rate fixed by the authorities, E\. At this fixed rate, there is an 
excess demand for foreign exchange, X2 — X$. Indeed, had the exchange rate been 
allowed to emerge as a market outcome, the domestic currency, h, will depreciate 
vis-a-vis the foreign currency, f and market forces will yield an equilibrium exchange 
rate at E". 
As can be seen from these situations, maintenance of a fixed exchange rate will 
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Q u a n t i t y of X 
f o r e i g n exchange 
F i g u r e ( 1 ) : Pegged exchange r a t e w i t h e x c e s s demand 
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Q u a n t i t y of X X 
f o r e i g n exchange 
F i g u r e ( 2 ) : Pegged exchange r a t e w i t h underva lued domest ic c u r r e n c y 
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Q u a n t i t y of X 
f o r e i g n exchange 
F i g u r e ( 3 ) : Pegged exchange r a t e w i t h o v e r v a l u e d domest ic c u r r e n c y 
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require holding international reserves to allow intervention in the foreign exchange 
market, when required. However, an obstacle may obstruct the authorities in their 
attempt to determine the size of the differences between the equilibrium and the 
fixed exchange rates. A means of avoiding frequent intervention is to allow for 
bands around the exchange rates. 
In spite of its shortcomings, many central banks in the modern world adopt 
a fixed exchange rate target, although the degree of rigidity of the exchange rate 
and the level of intervention may vary. Indeed, an overwhelming majority of them 
choose to adopt a new fixed value relative to another currency ( or a basket of 
currencies ), or to maintain the relative value of the currencies in terms of the U.S. 
dollar. For example, the number of countries which had adopted a single currency 
peg regime as of October 31, 1978, according to the International Monetary Fund, 
was 64, 41 of whom pegged to the dollar, while 18 countries adopted customized 
baskets10. However, there seems to be a movement away from a single currency 
peg and a rise in the number of customized basket peggers. According to the IMF, 
as of 30 September 1989, 33 countries were pegged to the dollar, with an additional 
4 showing limited flexibility vis-a-vis the dollar, out of the total 52 countries which 
pegged their currencies to a single currency. On the other hand, 32 countries 
pegged their currencies to a customized basket of currencies, with only 7 countries 
pegged to the Special Drawing Rights ( SDR ), compared to 13 countries in 197811. 
A theoretical review of the issue of currency pegging will be presented in Chap-
ter I I I . This will be followed by a similar presentation of the currency denomination 
of contracts, in Chapter IV. The methodology to be adopted in choosing an opti-
mal currency invoicing for oil is outlined in Chapter V. An empirical estimation 
of the model is provided in Chapter V I . Chapter V I I concludes the main body of 
the thesis, with concluding remarks as well as recommendations. 
10International Financial Statistics, vol. 31, no. 12 (December 1978), p. 11. 
1 1 International Financial Statistics, vol. 43, no. 2 (February 1990), p. 22. 
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I I L Review of the Literature of the Opt imal Currency 
Peg 
Following a decision by a developing country to peg its currency to either a 
single currency or a basket of currencies, a choice of peg has to be made. For a 
basket peg, both the number of currencies and their relevant weights have to be 
selected. The choice of either alternative tends to be closely associated with the 
criteria a choice of a peg is expected to satisfy. Defined as welfare index, or welfare 
function, such criteria may include, stability of domestic income, minimization 
of instability in terms of trade, stabilization of the trade balance or the domestic 
allocation of resources, stability in monetary policy, minimization of the variability 
of inflation rates and the distribution of income. 
I I I . l . Nature of the Currency Peg 
Subsequent to the collapse of the Bretton Woods and the Smithsonian agreements, 
many developing countries adopted the strategy of fixing the value of their individ-
ual currencies to that of a major currency of an industrial country, or, alternatively, 
to a basket of currencies. The decision of these countries to peg their currencies 
may be justified on the following grounds. Black ( 1976 ) argued that most de-
veloping countries lack a developed and integrated financial market, which is a 
prerequisite for an efficient floating exchange rate regime. Moreover, the small 
size of the financial markets that exist in many developing countries implies that 
fewer traders in foreign exchange would be willing to hold the currency of a small 
country, since investment opportunities would be small as well. Thus, a peg to a 
major currency would expand the investment opportunities available to investors 
and provide the confidence that is required to induce them to hold that currency. 
Klein and Melvin ( 1982 ) examined the importance of confidence in money and 
argued that confidence, which is built only over time, is an essential inducement 
for economic agents to hold a currency. On the one hand, consumers gain confi-
dence in a currency by measuring its real purchasing power over time, and tend 
to avoid currencies which have the habit of frequent fluctuations. On the other 
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hand, once consumer confidence is shattered, the ability of the government to gen-
erate seigniorage may be lost, because the public would decline to hold the issued 
currency. 
Furthermore, Mundell (1973) argued that a peg would induce a domestic coun-
t ry to hold international reserves, which may be used to affect the internal market. 
This implies that the central government can expand domestic credit or contract i t , 
and increase aggregate demand or even reduce i t , using reserves accumulated via 
pegging the domestic currency. Real economic shocks at home, such as a harvest 
failure or strikes, can cause a loss of real income. A government may react to this 
potential loss by stimulating domestic demand, a policy which may be fulf i l led by 
an expansion of domestic credit. Although the authorities would be under no con-
straint to expand the domestic credit, i f a flexible exchange rate system is assumed, 
the relative value of the domestic currency in terms of the foreign currencies may 
fal l , thus resulting in a depreciation of the former currency. I n contrast, under a 
fixed or a pegged exchange rate regime, the holdings of international reserves can 
be used for some time to cushion the expansion in the domestic credit, thus easing 
the pressure of depreciation on the domestic currency. 
On more general grounds, Crockett and Nsouli (1977), B i rd (1979) and Lip-
schitz and Sundararajan (1980), argued that there are real costs associated w i t h 
fluctuations in the exchange markets, which may be undesirable for the small 
economies of the developing countries. Such fluctuations may induce capital out-
flow and create uncertainty in the domestic currency and the economy. Once 
uncertainty is embodied in the domestic currency ( the confidence argument ) , 
economic agents would seek a way out of holding that currency by substituting 
stronger currencies for i t . To counter these consequences, therefore, a peg to a 
major currency or a basket of currencies is expected to have beneficial effects for 
developing countries. 
Crockett and Nsouli (1977) argued that the greater the stability of the exchange 
rate of a currency w i t h respect to a numeraire, the greater the level of trade in 
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that currency, because the demand for the exports of developing countries would 
be more stable. Moreover, a rise in the production of exported goods should lead 
to an increase in capital inflow. In addition, a peg is seen to shield the domes-
tic economy f rom shocks to the price level caused by exchange rate fluctuations. 
Thus, i f most trade is concentrated w i t h a particular trading partner, a peg to the 
currency of that country would provide the required protection. I t seems that this 
argument is important, because unless developing countries peg their currencies 
to a major trading partner or partners, the exchange rate wi l l transmit inflation. 
This may be caused by exchange rate changes and affect their domestic economies 
via trade, although real price shocks w i l l be transmitted whatever the exchange 
rate arrangements. I t may indeed be argued that economies which depend heavily 
on trade are more vulnerable to import ing inflat ion that originated in the coun-
tries of the trading partners. McKinnon (1963) has argued that the variability of a 
floating exchange rate may cause fluctuations i n the price of traded goods wi th in 
a country, i f the country under consideration is a price taker. Consequently, the 
domestic monetary authorities would be able to affect only the price of non-traded 
goods, while the prices of traded goods would be exogenously determined. 
Given these factors, which may contribute to the decision of a small developing 
country to peg its currency, the choice of the appropriate peg is not clear cut. In 
what follows, a discussion of the available possibilities is provided. 
I I I . 2 . T y p e s o f C u r r e n c y Pegs 
Af te r a decision to peg the domestic currency of a developing country is taken, a 
choice between a single currency peg and pegging to a basket of currencies must 
be made. A single currency peg is adopted i f the domestic currency price of one 
other currency is fixed at some value. On the other hand, fixing the value of the 
domestic currency in terms of a weighted sum of more than one currency, is known 
as a basket peg ( see Appendix I I I . A at the end of the present chapter for the 
technical aspects of a single peg and a basket peg ). 
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The choice of the currency to which the domestic currency is to be pegged, 
for a single currency peg, may be based on trade related arguments or historical 
links. In relation to trade, the domestic currency may be pegged to the currency 
in which most of the its trade is denominated. This may refer to the volume of 
imports or exports which is denominated in that currency, or to the total trade. 
Alternatively, the choice may be based on the percentage of trade conducted w i t h 
a country. According to this argument, the domestic currency would be pegged 
to the currency of the country w i t h which the domestic country trades the most. 
Some analysts ( for example, Connolly 1983 ) have argued that a choice of peg 
may be based on historical links between any two currencies. Thus, for example, i f 
the domestic currency had been pegged to the dollar for a long time, a breakdown 
of this relationship may destroy confidence in the domestic currency. 
However, i f a basket peg is chosen, more issues require consideration before the 
choice is implemented. Eventually, the number of currencies and which currencies 
would be included in the basket have to be defined on some basis. Furthermore, 
the weight assigned to each currency must be determined. 
I t has been argued that the weighting scheme of the basket may reflect trade 
patterns, where the currencies of most trading partners would be included, and 
weighted according to the percentage of trade conducted w i t h each partner. Alter-
natively, the trade weights may reflect the percentage of trade denominated in each 
currency. Like the single currency peg, the basket of currencies peg may utilize 
import shares, export shares or total trade shares as its weights. 
The choice of the currencies and their respective weights in the basket may be 
defined in terms of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) weighting scheme, or the 
European Currency Uni t (ECU) weighting scheme. In both cases, the weights and 
the included currencies are predetermined wi th no consideration of the trading 
pattern of the domestic country. 
Accordingly, a single currency peg may be defined as ( change in logarithm is 
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represented by lower case letters ): 
where 
eh/i — percentage change in the price of country i's currency in terms of the do-
mestic currency h ( denned as: 1 0 0 [ l n ( E ^ J / ^ y i 1 ] , where t refers to time ). 
Thus, i f the domestic currency is pegged to currency i , then there would be no 
change in the exchange rate between the domestic currency and currency i . How-
ever, the domestic currency w i l l float against all other currencies which are not 
pegged to currency i . For example, consider the case where the domestic currency, 
h, is pegged to the currency of country 1, where 
Ehn = 4.00 
Meanwhile the relative value of the currency of country 2 in terms of that of coun-
t r y 1, is given by 
Ex,2 = 2.00 
which implies that 
_. . Eh/2 = 8.00. 
I t follows then that i f the authorities in the domestic country peg currency h rigidly 
to currency 1, there w i l l be no change in the exchange rate between the domestic 
currency and currency 1. I f we assume that currency 1 has appreciated vis-a-vis 
currency 2 by 50 percent, then as a result of the peg, the domestic currency must 
appreciate by 50 percent vis-a-vis currency 2, so as to keep the exchange rate 
between the domestic currency and currency 1 fixed. A n appreciation by a smaller 
or a larger rate w i l l violate the peg condition ( see Appendix I I I . A at the end of 
this chapter for further discussion of this mechanism ). 
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On the other hand, a basket peg may be represented by: 
Oiieh/x + a 2 e h / 2 + a 3 e k / 3 + (- a n e h / n = 0 
where 
a,- = weights assigned to each currency in the basket, i = 1, 2, 3,.. . , n 
eh/i = percentage change in the domestic currency price of currency i , where i = 
1, 2, 3, . . . , n. 
The value of the basket in terms of the domestic currency may be expressed 
as: 
Vh = N^Eh/i) + N2(Eh/2) + N3(Eh/3) + ••• + Nn(Eh/n) 
where 
Ni = number of units of currency i included in the basket, where i = 1, 2, 3 , . . . , n 
Eh/i = the domestic currency price of currency i 
Ni = ai(Vi) 
V{ = the basket value i n terms of currency i . 
Since the number of units of any currency that is included in the basket is 
constant, the exchange rate e^/i would have to be adjusted i f the exchange rate 
between any two currencies that are included in the basket changes, so as to keep 
Vh constant. To illustrate this point, consider a domestic currency which is pegged 
to a trade-weighted basket of three of its trading partners, call them countries 1, 
2, and 3. Assume that the in i t ia l situation which is reported in Table (1) prevails 
at t ime t. 
Where 
Wi = weight of currency i in the basket 
Eh/% — the exchange rate between currency h and currency i , defined as units of h 
per unit of i 
Ni = number of units of currency i included in the basket 
TV/1 = value of the number of units of currency i in terms of currency h. 
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Currency N, Eh/i N,h W> 
1 0.360 0.4975 0.1791 0.1791 
2 0.400 0.5624 0.2250 0.2250 
3 0.845 0.7052 0.5959 0.5959 
Table 1: Configuration of the basket at the in i t ia l time 
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Using the definition of provided earlier, i t may be shown that the value of 
the basket in terms of the domestic currency is unity ( see Appendix I I I . A at the 
end of the present chapter for a detailed derivation of this ). 
Then, at a later time, assume that currency 1 had appreciated by 20 percent 
and 40 percent vis-a-vis currencies 2 and 3, respectively. This w i l l result i n changes 
amongst the exchange rates of these trading partners and consequent impacts on 
the exchange rates between the domestic currency and each of its trading part-
ners. Therefore, since the domestic currency is pegged partially to each individual 
currency, the appreciation of currency 1 vis-a-vis currency 2 would result in an 
appreciation of the domestic currency vis-a-vis currency 2 by 14^(0.20), and vis-
a-vis currency 3 by Wi(0.40). However, since the domestic currency is pegged 
to currencies 2 and 3, which have depreciated vis-a-vis currency 1, the domestic 
currency w i l l depreciate vis-a-vis this currency by a total of 
W 2 (0.20) + W 3 (0.40) . 
Thus, as demonstrated in Appendix I I I . A, the value of the basket in terms of the 
domestic currency wi l l be unaffected. 
Given these alternative currency pegs, the literature has developed several in-
dices upon which the performance of a peg may be judged. These constitute an 
essential part of the analysis, because a peg was adopted in the first place to meet 
a particular target set by the authorities in the domestic country. 
III .3. Choice of Welfare Function 
There appears to be no general consensus in the economic discipline on the appro-
priate choice of criterion upon which a currency peg scheme would be chosen. 
Black (1976) considered the optimal currency peg policy available to Less De-
veloped Countries ( LDC's ) w i th the assumption of the adoption of a floating 
exchange rate regime by developed countries, and argued that stabilization of the 
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relative price of tradable goods ( the ratio of the price of traded goods to non-
traded goods ) is the appropriate target of a peg. In general, developing countries 
are price takers for their imports and exports and accordingly they have l i t t le 
market power to affect the relative price of their tradable goods. Assuming that 
the domestic currency is pegged to a basket of currencies, this would imply that 
the prices of imports and exports may fluctuate as a result of either a real price 
shock to these goods, or because of changes in the exchange rates amongst the 
domestic country's trading partners. A peg to a trade weighted basket, in which 
the weights used are those derived f rom the definition of the effective exchange 
rate, EER ( nominal exchange rates weighted by trade shares wi th each country ) , 
may minimize fluctuations in the relative domestic price of tradable goods i f these 
fluctuations originate f rom changes in exchange rates amongst the trading partners 
of the domestic country. However, changes i n world prices of tradable goods that 
are not a result of changes in exchange rates, i.e. real price shocks, wi l l be passed 
through to the domestic economy, even i f the domestic currency is pegged to a 
basket of currencies uti l izing the EER weights ( reflecting trade in goods as well 
as services ). 
A broader welfare function was proposed by Flanders and Helpman (1979), who 
argued that for a small developing country, the relevant objective function should 
include minimization of instability in both its balance of trade and the level of 
real income. The rationale behind this stems from the fact that changes in the 
exchange rates amongst the-trading partners of the domestic country may exert an 
influence on the domestic balance of trade, through the effects of terms of trade. 
Defined as the ratio of the price of exports to the price of imports, a lower price of 
exports would worsen the terms of trade, although improving the trade balance, 
and domestic welfare would be lost due to the fact that more exports have to be 
exchanged for the same amount of imports. Exchange rate changes may affect the 
domestic cost of imports and exports, thus affecting the level of real income. 
Branson and Kasteli-Papafstratiou (1980) set up a model in which they argued 
that the welfare funct ion should be based on reducing variations in the terms of 
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trade. The argument states that terms of trade have an influence on the deter-
mination of domestic income since they are related to the world market price of 
the domestic country's exports and imports, the domestic country's price of its 
exports and imports and exchange rate fluctuations. 
Addressing the issue of the opt imum currency peg in a monetary framework, 
Connolly (1982, 1983) and Connolly and Yousef (1982) argued that an appropriate 
welfare index would be the minimization of the variance in the imported component 
of the domestic rate of inflation. This is chosen because of the potential undesirable 
effects which instabili ty in the imported component of the domestic price level may 
have on the domestic economy. ( This issue is explored further in Chapter V . ) 
A macroeconomic model was constructed by Turnovsky (1982), who assumed 
stabilization of domestic real income to be the relevant welfare criterion. 
Lipschitz (1979) suggested stability i n the real effective exchange rate to be 
the appropriate welfare function. The reasoning behind this choice is derived f rom 
the effects of fluctuations in the real effective exchange rate ( EER deflated by 
a price index ) on domestic relative prices, the real value of assets, investments, 
production, imports and exports. Furthermore, such fluctuations have impacts 
on the domestic pattern of resource allocation and consequently on the internal 
distr ibution of income. 
A n extended version of the previous model was presented by Lipschitz and 
Sundararajan (1980), i n which they-considered minimizing the variance in the real 
effective exchange rate, subject to keeping the equilibrium value of this exchange 
rate wi th in some defined range. 
Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1982) specified a welfare function of a peg to 
include trade related variables, such as stabilization of terms of trade or balance 
of trade. 
Bhandari (1985-a) assumed the authorities in developing countries to be inter-
ested in minimizing the instabili ty in the real effective exchange rate and income. I n 
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a subsequent analysis of the choice of the optimal currency peg, Bhandari (1985-b) 
derived empirically simulated conclusions, based on the assumption that a welfare 
index was to include minimization of the variance of the domestic output around 
its expected value, minimization of the variance of the domestic output around 
its ful l- information level, minimization of the variabili ty in the domestic money 
supply and minimization of the variance of the real effective exchange rate. 
III.4. Analysis of Reviewed Models 
Before we proceed to examine the relevant literature, and since stability of the 
price level is either explicitly or impl ic i t ly targeted in several studies, i t would 
seem a suitable point at which to consider. 
Stiglitz (1972) has shown that i f the principle of diminishing marginal u t i l i ty 
of income holds, then we would expect individuals to attach less value ( u t i l i ty in 
money terms ) to increases in income due to favorable price outcomes than to losses 
in income due to unfavorable outcomes. Accordingly, i f we assume consumers to 
be averse to risks, then they would favor small variances in prices as long as the 
cost associated wi th their behavior of seeking such a reduction does not exceed 
the expected benefits f rom the reduction. Similarly, f rom a firm's point of view, 
Sandmo (1971) has demonstrated that i f prices follow a random process, then 
firms are expected to produce less output than they would produce when prices 
are less variable. Thus, higher variances are expected to Jiave negative effects on 
production compared to smaller variances. However, i f this reaction to uncertainty 
is considered across the economy, i t is evident that stabili ty in prices is both 
desirable and a target which governments do pursue. 
Building upon this argument, Black (1976) argued that the appropriate welfare 
index is stability in the relative domestic price of traded goods. This ratio of 
traded to nontraded goods is affected by internal factors, that affect the price of 
nontraded goods, and by external forces that work through the price of traded 
goods. Although the first may be manageable by the domestic government, i t 
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is the stability of the latter which is diff icult for small developing countries to 
control. Indeed, in order to diminish the potentially undesirable negative effects 
of fluctuations in the price of traded goods, a small developing country would be 
better off pegging its currency to a trade-weighted basket in which the weights are 
those of the EER. Consequently, a stabilization of the effective exchange rate should 
diminish the variability in the relative domestic price of tradables. Furthermore, 
Black argued that a peg to the SDR would prove to be optimal in the present 
context only i f the weights of the currencies included in the SDR approximate 
those in the EER. 
Dynamically, the domestic country's trade patterns may vary, and there may 
be prolonged deviations between the rates of inflation in the domestic country and 
those of its trading partners. Black supported the view that the value of the peg 
may be adjusted so as to neutralize the inflat ion differentials and to promote the 
competitiveness of the domestic country. 
In general, Black favored a basket peg rather than a single currency peg, be-
cause, according to the author, a basket peg is more efficient in insulating the 
domestic economy f rom external shocks. Also the choice of which single currency 
to adopt is not always clear. However, for a single currency peg, both the vari-
ance of the candidate currency and its covariances w i t h the currencies of the other 
countries w i t h whom the domestic country trades should be considered. Assume 
that the chosen currency to which the domestic currency is to be pegged has a 
low variance relative to the other potential currencies and that i t is negatively 
correlated to their variance. Then the choice could not be optimal, because, al-
though its variance is low, i t tends to fluctuate more when fluctuations in the 
other currencies are diminishing. Thus, the total variation is higher. On the other 
hand, when the currencies of the other trading partners experience higher levels 
of variation, the chosen currency would fluctuate less. But , i f they were positively 
correlated, then the chosen currency, w i t h its low individual variance, would be a 
superior choice. Note that the relativity of the covariance terms depends on the 
trade shares w i t h each of the trading partners. To see this, assume the extreme 
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case where the domestic currency trades solely wi th one trading partner. Then i f 
i t pegs to the currency of that partner, covariations between other currencies in 
the system and that of the trading partner are irrelevant to the domestic country. 
Black argued that these complications do not point to the adoption of a single 
currency peg. 
However, the ultimate choice should be considered and evaluated according to 
its potential costs and benefits. Costs such as reserve holdings, basket manage-
ment, communication and dealing in foreign exchange markets and insti tutional 
settings are important factors in the analysis. 
Constructing a more formal model, Flanders and Helpman (1979), argued that 
the relevant criteria upon which a peg is chosen includes both stability of balance 
of trade and the level of real income. That is, i n the first case the aim of the 
domestic policy is to minimize variabili ty i n the balance of trade, which may arise 
due to fluctuations in exchange rates amongst trading partners, or to keep vari-
abil i ty below some upper value. In the second case, the variance of real income is 
minimized whenever this variance is kept around a particular expected value. 
The authors favored a basket peg in which elasticity weights are utilized. How-
ever, i f the objective is to improve the trade balance, then greater weight should 
be assigned to currencies that are expected to depreciate than to those that are ex-
pected to appreciate. Assume the domestic country trades w i t h country B, whose 
currency has depreciated, then domestic terms of trade w i l l jmproye, worsening the 
domestic balance of trade. Consequently, the domestic country would be better 
off f rom the point of view of the trade balance, had i t pegged to a basket in which 
currency B received more weight. This would prove to be optimal particularly i f 
the domestic country trades less w i t h country B, whereas i t competes more w i t h 
i t for other markets. 
I f the aim is to minimize variabili ty i n real income, the choice of peg depends 
on shares of import f rom trading partners, the trade multiplier and the elasticity 
of demand for domestic exports w i t h respect to prices in the currencies of the 
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trading partners. A n appreciation of the currency of a trading partner would 
reduce domestic welfare, while domestic production should be stimulated. The 
latter effect would raise the level of employment, thus improving welfare. However, 
the outcome depends crucially on the domestic country's position in the market 
compared to that of its trading partner. In summary, the greater the domestic 
economy's imports f r o m that partner and the less they compete in a th i rd market, 
the greater the likelihood there is that any improvement in domestic employment 
w i l l fa l l short of compensating for the loss in domestic welfare through deterioration 
in the terms of trade, whenever the currency of the trading partner appreciates. 
To clarify this, assume currency B has appreciated. The domestic price of imports 
would rise, leading to deterioration in the terms of trade and improvement in 
the trade balance. Nevertheless, the rise in the relative value of currency B has 
reduced welfare, and since competition wi th country B is l imited, employment 
in the domestic economy is not expected to rise, since domestic output is not a 
substitute for that produced by country B. Therefore, the domestic currency needs 
to depreciate so as to encourage domestic production and increase employment. 
According to Flanders and Helpman, this may be achieved by assigning a low 
( or even negative ) weight to currency B in the basket of currencies to which the 
domestic currency is pegged 1 2. 
To sum up, the choice of the weights in the basket depends to a large extent 
on balancing the potential loss and gain in welfare, w i th changes expected to arise 
in the employment sector. 
I n spite of the valuable contributions of the previous two models, they ap-
proached the choice of the currency peg in a less general framework than the work 
presented by Branson and Kasteli-Papaefstratiou (1980). The authors set up a 
model i n which they discussed the role of the terms of trade ( the ratio of the price 
of export to the price of import ) as a relevant and influential factor in determining 
income stability, and proceeded to show how exchange rate policy may be used to 
1 2Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980) argued that negative weights are difficult to be interpreted 
in the context of the currency composition of an optimal basket. 
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reduce variations in the terms of trade. 
The argument states that fluctuations in the terms of trade can be related to 
movements in any or all of the following: i ) the world market price of the domestic 
country's exports and imports; i i ) the domestic market's price of imports and 
exports; i i i ) exchange rate fluctuations. 
The analysis proceeds as follows. Assume a small developing country, call i t 
j , which has market power over the supply of its exports. As i t w i l l be evident, 
market power is a necessary condition for the domestic country to influence the 
terms of trade. Using some compact notations relative to those presented in the 
model, changes in terms of trade may be defined as: 
tot = p -^V + fc^a.Ji-^^A^l + ^ E ^ x , ~ 
i^j i&j i^j 
^ E ^ l ] + [ ( i - ^ ° - ( i - ^ ] 
where 
tot = percentage change in terms of trade 
k = an index of export-side market power ( as k —+ 1 ), no market power 
k1 = an index of import-side market power ( as k1 —• 1 ), no market power 
r = percentage change in the exchange rate of the numeraire ( dollar ) in terms of 
the domestic currency 
J j = percentage change in the exchange rate of the dollar per currency i 
c*i = export weights 
fa = import weights 
Ixi = percentage change in world price of country j ' s ( domestic country ) export 
= percentage change in world price of country j ' s import 
Px = percentage change in country j ' s price of export 
Pm = percentage change in country j ' s price of import . 
For simplicity, the components in the above definit ion may be broken into 
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smaller terms. Let the following represent the terms of trade equation: 
A = (k - kx)r 
c = kj2&Jt 
F = ( l - k)P? 
G = (1 - k)Pl 
Accordingly, the terms A, B and C reflect the influence of exchange rate move-
ments on terms of trade. Specifically, the term A reflects changes in the domestic 
currency price of the numeraire ( the dollar ) . The terms B and C represent the 
dollar price of currencies J. Note that i f the domestic currency is pegged to the 
dollar, then r would vanish f r o m the terms of trade equation. However, fluctu-
ations in the dollar value would have impact on the terms of trade via changes 
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in the dollar exchange rates vis-a-vis the other currencies in the system. I n the 
commodity market, the terms D and E capture the effects of shifts in export de-
mand and import supply conditions in all other i such that i j. Internal market 
disturbances and conditions are represented by the terms F and G. 
Consequently, i t may be argued that fluctuations in terms of trade may be 
reduced via a single term or all of the terms defined above. However, Branson 
and Kasteli-Papaefstratiou argued that developing countries rarely have market 
power to affect world terms of trade. Thus the terms D and E, which represent 
the impact of fluctuations in world market conditions on terms of trade, cannot 
be reduced by the domestic country. Nevertheless, developing countries are more 
likely to have market power over their exports than over their imports, Therefore 
they are expected to perform better in implementing policies in the export sector 
aiming at stabilizing terms of trade. 
Of greater interest is the abili ty of changes in the exchange rates to reduce 
variability in terms of trade. Here the relevant terms are A, B and C. Assume the 
domestic currency is to be pegged to a basket of currencies and let the weights 




wi = weight of currencies in the basket. 
Assume also that the sum of movements in the exchange rate of the domestic 
currency price of the other currencies is zero ( i.e. a basket peg holds ). Some 
obvious possibilities for these weights are import and export shares, and Pi, 
respectively. In summary, using export weights would reduce the terms A, B and 
C to: 
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Adoption of an import weighting alternative would reduce the same terms to: 
If one assumes that the domestic country has market power in its export sector, 
then k is expected to be less than k1. Then a peg to a basket in which weights 
correspond to import shares is expected to reduce fluctuations in terms of trade. 
This is seen from the fact that: 
[kT,(<*i-A)Ji]<lklY,(<xi-&)*]• 
This implies that the domestic currency should be pegged to a basket in which the 
weights used are those of the sector in which it has the smallest market power, if 
stabilization of terms of trade is the objective. To derive the optimal set of weights, 
Wi, assume that the g£i>9mi)P2 a n d Pm a r e constant. Then terms of trade may be 
expressed as: 
tot = ^[{k1 - k)Wi + kat - /fc1/?,] J , . 
Then, solving for the set of exchange rate weights Wi that would eliminate the 
effect of exchange rates on the terms of trade, i.e. minimizing the above equation 
with respect to J , , yields: 
^ [ ( f c 1 - k)wi + kcti - k1^} = 0. 
Solving for Wi implies 
w, = [ k a i - k ^ M l k - k 1 ] . 
Since X > , = £ / 3 , = 1, then = 1. 
Note that, according to the present analysis, there is no prior restriction on the 
value of an individual W{. For example, if the domestic country is assumed to have 
48 
market power in its exports, then k < 1 and k1 — 1; the optimal weighting scheme 
will reduce to: 
Wi = (A - (*ik)/(I - k) 
where currencies of those countries with whom the domestic economy engages in 
large scale of trade, i.e. a; is large, may be assigned negative weights. 
Although this latter model addresses the basket peg issue when the domestic 
country has market power, the next model assumes that developing countries are 
small and their economies are characterized by a lack of market power. Connolly 
(1982) constructed a partial equilibrium model for a small open economy in which 
attention is directed toward a monetary framework. 
The explicit aim of the model is to provide answers to two questions. Firstly, to 
which currency should a given small economy peg its currency, and secondly, is a 
basket peg superior to a single peg ? The analysis was performed on the assumption 
that the welfare function of a peg is to minimize the imported component of the 
domestic inflation rate. Wickham (1985), in considering the rate of imported 
inflation as a criterion wrote: 
It can, however, be argued that if the average externally given inflation 
rate is significantly positive and variable, a domestic target for a lower 
and more stable inflation rate is likely to be regarded as a legitimate 
objective of policy 1 3. ~ ~ 
Connolly argued that pegging the domestic currency to the single currency of 
one of its trading partners will not insulate the domestic inflation rate from price 
fluctuations that are passed through the exchange rates from all of its trading 
partners. For example, assume the domestic country trades with the U.S. and 
the U.K. , whilst its currency is pegged to the dollar. Then, two major sources of 
disturbance can affect the domestic price level. Firstly, the inflation rate in the 
1 3 P e t e r Wickham, " The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime in Developing Countries," IMF 
Staff Papers, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 1985), p. 262-263. 
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U.S. and secondly, deviations in purchasing power parity caused by differentials in 
inflation rates in the U.S. and the U.K. 
Thus, with this approach a peg must be chosen according to its contribution 
to the variance of the domestic rate of inflation, which in turn is affected by the 
variability in the purchasing power parity relationship. Rather than a single peg, 
the domestic country may peg its currency to a weighted basket of currencies 
of its trading partners. In this case it would import an average of the change 
experienced in the price levels in those countries. It is expected that deviations in 
the purchasing power parity would have, as random variables, an expected value 
of zero. 
An empirical application of this theoretical model was conducted by Connolly 
and Yousef (1982) and by Connolly (1983). In the latter case, Connolly utilized 
data from Latin American countries and found a single currency peg to the dollar 
to be optimal for most countries. Based on historical examination of variability 
in their domestic rates of inflation, it was reported that countries which pegged 
to the dollar experienced lower and more stable rates than those which pegged 
to an alternative arrangement. Several arguments were put forward for favoring 
a dollar peg. Firstly, a dollar peg would promote confidence in local currencies, 
where this confidence was built over a long time and had a psychological value 
attached to it. Simply, according to Connolly, individuals in those countries view 
the dollar as the " best " currency and thus tend to denominate trade and conduct 
financial transactions in dollars. Secondly, a dollar peg would restrain domestic 
money growth ( which is closely related to the price level in a monetary model ), 
although this characteristic is not unique to the dollar. Thirdly, a dollar peg would, 
ultimately, overcome competitive devaluation amongst the Latin American coun-
tries, which may arise if different pegs were adopted by them. Fourthly, economic 
downturns may be of less consequences if domestic economies have dollar reserves, 
which consequently may be used to promote economic growth during recessions. 
The empirical results of the fitted data satisfied Connolly that a dollar peg 
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is optimal. Furthermore, the results have strengthened the significant role trade 
patterns played in the stability of the domestic inflation rate. For example, the 
German mark was found to be a better peg than the dollar for Latin American 
countries which traded with Germany more than the U.S. Connolly also considered 
trade-weighted and SDR-weighted basket pegs. The results favored trade-weighted 
baskets. However, Connolly warned that abandoning the dollar peg may destroy 
consumers' confidence in the domestic currencies, may undermine the domestic 
currencies and may lead to currency substitution and capital outflow. 
Further testing of Connolly's model was conducted by Connolly and Yousef 
(1982). Using data for Arab countries, several conclusions may be derived from the 
results obtained in the estimation of the model. Firstly, for oil exporting countries, 
a dollar peg was optimal. Secondly, for countries with the majority of their trade 
with the U.S., a dollar peg proved optimal. Thirdly, for countries with the majority 
of their trade with France, a franc peg was optimal. Comparing basket pegs, to 
include import-weighted and total trade-weighted baskets, and the SDR-weighted 
basket, greater stability in imported inflation was achieved by adopting these pegs 
rather than a single currency peg. 
Although all models complement each others in some aspects, the previously 
discussed frameworks and findings have some common factors embodied into them. 
Among these are: a) exogenity of exchange rates for a small country compared to 
the rest of the world; b) a partial equilibrium setting; c) international capital flows 
were not allowed to play a role in the models; d) expectations of exchange rates 
were ignored; d) immobility of financial assets was assumed. 
Relaxing these assumptions to some extent, Turnovsky (1982) constructed a 
macroeconomic model in which a small country trades with other countries in 
goods and bonds. This country is assumed to be interested in stabilizing domestic 
real income. After specifying the model in an analytical framework and conducting 
some algebraic manipulations, real income is defined as: 
Yt = { j [ X t + (4 - d262 - (d\ + 4 + 6Qd2)\2)Vt\ + Zt}/D 
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where 
Yt = domestic real income 
Xt = a measure of random fluctuations in the domestic demand for domestic out-
put originating from fluctuations in foreign variables 
Vt — a measure of differential movements in foreign nominal interest rates 
Zt = a measure of disturbances of domestic origin 
D = i ( l - d 1 ) + 4 + 4 + d2(l - 6 1 - 8 2 ) > 0 
d2 = the interest elasticity of the domestic demand for domestic output 
dl3 = price elasticity of domestic demand for output in country i 
7 = 71 + 72 = elasticity of domestic output to domestic prices 
60 = (1 — 6i — <52) = elasticity of domestic overall price index ( cost of living ) to 
foreign prices of imported goods. 
From this equation, it can be inferred that as long as Vt ^ 0, then fluctua-
tions in domestic output depend upon the relative weights of currencies in the 
basket, Ai and A 2 . However random fluctuations in Yt would be independent of 
the composition of the currency basket if Vt = 0. 
Suppose this small country pegs to a basket of two currencies, then it must se-
lect the appropriate weights so that the variance of the above equation is minimized 
with respect to the weights chosen. This operation yields: 
A 2 = [{4 - d282)al + axv\l[{d\ -<% + d260)a2v] 
(note that in the case of two currencies, Aj + X2 — 1). 
Consequently, the composition of the optimal basket depends upon several fac-
tors. Firstly, the variance of the differential in foreign interest rates, <j\. Secondly, 
the covariance between the first factor and the disturbances in the demand for 
domestic output, axv. Thirdly, the effect of a change in the domestic currency 
price of currency 2 on the demand for domestic output. Fourthly, the effect of a 
simultaneous unit increase in the exchange rates between the domestic currency 
and each of its trading partners. 
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The considerable role trade shares play, as indicated by most models in this 
review, is minimized in the present model. Since trade shares were found to affect 
the optimal choice of weights through the interest rate, if demand for domestic 
output is interest inelastic, then trade shares do not affect the choice of weights. 
Furthermore, Turnovsky argued that there is no compelling reason to restrict all 
currencies included in the basket to have positive weights. This was found to 
depend greatly on the variance of the differential in interest rates amongst the 
trading partners, and on the covariance term axv. Depending on the degree of 
correlation between the price levels amongst the trading partners, it is argued 
that the domestic currency should be pegged to the currency of the country which 
experiences the least instability in its rate of inflation, if there is no correlation 
amongst their prices. However, if prices are correlated, but the correlation is not 
perfect, then a case may be presented for pegging the domestic currency more 
heavily to the currency of that trading partner which experiences greater stability 
in its inflation rate. In general, if the rate of inflation in a trading partner is less 
stable than that of another, the weight of the currency of the latter trading partner 
should be increased in the basket. Nevertheless, Turnovsky argued that if there are 
no deviations in the purchasing power parity relationship, and no random shocks 
affect the capital markets, so that Vt = 0, then the choice of the optimal weights 
is indeterminant. Accordingly, any set of weights would provide the same level of 
stability in the variance of real income. 
Since exchange rate_fluctuations can affect the purchasing power_of_money-bal-
ances, through their effect on prices, there are distributional impacts embodied 
in changes in those rates. Lipschitz (1979) proceeded by arguing that exchange 
rate changes affect relative prices which, in turn, are of significant impact on real 
variables in the domestic economy. These include real value of assets, investments, 
production, imports and exports. Explicitly, the model presented by Lipschitz 
focused on the effects of the choice of pegging policy on, firstly, the internal distri-
bution of income, and secondly, on internal relative prices. 
Indeed, exchange rate fluctuations affect the real rate of return on capital, 
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as well as real wages. Furthermore, since the internal relative price index is a 
composite of the prices of traded and nontraded goods, changes in these prices are 
expected to have an impact on domestic resource allocations. 
Consider a small developing economy for which imports and exports are in-
voiced in the currencies of its trading partners. Furthermore, assume that the do-
mestic economy consists of import, export, and import-competing sectors. Then, 
domestic real income may be affected in many ways. Consider the case where the 
domestic currency is pegged to an export-weighted basket. An appreciation in the 
currency of the country from whom the domestic economy imports would raise the 
price of its imports, while inflicting no changes in either the price of its exports or 
nontraded goods. However the domestic relative price index would rise, reducing 
the labor real wage and consequently the labor real income would decline. On the 
contrary, the rise in the domestic currency price of imports would stimulate the 
production of goods in the import-competing sector. To sum up, labor is expected 
to incur losses whilst capitalists gain. 
However, with the same appreciation, capitalists would suffer more had an 
import-weighted basket been adopted as a peg. In this case, prices of imports 
in the domestic currency would not change, while export prices would fall. As a 
result, internal terms of trade would decline, so real wages would rise, leading to a 
similar rise in labor real income. Unlike the case when the domestic currency was 
pegged to an export-weighted basket, in the present case, capitalists would incur 
losses due to both the fall in export prices and the rise in their wage bills. ~ 
More frequently, owners of resources respond to changes in relative prices, par-
ticularly, if they are assumed to behave as profit maximizers. Hence, if the argu-
ment proceeds by considering an appreciation in the relative value of the currency 
of the domestic country's exporter, then adopting an export-weighted basket would 
result in a rise in import prices. Consequently, resources would be reallocated from 
the production of nontraded goods and export- orientated plants toward import-
competing goods. By contrast, a peg to an import-weighted basket has the ten-
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dency to reallocate resources toward domestically consumed goods and away from 
exports. Nonetheless, these effects may diminish if the domestic currency is pegged 
to an average basket of both currencies. In addition, this choice tends to have no 
reallocative impact on domestic resources. 
Relative prices affect the performance of the domestic economy and its compet-
itiveness. A measure that is commonly utilized to assess the ability of an economy 
to compete in the international market is the real effective exchange rate. By 
definition, the real effective exchange rate is given by: 
REER = J2<*iEh/i(pi/ph) 
where 
cti = trade shares 
Eh/i = exchange rate between the domestic currency and those of its trading 
partners, domestic units per foreign unit 
Pi = price index in country i 
Ph = price index in the domestic country. 
Eventually, as the rates of inflation differ between the domestic country and 
its trading partners, the nominal effective exchange rates (Ek/i ) would have to 
change to maintain the same R E E R , otherwise R E E R would change. Thus, total 
variability of the real effective exchange rate is affected by changes in individual 
components' variances, that is the variance of E^/i and the variance of Pi/Ph., as 
well as by the extent to which changes in either of these are damped or exacerbated 
by changes in the other. Consider a rise in the domestic rate of inflation that is 
not offset by changes in the exchange rates. Then, the real effective exchange 
rate would appreciate ( R E E R term declines ), reducing the competitiveness of 
the domestic economy. The same would occur if the foreign price level declines. 
However, if the domestic country aims at stabilizing the real effective exchange 
rate at some desirable base value, it would be necessary to change the nominal 
exchange rates. In summary, if there is either a rise in Ph or a fall in Pi, leading 
55 
to an appreciation in R E E R , the domestic currency must be depreciated relative 
to currencies i, if R E E R is to be kept constant. Nevertheless, the opposite should 
be done if either Pf, declines or Pt rises. 
Evidently, exchange rates may have to be adjusted to new competitive rates if 
the inflation rates of the domestic economy and its trading partners differ signifi-
cantly. This would imply that it is the real effective exchange rate, R E E R , rather 
than the nominal effective exchange rate, N E E R , which it is important to stabilize. 
Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980) consider a model in which the aim is to choose 
currencies with weights in an optimal basket peg, where the objective function is 
minimization of variations in R E E R . Basically, the aim is to investigate whether 
the predetermined currency weights defined in the real effective exchange rate 
would remain optimal whenever there are relative price index changes in response 
to exchange rate fluctuations. 
Assuming the initial weights chosen for the currencies of the trading partners, 
that are defined in the definition of R E E R , are elasticity weights1 4, the analysis 
concludes that, in general, elasticity weights are not optimal. This conclusion is 
reached whenever the assumption of fixing the relative price index is relaxed, which 
has now introduced into the analysis the importance of variances and covariances 
of prices and exchange rates. 
Indeed, elasticity weights will be optimal whenever exchange rates are not 
responsive to movements in relative prices ( in the definition of the R E E R ). Since 
the aim of the policy is to minimize instability in R E E R , the best result may be 
attained by allowing the variance of the real effective exchange rate to follow that 
of the relative prices. Note that any changes in the exchange rates will raise the 
variance of the real effective exchange rate. 
Furthermore, the analysis examines the conditions under which a single cur-
rency peg may be optimal. In general, the derivation suggests that if the covariance 
1 4 T h e s e weights measure the responsiveness of the domestic country's balance of trade with 
respect to changes in its trade pattern with each of its trading partners. 
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between the relative price of the domestic country and its trading partners, and 
the exchange rates of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the trading partners is zero, 
and purchasing power parity holds, then the domestic currency would be pegged to 
any currency amongst those of its trading partners which inflates at the same rate 
as the domestic economy. Instability in R E E R can then be minimized. Moreover, 
if the variance of the exchange rates is greater than the covariance between the 
exchange rates and relative prices, then whenever the latter change, although the 
covariance will add to the instability of the R E E R , it is argued that, if the variance 
of the exchange rates offsets changes in the value of R E E R due to relative price 
changes, a greater weight should be assigned to currencies for which the variance 
in the exchange rates is greater than the covariance between these rates and rela-
tive prices. If, however, there is be a single currency that is characterized by this 
feature, then a single currency peg to that currency is optimal. 
Building upon this theoretical model, Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1982) ex-
amined the objective function proposed by Branson and Kasteli-Papaefstratiou: 
stabilization of terms of trade, or trade balance, and arrived at a different weight-
ing scheme. The model concludes that, there is no prior justification for the weights 
derived for R E E R when relative prices were held constant being the same as those 
attained whenever the model allows for fluctuations in relative prices. 
Thus, for policymakers, any relationship between exchange rates and relative 
prices is of importance and must be incorporated into the determination of the op-
timal basket weights. Assuming the existence of a certain systematic relationship, 
the task of the authorities would be to choose the set of weights from the expres-
sion of either objective function, so as to minimize its variations. The expression 
defined as: 
OB = w ( f p + s) - (rph + 0s) 
where 
O B = either objective variables, terms of trade or trade balance 
w — the transpose of the vector of elasticity weights 
rp — a matrix of the log of the ratios of the trading partners' prices to that of a 
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numeraire 
s = a matrix of the log of the exchange rates defined as numeraire per other trading 
partners 
rph = a matrix of the log of the ratios of domestic price level to that of the 
numeraire 
Sh = a matrix of the log of the exchange rate defined as domestic per that of the 
numeraire. 
Then, the minimization with respect to (3 was shown by Lipschitz and Sun-
dararajan to depend on the variance-covariance matrix of exchange rates, and 
on the covariance matrix of relative prices and exchange rates. Thus, the choice 
of weights depends on the weights defined in the R E E R with fixed relative prices 
( elasticity weights in this example ), and moreover, on the variance and covariance 
terms of exchange rates and relative prices. 
To sum up, it is argued in the last two models that, once a choice of an optimal 
single currency or a basket of currencies is considered, there exists a compelling 
rational to incorporate variances and covariances of relative prices and exchange 
rates in the decision. 
Another contribution to the literature on the optimal currency peg was pre-
sented by Bhandari (1985-a). The basic motivation of the analysis is based on 
the observation that not all-peggers-fix the weights of .the currencies rigidly„in the 
basklt.- Nonetheless, some peggers allow for changes in the exchange rates of their 
currencies with respect to the currencies to which the are pegged. Calling the 
latter practice a flexible basket or a wide margin policy, as opposed to the fixed 
exchange rates in the basket, called a rigid basket or a narrow margin policy, the 
analysis proceeds to examine two important issues: Firstly, what is the optimal 
margin size and secondly, what is the optimal composition of the basket ? 
A multicountry model is constructed in which commodity as well as money 
market relationships are defined. Accordingly, a basket peg is defined as ( all 
58 
variables are in log form ): 
E° = \ E A B + (1 - \ ) E A C 
where 
E" — the domestic currency value of the basket 
A, (1 — A) = target shares of currency B and C , respectively 
EAB, EAC — the exchange rates of foreign currencies, B and C , in terms of the 
domestic currency, A. 
Although this basket defines the rule at which the domestic country aims, there 
is, however, no guarantee that it will be satisfied. To see this, let the targeted 
exchange rates be defined as: 
EAB = E" — (1 - \)EBC 
EAC — E" + \Ej3c-
These relationships reflect the effect which EBC m a v have on the value of the 
exchange basket chosen by the domestic country. With a rigid basket, fluctuations 
in EBc are offset by matching changes in EAB a n d EAC- However, adopting a 
flexible basket peg will allow for intervention in the exchange rate market. The 
intervention parameter ( defined as the margin size ) is defined as the difference 
between the targeted exchange rates and the actual rates. Nevertheless, a currency 
sharg.in a basket and the intervention parameter would depend on the objective 
of the peg. 
The authorities in the domestic country are assumed to be interested in an 
objective function which includes external and internal components. Accordingly, 
Bhandari defined the following loss function which is to be minimized: 
L = 9var(REER) + (1 - 6)var(Ya) 
where 
# ; (1 - 0) = measures of the importance attached by the authorities to external 
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target and internal target, respectively 
var(i) = the variance of the i argument 
REER - real effective exchange rate 
YA = domestic income 
(0 < 9 < 1). 
The weights of currencies of the trading partners are embodied in the R E E R 
term, whereas the intervention parameter is derived in the manner explained above 
( for instance, EAi — EAi, where i may be the currency of either of the trading 
partners, and EAi is the targeted exchange rate ). It is found that the weights of the 
currencies and the size of the intervention parameter depend on: firstly, domestic 
bilateral trade patterns; secondly, the relative weights assigned to the external and 
internal components; thirdly, the relative sizes of the trading partners; fourthly, 
the relative variability in monetary and real policies in the countries of the trading 
partners. 
Empirical estimation of the model was conducted for hypothetical countries 
( no real data was used ) and some important findings are reported below. 
In summary, a rigid basket is optimal if trade is symmetric between the domes-
tic country and its trading partners, without regard to the nature of disturbances. 
However, if trade is asymmetric, then a rigid basket is optimal if shocks are mon-
etary in nature, although the weight of the currency of the closer trading partner 
would be. increased. However, if shocks are real in origin and originate in both 
tradmg partners, then for a flexible basket, the share of the country with whom 
the domestic country trades more increases in excess of unity, but by less than 
unity for a rigid basket. 
Furthermore, if disturbances are mostly monetary in origin, then a rigid basket 
is optimal without regard to the relative size of the trading partners. Contrary to 
this, if all shocks occur in one country, then a rigid basket is not optimal even with 
symmetric trade patterns. However, adopting a flexible basket in this case, would 
reduce the weight of the currency of the country which experiences the shock. 
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Bhandari investigated the significance of the degree of variability in monetary 
and real variables in the trading partners on the domestic economy and concluded 
that, if trade is symmetric, an optimal intervention parameter is zero, i.e. a rigid 
basket is optimal with an equal weighting scheme within that basket. On the other 
hand, if trade is not symmetric, then a more flexible weight will be assigned to 
the currency of the trading partner whose monetary policies are less stable. It 
may be argued that this would allow the authorities to distant the behavior of the 
domestic currency from that of the less stable currency. Finally, real disturbances 
were found to affect the composition of the basket regardless of trade patterns, 
and also altered the size of the intervention parameter. 
In a subsequent contribution, Bhandari (1985-b) expanded the above model in 
terms of its welfare function. Accordingly, he defined the following loss function 
which the authorities attempt to minimize: 
L = ai(d) + a2(C2) + a 3 ( C 3 ) + a 4 ( C 4 ) 
where 
a{ = weight assigned to each criterion 
C\ — variance of domestic output around its expected value 
C 2 = variance of domestic output around its full-information level 
C 3 = variance of domestic money supply 
C 4 = variance of real effective exchange rate 
£ a r = l . -
Contrary to the generally cited argument of assigning a greater weight to the 
currency of the most significant trading partner, call it country B , Bhandari found 
this to be subject to several qualifications, and to depend upon both the optimality 
criterion chosen by the domestic country, as well as, upon the nature of shocks in 
the system. 
Simulation of the model indicates that, if disturbances are monetary in nature, 
then the weight of currency B is reduced under criteria C i , C 2 and C 3 , and the 
flexibility of the exchange rate between the domestic currency and currency B 
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would be increased. However, the weight of currency B would have risen under the 
fourth criterion, and the flexibility increases. This latter conclusion is due to the 
fact that a non-internal solution was achieved 1 5. Bhandari argued that, this result 
is contrary to the argument that is arrived at whenever a basket with a simple 
weighting scheme ( based on trade patterns ) was adopted, where flexibility of the 
exchange rate between the currency of the domestic country and that of its most 
significant trading partner, would be more rigid 1 6 . 
Alternatively, had shocks been real in nature, then the weight assigned to 
currency B would have been reduced under the C\ criterion, whilst it would have 
been increased under the other criteria. With respect to the degree of flexibility 
of the basket, the simulation results favored increasing flexibility with respect 
to currency B if C\ was the objective. However, the weight would have been 
increased and the flexibility reduced under C2, C 3 and C 4 , although the flexibility 
of the exchange rate would have increased in the latter case due to the non- internal 
solution. It is worth mentioning that, although a simple trade-weighted basket only 
takes trade patterns into consideration in assigning currency weights and ignores 
the nature of shocks in the world, it was found that under criteria C2 and C 3 , 
the simple trade-weighted basket and the optimally derived basket generated in 
the present model enhanced the optimality of increasing the flexibility of exchange 
rate if shocks were real in nature. However, if the disturbances were monetary in 
origin, conflicting conclusions were reached. 
Furthermore, the exclusive consideration given to trade patterns in the simple 
trade-weighted basket has contributed to its insensitivity to changes in the relative 
size of the trading partner. In contrast, the basket derived in Bhandari's model 
favored increasing the weight assigned to larger countries, when all criteria were 
considered, thus leading to a less flexible exchange rate between the domestic 
1 5 A non-internal solution is defined whenever the absolute value of A is negative or greater 
than unity. 
1 6 Looking at the extreme case when trade with country B amounts for all trade conducted by 
the domestic country, reveals the fact that the domestic currency should be pegged to currency 
B . 
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currency and currency B. This holds whether disturbances were real or monetary 
in nature. 
Examination of the relative role of monetary and real policies concludes that 
lower weights must be assigned to the currency of the country which exhibits a less 
stable policy and consequently, the flexibility of the bilateral exchange rate in the 
basket would be increased. This holds under all criteria. However, this conclusion 
would not hold for criteria C 4 had the real economic behavior in that country been 
less stable. Nevertheless, the simple trade-weighted basket can not be compared 
in this case, because it is insensitive to monetary or real policies. 
The conclusions arrived at in this model as well as in all other earlier models, 
rely on the assumptions stated, the objective functions and the data used. In 
comparing the models discussed above, several general similarities and differences 
may be obtained. Many models have singled out the R E E R as an important 
variable in the choice of the optimal currency peg. This importance is derived 
from the role the index may play in affecting the competitiveness of the domestic 
economy. Explicitly, Black argued that the measure of an effective exchange rate 
should be weighted according to trade in goods and services. Stabilization of the 
real effective exchange rate is rather a general argument, which was defined by 
Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980) as: 
. . . is one that minimizes the variance of the real exchange rate about its 
equilibrium, while maintainmg~the average value of the real exchange 
rate close to its equilibrium level over the reference period 1 7. 
It may be argued that Black favored adjusting the effective weights of exchange 
rates to account for inflation differentials. However, the process of adjustment was 
advocated explicitly by Lipschitz, Lipschitz and Sundararajan, and Bhandari. 
With regard to the determination of the appropriate set of weights in the bas-
ket, Flanders and Helpman advocated elasticity weights, Branson and Kasteli-
1 7 L e s i l e Lipschitz, and V . Sundararajan, " The Optimal Basket in a World of Generalized 
Floating," IMF Staff Papers, vol. 27, no. 1 (1980), p. 95. 
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Papaeftratiou favored a weighting scheme which is related to market power, and 
Connolly, and Connolly and Yousef argued for trade weights, although they placed 
greater emphasis on historical links and the implicit confidence in the currency to 
which the domestic currency may be pegged. Lipschitz and Sundararajan argued 
that in the weighting policy proposed by Flanders and Helpman, elasticity weights 
are not, in general, optimal. Moreover, Turnovsky, by allowing for expectations 
and capital mobility in the model, has shown that trade shares can be of little 
importance to the choice of the optimal basket arrangement, although price elas-
ticities of demand gained ground as a determinant of optimal weights in certain 
cases. 
On the issue of flexibility of weights in the chosen basket, Bhandari has demon-
strated that not all peggers adopt a rigid basket peg; some countries have allowed 
for flexibility in their pegs. The two models presented by Bhandari cited certain 
situations when rigid baskets would be more optimal relative to flexible baskets, 
and examined the conditions according to which the degree of flexibility of a par-
ticular exchange rate should be increased or decreased. 
On the generality of the models, although Connolly, and Connolly and Yousef 
relied on partial equilibrium, monetary settings, Turnovsky, and Bhandari consid-
ered general macroeconomic models. Furthermore, Turnovsky's model aimed at 
relaxing several constraints embodied in other models. 
The optimality of a single currency peg or a basket of currencies peg has cen-
tered on several properties. Black argued that single currency peg is unlikely to 
minimize the impact of shocks originating abroad, and thus favored a basket peg. 
Crockett and Nsouli (1977) noted that a single currency peg would require holding 
of reserves, since the fixed exchange rate parity between the domestic currency 
and that of an industrial country, is not likely to be the equilibrium exchange rate. 
Furthermore, movements in this parity will reflect movements in the balance of 
payments of the industrial country and since the factors affecting the equilibrium 
exchange rates of the industrial country's currency vis-a-vis the rest of the world, 
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tend to differ from those affecting the domestic currency exchange rates with re-
spect to the same currencies, the need for reserves may be greater under a single 
currency peg. A general disadvantage which is frequently cited is that a single 
currency peg, assuming trade with more than a country, will result in higher im-
port prices. It may be argued that investment returns will either be biased toward 
the country to whom currency the domestic currency is pegged, risking political 
consequences, or diversified, thus risking changes in the expected value of returns 
in terms of the domestic currency. 
A peg to a single stable currency is advantageous when seen as promoting 
the stability of the domestic currency. This result is related to the argument of 
confidence in the domestic currency, discussed earlier, which is important to many 
developing countries. As it will appear in Chapters V and V I , a peg to the currency 
in which a country receives most of its revenues will make it more convenient for 
its government to plan its budget. 
In general, a basket peg is preferred on the grounds of minimization of imported 
shocks caused by exchange rate fluctuations. A major difficulty frequently associ-
ated with the basket is embodied in its configurations, i.e. the currencies included 
and their weights. However, some authors have argued against a customized basket 
peg because trade and investments will be discouraged as countries adopt different 
baskets. 
Table (2)-summarizes the models reviewed in this_chapter, with particular 
emphasis assigned to the objective function(s) proposed and the recommended 
peg-
This concludes the review of the literature on the optimal currency peg for 
developing countries. However, this would provide only part of the analysis of 
the existing work which is relevant to the major concern of the present thesis. In 
addition to pegging the domestic currencies of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the 
member states invoice most of their trade ( imports and exports ) in foreign cur-
rencies. This scheme is likely to introduce an exchange rate risk which is added to 
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other potential types of risk involved in international trade. Although, customarily 
oil has been invoiced in dollars and the imports of the G C C member states have 
been invoiced in the currency of exporters or of a third country, familiarization 
with the literature of the currency invoicing of contracts would illustrate how rev-
enues from oil exports can be affected by risk involved in trade. Furthermore, it 
will show that small economies tend to be more vulnerable to invoice contracts in 
the currency(s) of their partners. The next chapter will, in addition, show that 
the issue of determining how a commodity, oil in the present case, is invoiced, is 
important from the point of view of the parties involved in trade. Nonetheless, 
this concern is justified because of the potential impact on payments and revenues 
from contracts the various contractors pay and receive. 
Thus the next chapter will review the literature on the currency invoicing of 
contracts at the international level, where risks of various types can have conse-
quences on the value of these contracts. Moreover, it will shed light on how the 
currencies of contracts are determined, and possible methods of minimizing the 
risks impinging on either party of a contract. After that, the analytical framework 
is presented, and then estimated. 
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Author Objective function Recommended peg 
Black Stabilizing R E E R by 
minimizing variations in 
relative prices 
A basket in which weights 
are based on trade in 
goods and services 
Crockett 
and Nsouli 
Stabilize E E R so as 
to stabilize balance 
of payments 
Import-weighted basket, the 
SDR may be a good proxy 
Flanders and 
Helpman 
Stabilize E E R so as to 
minimize variations in real 
income and balance 
of payments 
With respect to balance of 
payments, peg to a basket 
with more weight given 
to the currency of a country 
with which the domestic 




Stabilize the terms 
of trade 
Peg to a basket in which 
market power of the domestic 







Minimize the level 
of variations in 
imported inflation 
Peg to a single currency 
of an important trading 
partner or a basket reflecting 
trade patterns 
Turnovsky Stabilize domestic real 
income 
Depending on the source 
and the type of disturbances, 
single or a basket peg 
may be optimal 
Lipschitz Minimize allocative 
effects of exchange 
rate changes via 
minimizing R E E R 
Trade-weighted basket 
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. . . , continue 




Stabilizing R E E R Single currency peg to a currency 
which inflates at the same 
rate as the domestic currency. 
Or a basket with weights 




Stabilize terms of trade 
and trade balance 
Same as above 
with respect to a single 




R E E R 
Adopting a flexible 
or rigid basket, subject 




variance of domestic 
output, money supply 
and R E E R 
Optimally derived 
basket which depends on 
sources and nature 
of changes in trading 
partners' countries 
Table 2: Summary of objective functions and recommended pegs 
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A p p e n d i x I I I . A 
The Mechanics of Single Guirireecy and Basket 
Currencies Pegs 
This appendix describes how a single currency peg and a basket of currencies 
peg operate. The examples given are hypothetical ones, so the data are not in-
tended to reflect actual relationships. However, the objective of explaining the 
mechanics of each currency peg will not be affected by the fact that real data are 
not used. 
I I L A . l . Single C u r r e n c y Peg 
By definition, a peg to a single currency implies fixing the value of the domestic 
currency in terms of a specific number of units of a foreign currency. In what 
follows, currency h refers to the domestic currency, while other currencies are 
referred to by 1, 2, and 3. 
Assume that at time t, the authorities in the domestic country decided to peg 
the domestic currency to a single currency, for whatever reason 1 8. Explicitly, let 
the value of the domestic currency in terms of currency 1 equal 0.25, thus 
Ein = 4.00 
Given the_exchange_rate between currency l_and_ any other currency in the world, 
the exchange rate between h and the other currency can be found. For example, 
assume that 
E[/2 = 2.00 
then 
K/2 = E[/2/E[/h = 2.00/0.25 = 8.00. 
If a rigid single currency peg is adopted, then there will be no change in Eh/i, 
consequently h fluctuates against currencies 2 and 3, at the same rate as currency 
1 8 There is extensive literature on this and Williamson (1982) presents a survey article; Chapter 
II I of this thesis also presents a review of the literature on this topic. 
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1 does. For example, assume that at time t+1, currency 1 appreciates against 
currency 2 by 50 percent, then currency h must appreciate by 50 percent vis-a-vis 
currency 2. Accordingly, in our example, we get a new exchange rate between h 
and 2, but not between h and 1. That is 
4/i = E m l E \ f h = 1.00/0.25 = 4.00 
where 
It may be the case that the authorities would like to keep the exchange rate 
between h and 2 fixed. Can they pursue this policy under the present peg ? The 
answer is simply no. This is because keeping the exchange rate between h and 2 
fixed implies, by definition, that h is pegged to 2. In the face of changes in £1/2, 
the initial peg to currency 1 would be abandoned. 
Alternatively, the authorities may think the appreciation of currency 1 against 2 
undesirable and decide to appreciate against 2 by less than the implied appreciation 
by the change in EXj2- In this case, any change in Eh/2 which is not equivalent 
to the change in Ei/2 would result in a partial peg of the domestic currency to 
currency 1. For example, if the domestic currency is desired to appreciate against 
currency 2 by only 25 percent ( not 50 percent as implied by the change in Ei/2 ), 
then we get 
But^we know that E^jl = 1.00, and we have Elh/2- However, since the desired 
equals the previous value less 25 percent, we have 
= 8.00 - [0.25(8.00)] = 6.00. 
Thus, the percentage change in Eh/2 is 
eh/2 = [(6.00 - 8.00)/8.00]100.0 = -0.25. 
Therefore, the domestic currency has appreciated by only 25 percent against cur-
rency 2. Adopting this policy would, however, change the exchange rate between 
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the domestic currency and currency 1. Simply, a new rate emerges from 
Bit = Eyl/Eyl = 1-00/0.1667 = 5.99. 
If the domestic currency appreciates against currency 2 less than does currency 1, 
it is implied then the domestic currency would have to depreciate against currency 
1. In fact, 
e/i/i = [(5.99 - 4.00)/4.00]100.0 = 0.4975 
where 
e/i/i = percentage change in Eh/i-
Thus, h has depreciated against currency 1 by more than 49 percent. 
What constitutes an optimal policy for pegging the domestic currency as the 
exchange rates amongst the other currencies in the world change depends on the 
criteria by which a peg is assessed. However, it is argued that, with trade diversi-
fication, a peg to a basket of currencies can best help achieve the targets set out 
in the economy. The mechanism of a potential basket peg is discussed next, with 
the aim of displying changes in the values of the other currencies in terms of the 
domestic currency, as the exchange rates amongst them change. 
I I I . A . 2 . Basket of CuMremcies Peg 
Viewed from the prospective of the policymakers, a single currency peg may be seen 
to yield a non-optimal solution, given a particular welfare function. Consequently^ 
a peg to a basket which is composed of a fixed number of units of more than one 
currency may qualify as an alternative. Formally, a basket peg may be defined as 
a policy of determining the value of the domestic currency in terms of a number 
of foreign currencies, each weighted according to a certain method. A familiar 
weighting scheme is the one in which trade shares, imports, exports or total shares 
are used to determine the initial weight of each currency in the basket. However, 
as we will see later, as the exchange rates between the domestic currency and 
individual currencies change, the weights would have to change, since the number 
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of units of each currency is held fixed. If the authorities adjust the weights, then 
the basket is said to be flexible. Alternatively, keeping the weights fixed, even 
though the exchange rates have been altered, yields a rigid basket. 
Assume that at time t, the domestic currency is pegged to a basket which 
consists of three currencies. The initial number of units of each currency included in 
the basket, the initial weights, and the initial exchange rates between all currencies 
in this world are given in Tables (1) and (2). Note that i refers to currencies 1, 
Currency Ei/i Ez)i Eh/i 
1 1.0000 0.8846 0.7055 0.4975 
2 1.1305 1.0000 0.7975 0.5624 
3 1.4175 1.2539 1.0000 0.7052 
Table 1: The exchange rates at time t 
2, and 3, and the exchange rate Ei/i is defined as units of currency 1 per unit of 
currency i. 
At this stage it may prove necessary to define some relationships between the 
domestic currency and the other currencies included in the basket, as well as be-
tween the three currencies of the trading partners, i.e. countries 1, 2 and 3. 
Currency Ni Eh/i A ? Wi 
1 0.360 0.4975 0.1791 0.1791 
2 0.400 0.5624 0.2250 0.2250 
3 0.845 0.7052 0.5959 0.5959 






Wi = NiEh/i/Vh 
Wi = Nth/Vh 
VH = ViEhli 
where 
Ni= number of units of currency i included in the basket 
Eh/i= the exchange rate between currency h and currency i, defined as units of h 
per unit of i 
Nj1 = value of the number of units of currency i in terms of currency h 
Wi= weight of currency i in the basket. 
Furthermore, by definition we find the cross exchange rates between any three 
currencies, if the"exchange rates~are" known between any two currencies in terms 




Ek/j = Ei/j/Ei/k = Ei/jEk/i-
If the domestic currency, h, is pegged in terms of a weighted basket of currencies 
1, 2 and 3, the initial value of the basket in terms of the domestic currency may 
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be defined as 
(1) 
Thus, in our example, 
Vh = 0.360(0.4975) + 0.400(0.5624) + 0.845(0.7052) = 1.000 
Assume that at time t+1 currency 1 has appreciated vis-a-vis currency 2 by 20 
percent and vis-a-vis currency 3 by 40 percent. Thus, new exchange rates amongst 
the currencies of the trading partners emerge. The new exchange rates for E\/2 
and Ei/3 are simple to find; they are only 20 percent and 40 percent less than the 
old rates between currencies 1 and 2, and between currencies 1 and 3, respectively. 
Thus, the new rates are 
The task to perform now is to find the new value of the basket in terms of the 
domestic currency and to check whether this value has changed. Moreover, what 
are the required changes so that the new value will coincide with the initial value 
of the basket ? 
As we have seen in calculating the value of the basket at time t, the exchange 
rates between the domestic currency and the currencies of the trading partners, 
are essential. However, if Eh*l can be found, then by definition (4), Vht+1 will be 
determined. Explicitly, 
The new value of the basket in terms of currency 1 may be found accordingly: 
1/2 0.9044 
E\1} = 0.8502. 
Vl+l = N^l+t + N2E$ + N3E{%. 
Thus 
V{+1 = 0.360(1.0000) + 0.400(0.9044) + 0.845(0.8502) = 1.4402. 
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Let us call this value E ^ a a k e t . Then using the cross exchange rate property, we 
can derive Ejjl- That is 
^h/l ~ ^basket/\/^basket/h-
Nonetheless, a basket peg implies that the value of that basket in terms of the 
domestic currency is fixed over time and defined at the initial time. In our example, 
this is given by Vl =1.0000, which may be defined as Ei,asket/h =1-0000. This can be 
used to derive the new exchange rate between the domestic currency and currency 
1, using the above cross rates condition between currencies h, 1, and the basket 
( if one can call it so ). Substitution implies 
KTx = KtUJ'EltLt/H = 0.6943/1.0000 = 0.6943. 
From a comparison of this rate with the rate at time t, we can conclude that 
the domestic currency has depreciated against currency 1 by about 33.33 percent. 
However, since the domestic currency is pegged partially to currency 1, as well as 
to the other currencies, the actual change in E^/i must be weighted, as we will 
explain later. For the time being, the new value of the basket in terms of the 
domestic currency may be determined as 
V£+1 = Vl+lE^l = 1.4402(0.6943) = 1.0000 
Thus, the value of the domestic currency in terms of the basket has not changed 
( the opposite is true as well ). 
In terms-of weighted changes_of exchange rates between the domestic currency^ 
and these of its trading partners, a basket peg implies that the following condition 
must hold: 
WWi + W2ehii + W 3 e h / 3 = 0 (2) 
where 
£h/i = percentage change in the domestic currency price of currency i. 
In order to check this condition, we need to find E*^, and E^. Again, using 
the cross rates between currency 1 and each of 2, 3 and h, we get 
Eh/2 = E i ' / 2 1 / E t j h = 0.9044/1.4403 = 0.6279 
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Ehjl = K / t / E i / h = 0.8502/1.4403 = 0.5903. 
Since the value of the domestic currency with respect to each of the three curren-
cies changes as the cross rates change, there is an inter-relationship between, say, 
changes in E2/i, and variations in Eh/i and Eh/2- For our present example, the 
appreciation of currency 1 against 2 by 20 percent, will not imply that the domes-
tic currency will appreciate against currency 2 by the same percentage. This is 
expected since the domestic currency is only partially pegged to currency 1. As a 
matter of fact, the percentage change in the domestic currency price of each of the 
other currencies is given by the following: 
c*/i = Wbei/2 + W 3 e 1 / 3 
eh/2 = Wie 2 / i + W 3 e 2 / 3 
Cfc/3 = W i e 3 / 1 + W2e3/2. 
Substituting these into equation (2) yields 
^ i [ W 2 e i / 2 + W 3 e 1 / 3 ] + W2[Wle2,x + W3e2/3] + W 3 [ W i e 3 / 1 + W2e3/2\ = 0 
where we can define 
Wi[W2ei/2 + W 3 e 1 / 3 ] 
as the implied change in the domestic currency ( since it is pegged to each of 
the three currencies ) against currencies 2 and 3, as a result of the change in the 
exchange rates between currency 1 and each of currencies 2_and 3.„ Similarly we 
can talk about the implied changes in the domestic currency price of currencies 1 
and 3, in the second part, and 1 and 2, in the last part of the equation. 
However, more information is needed to be able to calculate these changes. 
Namely, e^, for i = l , 2, 3 ( j ^ i ) need to be denned. Using the change in the 
natural log as an approximation for the percentage change 1 9, we get 
e l / 2 = ln(0.9044/1.1305) = -0.2231 
1 9 ln ( i t /a : t - i ) = relative change in x. However, a percentage change will be obtained by 
multiplying the result by 100. 
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ei/3 = ln(0.8502/1.4175) = -0.5112 
e 2 / i = 0.2231 
c 3 / i = 0.5112 
e 2 / 3 = ln(0.9401/1.2539) = -0.2880 
e 3 / 2 = 0.2880. 
These values can be substituted into the above equation yielding 
0 = 0.1791[0.2250(-0.2231) + 0.5959(-0.5112)] + 0.2250(0.1791(0.2231) 
+0.5959(-Q.2880)] + 0.5959[0.1791(0.5112) + 0.2250(0.2880)]. 
Thus, the condition of a basket peg in terms of weighted changes in the exchange 
rates is maintained. 
As we have denned earlier, the weight assigned to a foreign currency in the 
basket is a function of the exchange rate between the domestic currency and that 
currency, as well as of the value of the basket in terms of the domestic currency. 
Although the latter does not change as a result of changes in the exchange rates, 
the former does; however, it is not frequently changed. The rationale for the 
policy of not changing the weights is embodied in the relationship between trade 
shares and these weights. Applying definition (2), new weights can be found, which 
are: 24.99, 25.12 and 49.88 for currencies 1, 2 and 3, respectively ( use the new 
exchange rates to calculate -these -weights ). I f the trade patterns of the.domestic 
country have not varied over the periods of time when the exchange rates changed, 
then altering the weights may trigger domestic inflation, caused by aforementioned 
changes. 
It can be assumed that the original weights reflect import shares, that is the 
weight of each currency in the basket was equated to the percentage of goods 
that the domestic currency imports from each country. Furthermore it can also 
be assumed that the domestic country imports 20 percent from country 1 and 
it has pegged 20 percent of its currency to currency 1, i.e. Wi = 0.20. Then, 
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with the same import share prevailing in the next period, where currency 1 has 
appreciated against, say, currencies 2 and 3, by 10 percent, the cost of 20 percent 
of the domestic country's imports will not change, while the cost of 80 percent of 
the imported goods will rise in terms of the domestic currency. If the weight of 
currency 1 is changed in time t+1, while the import share remains at 20 percent, 
then the domestic economy will suffer. On the one hand, had the weight of currency 
1 been increased to, say, 30 percent, then the cost of imports from country 1 will 
not change and, moreover, there will be a further decline in the cost of imports 
from countries 2 and 3, in terms of the domestic currency. However, the rise in the 
domestic currency value in terms of currencies 2 and 3 would have two potential 
effects. Firstly, there would be a deterrent effect on domestic exports to these 
two countries; secondly, imports from these countries may be stimulated due to 
the decline in the cost of imports from these countries in terms of the domestic 
currency. On the other hand, had the weight of currency 1 been less than the 
import share, the appreciation of currency 1 against 2 and 3, would raise the cost 
of imports from country 1, although there would be a partial decline in the imports 
from countries 2 and 3, due to the implied appreciation of the domestic currency 
against 2 and 3. 
As a result, stabilization of the cost of domestic imports from all trading part-
ners would be met on average if the domestic currency is pegged to an import-
weighted basket. Furthermore, these weights may have to be kept constant, al-
though changes amongst the exchange-rates oLthe trading partners imply other-
wiser _ 
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I V . A Review of Literature 01 Contract Invoicing and 
International Trade 
The demise of the international financial agreements that followed the gold 
standard brought concern about the future of international trade and the financial 
settlements involved. Traders feared the uncertainty surrounding their transac-
tions, which rose from fluctuations in the exchange rates of their currencies with 
respect to those of their trading partners. 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in early 1971 and the subsequent 
short-lived Smithsonian agreement which ended in 1973 were seen as deterrents to 
international trade since traders were no longer certain about the real value of their 
sales or purchases. Under these standards, member states were not allowed to vary 
the par value of their currencies unless such variations were permitted by the I M F . 
Nevertheless, the I M F allowed the country to adjust its exchange rate in terms of 
the common denominator, the United States dollar, without prior consent of the 
I M F , within a narrow band of one percent up or down. But the collapse ended 
such assurances for traders who worried particularly most about market-originated 
forces, depreciation and appreciation as well as official acts by governments which 
were designed to devalue or revalue their currencies. 
Although trading partners would face no exchange risk in dealing in any cur-
rency under_a rigidly: fixed par value arrangement ( no bands around the exchange 
r a t e i ^ a n d may face less risk under the above mentioned agreements, their trans-
actions would be exposed to various kinds of risk if the currencies involved in 
the transactions experience changes in terms of their relative values. This could 
happen under the flexible or floating exchange rate regimes as well as under an ad-
justable peg regime. Consider two individuals living in two different countries, each 
of which has its own national currency. Furthermore, assume there is a floating ex-
change rate regime through which the values of these currencies are simultaneously 
determined. Individual A, living in country A, imports a particular type of goods 
from individual B, who lives in country B. At time t a contract was signed by the 
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two individuals, in which A will pay at time t+1 a total of 100,000 units of a cur-
rency for certain units of goods imported from B. Would both individuals consider 
this contract to be an assurance against exchange rate fluctuations ? The outcome 
depends largely on the currency involved in the transaction. If we assume currency 
B was used as a means of payment, then, say, a depreciation of this currency in 
terms of currency A would result in an unexpected gain by individual A, since it 
takes fewer units of his currency to purchase the required units of currency B. By 
contrast, had currency A been the contracted currency, individual B would receive 
the contracted amount, but currency A is worth more in terms of his domestic 
currency; thus individual B would have gained from this scheme of invoicing. 
This simple example illustrates the complexity of contract invoicing ( the act 
of specifying the currency of payments ) and the uncertainty which could unfold 
when a contract matures. 
The subsequent summary of the literature on " Contract Invoicing and Interna-
tional Trade ", will discuss the theoretical as well as the empirical issues involved. 
The remaining parts of the review will start by discussing the importance of the 
issue in hand. Then, in the second section, the role which risk may play in trade is 
covered. The third section describes the alternative regimes of invoicing. Empir-
ical analysis of invoicing practices is presented in the fourth section. The factors 
which contribute to the choice of the currency of a contract, are described in the 
fifth section. -The sixth section discusses J;he forward market and how it can be 
usecH;Q cover for risk in conducting trade. Another form of avoiding risk in trade, 
leads and lags, is described in the seventh section, followed by some concluding 
remarks. 
I V . 1 . The Importance of Invoicing Practices 
The practice of invoicing contracts in certain currency(s), from a microeconomic 
perspective, has consequences on the individual's economic behavior. The behavior 
of a utility-maximizing consumer is affected by wealth as well as prices, among 
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other factors. Assuming a well-behaved utility function, the consumer is expected 
to be worse off as a result of an increase in the relative price level, where this 
price affects the consumption bundle of the various ( normal ) goods consumed. 
Furthermore, the individual's wealth would decline in real terms as the price level 
rises disproportionately. Similarly, the real value of assets held by firms and the 
expected real value of their stream of income would decline. 
On the general level the choice of invoicing tends to have effects at the macroe-
conomic level, such as its effect on the trade balance which is thoroughly discussed 
in the literature associated with the J-effect ( Magee, 1973 ). In short, Magee 
(1973) explored the effects on the trade balance after a devaluation in the domes-
tic currency, during two distinct periods of time: the currency contract period and 
the pass-through period. Throughout the first period, contracts are in force and 
the currency of denomination is taken as given. However, the second period is char-
acterized by flexibility of prices and the likelihood of newly negotiated contracts 
that take into consideration the consequences of the devaluation. 
I V . 2 . Risk in International Finance 
The possibility of loss of profitability and real wealth of a firm arising from changes 
in the exchange rate of one currency in terms of the other represents the broadly 
denned concept of risk in international finance. 
TJhe importance of analyzing risk in international trade rests on its welfare 
implications and its effect on the efficiency of stabilization policies. Risk which 
emerges from exchange rate changes can increase the costs of financing trade, 
whenever traders consider the transaction of goods and assets as risky. In addi-
tion, there would be a welfare loss if the real rates of return from two identical 
investments differ as a result of the risk involved in holding foreign currencies 
( Wihlborg, 1978 ). 
The risks involved in trading internationally may be categorized by four kinds 
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of exposure a firm is likely to face: translation exposure, transaction exposure, 
economic exposure and political exposure. Translation exposure is associated with 
uncertainty in exchange rates which may affect the liabilities and assets of a firm 
once they are converted into domestic currency for accounting purposes. The 
transaction exposure is actually the realization of the effects of exchange rate 
changes on the liabilities and assets which are being transacted ( Levi, 1983 ). 
The first two types of exposure may give rise to exchange risk, which is defined 
as the possibility of loss which may arise when the related exchange rate varies. 
A firm that faces exchange risk could eliminate it by invoicing the contract in its 
own currency; however, the other individual who is involved in the transaction will 
have to assume the risk. 
While exchange risk affects the expected revenue of the firm, price risk, which 
may be classified as an economic risk, affects the firm since it is subject to interna-
tional as well as domestic market conditions. Moreover, exchange rate changes can 
introduce price risk, as they alter the new worth of the firm ( Aliber, 1976 ). An 
example of this price risk could be manifested in the risk which inventory holding 
may cause to a firm. Prindl (1976) argued that if stocks are bought in a different 
currency to the one they are sold in, an appreciation of the foreign currency would 
change the costs to the importer if the domestic price cannot be altered to accom-
modate the foreign currency price change. Moreover, Aliber (1976) emphasized 
that as long as the contract calls for future date payment, the firm would have 
toaccept a particular price defined at-the present time which^must be honored in 
the future. As a consequence of fluctuations in the exchange rate, the actual price 
of the contract may change and then the net worth of the firm's assets would be 
affected. 
In addition to the uncertainty in the exchange rate market, there exists the 
probability of confiscation, liquidation, capital control, exchange rate control or 
destruction which may result from a political rather than an economic event. A 
good example of this political risk is confiscation or nationalization of foreign 
investments after a revolution. It is expected, however, that the seller will continue 
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to encounter price and political risks although it may be successful in eliminating 
exchange risk. 
Consequently, it is of great importance to an exporter as well as an importer 
to realize the extent to which any of these forms of risks apply to their interna-
tional trade, since conducting trade internationally involves at least one of the 
participants making use of the foreign exchange market. Furthermore, a firm must 
analyze the options available to it to avoid being exposed to risk whenever it can 
do so. However, the ability of a firm to minimize risk is not always subordinate 
to its control; rather, it depends on many factors. Among these are the currency 
of invoice, the degree of risk aversion of both traders, the hedging ability of either 
traders and leads and lags, which will be discussed in subsequent parts of this 
chapter. 
I V . 3 . Types of Invoicing Practices 
Contracts that involve transaction for goods and financial assets between one coun-
try and another can be invoiced in two types of currencies: vehicle and nonvehicle 
currencies. Nonvehicle currency invoicing is defined as occurring whenever the 
currency of either the exporter or the importer is used; vehicle currency invoicing, 
on the other hand, occurs when a third currency is used in invoicing the contracts 
( Magee and Rao, 1980-b ). The nonvehicle currency contracts may not be strictly 
invoiced in either currency, rather they may consist of a mix of both at various-
weights. For example, it may be the case that the currencies of the exporter and 
the importer are used in equal proportions in the invoicing of a specific contract. 
Similarly, a vehicle currency invoicing may not be a single currency; composite 
units may be used, such as the SDR and the E C U . For example, Asheim and Park 
(1976) have referred to the privately issued unit of contract in which trade may be 
invoiced. By early 1974, such a unit was developed by Barclays Bank of London, 
called the B-Unit and was defined in terms of five major industrial countries as 
different units of their currencies. 
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I V . 4 . Currency of Denomination of a Trade Contract 
The era of fixed exchange rates did not provide an incentive for analyzing the 
issue of currency invoicing in the international flow of goods. The literature on 
this matter developed mainly in response to the empirical findings revealed by 
Grassman (1973-a), which emerged after the abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system. However, some earlier theoretical anal) sis was 
presented by Einzig (1962, 1968). Grassman analyzed the Swedish pattern of trade 
invoicing and observed certain practices. As reported in Table (3), the findings 
reveal that about 66 percent of Sweden's exports and 26 percent of its imports 
were invoiced in the Swedish domestic currency. 
Moreover, the currency invoicing of Swedish trade depended on the trading 
partner. Trade with the U.S. and the U.K., for instance, was heavily invoiced in 
the U.S. dollar and the U.K. pound sterling. In fact the U.S. dollar was the choice 
whenever the need for a third currency invoicing was adopted as an alternative. 
This observation by Grassman has become known as Grassman's Law. Thus, 
this law states that most of a small developed country's trade will be invoiced in 
the exporter's currency, a smaller proportion will be invoiced in the importer's 
currency, while the remainder will be invoiced in a third currency ( Grassman, 
1976 ). 
The choice of currency of settlement for Danish foreign trade confirms the 
pattern found for Sweden. Grassman (1973-a) reported the seller's currency to be 
the dominant currency of invoice, with 41 percent of Denmark's exports invoiced 
in the Danish krone. Imports were mainly invoiced in the importer's currency, 
with only 19 percent invoiced in the Danish currency and the U.S. dollar and the 
British pound playing a minor role. 
Further empirical testing of Grassman's law was conducted for a number of 
countries with various assumptions and constraints. Magee ( 1974 ) analyzed the 
U.S. trade pattern with explicit focus on its imports from Japan and West Ger-
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Currency Exports Imports 
1973 1968 1973 1968 
Swedish kronor 67.4 66.1 25.7 25.8 
U.S. dollars 14.1 12.3 20.0 22.0 
Deutsche marks 4.80 3.80 19.7 17.4 
Pound sterling 4.60 11.2 10.3 17.3 
Danish kroner 0.90 1.80 4.50 3.90 
Norwegian k. 1.00 0.70 3.60 2.20 
Dutch guilders 0.05 n.a. 2.80 n.a. 
Swiss francs 1.60 0.05 2.40 2.40 
French francs 0.07 0.80 2.10 2.50 
Italian lira 0.10 0.03 1.90 1.80 
Other 4.30 2.50 7.00 4.70 
Totals- 100 1Q0 J 00 100 
Total (a) 51.200 24.600 45.800 26.200 
Source: Grassman (1973-a), p. 217 
a: Millions of Swedish kronor. 
n.a.: Not available. 
Table 3: The currency denomination of Sweden's trade payments (percentage) 
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many. Keeping in mind the period over which the survey was conducted, 1971 to 
1973, and defining it as a transitional period from the Bretton Woods system to 
the flexible exchange system, the findings reveal the following conclusions. The 
total proportions of Japanese and German exports invoiced in the exporter's cur-
rency were 37 percent and 79 percent respectively. Most of Japan's exports to 
the U.S. were invoiced in dollars, 63 percent; Germany tended to invoice only 17 
percent of its export contracts to the U.S. in dollars. These findings conform, in 
part, with those presented by Grassman; the Japanese invoicing practice, however, 
constituted a deviation. 
Another estimation was reported for the Netherlands, where Van Nieuwkerk 
(1979) supported Grassman's findings. The Netherlands' currency, guilder, was 
used to invoice 50 percent and 25 percent of the country's exports and imports, 
respectively. 
In addition to the exporters' preference for invoicing their exports in terms of 
their own currencies, Grassman observed that Sweden's imports from developing 
countries tend to be predominantly invoiced in the Swedish kronor, and from Latin 
American countries, the dollar and the Swedish currency unit were the dominant 
means of invoicing. Page (1977) found substantial evidence in support of the im-
portance of characteristics of the trading partners in determining the invoicing of 
contracts. In general, large percentages of nine industrial countries' exports were 
invoiced in their currencies. The only exception was Finland, for which the dollar 
was the dominant currency of invoicing. The dollar was the currency of contracts 
for exports from Prance and Sweden to the U.S., and about 50 percent of the 
U.K. exports to the U.S. was denominated in dollars, with the rest was in sterling. 
Furthermore, the exporter's currency was mainly the currency of denomination 
of exports to the third world, except Latin America for whom the dollar proved 
again to be the major currency. However, the role of the dollar declined sub-
stantially when trade flows between the member states in the European Economic 
Community, E E C , were considered. 
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Further evidence was presented by Carse et al. (1980), who analyzed U.K. for-
eign trade from the invoicing perspective. Considering the number of transactions, 
the results reveal that about 86 percent of the total number of the sampled British 
export contracts were invoiced in the British currency; only 11.5 percent were in-
voiced in the buyer's currency. The data on export by trading partner show that 
the pound sterling preserved its role in invoicing exports to all countries in the 
survey including the U.S; however the dollar was the currency most commonly 
used to invoice British exports after the pound sterling. In contrast to British 
exports, about 64 percent of the total imports by the U.K. were invoiced in the 
seller's currency, while the pound was used to invoice about 29 percent of the to-
tal transactions sampled in the survey. About 59 percent of imports from Latin 
America and 95 percent of those from the U.S. were priced in dollars. The role of 
the pound was predominant in U.K. imports from Eastern Europe, where only 20 
percent of total imports from this block were priced in other currencies. 
In general, we find these studies to be supportive of the early evidence presented 
by Grassman. With minor deviations, it was found that most of a developed 
country's exports were invoiced in the domestic currency. In the second place was 
the currency of the buyer , and lastly there was the presence of a vehicle currency, 
usually U.S. dollar. 
Since the choice of currency for invoicing is of considerable importance to a 
given firm, this economic agent is likely to seek out the various methods available 
to invoice in the most stable currency, so as to minimize the potential negative 
effects of the choice on its earnings as well as on the value of its assets. In the 
next part we shall consider the various factors which have been mentioned in 
the literature as contributing factors to the strategy of selecting the currency of 
invoicing. 
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I V . 5 . Determinants of the Choice of a Contract Currency 
In surveying the theoretical and empirical models of contract-currency invoicing, 
several factors to which the choice of the invoicing currency is attributed have been 
mentioned. Among these are: i) tradition and habit; ii) type of goods; iii) market 
power; iv) inflation differentials and the stability of inflation rates; v) degree of 
risk aversion. 
Although not every factor has been referred to by each of the models considered 
in this review, a discussion of each factor in turn should reflect the importance 
and the contribution of these factors to the process of selecting the currency of 
denominating contracts. 
i. Tradition and Habit 
The pioneer work of Grassman (1973-a, 1973-b), revealed that certain invoicing 
practices for selected commodities reflect mere tradition and habit. This practice 
is evident in raw materials such as oil, where the dollar has been the currency 
of denomination. For Sweden, Grassman noted that the pound tends to be the 
currency denominating the exports of forestry products. A similar conclusion was 
arrived at by Magee (1974), who surveyed the invoicing practices of American 
importers. According to the data presented by Magee, imported steel plates and 
sheets from Japan and Germany were invoiced in the U.S. dollar. 
ii. Type of Goods - — 
In addition, currency invoicing choice may be affected by the type of goods 
being traded. McKinnon (1979) distinguished between two groups of goods, trad-
ables I and tradables II. According to this classification, tradables I tend to have 
distinct characteristics, i.e. heterogeneous products, with which a producer can be 
associated. This group includes manufactured and trade-mark products. Another 
economic characteristic of these commodities is that their prices tend to be fixed 
for a relatively long time, although their producers could have a direct influence 
on them. On the other hand, tradables II include commodities which are homoge-
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neous and produced on a large scale. Producers tend to be incapable, in general, of 
controlling their fluctuating prices. Goods such as primary products would qualify 
for this class. 
The evidence on the currency invoicing of these groups of goods has disclosed 
some uniform practices. McKinnon (1979) found contracts for goods produced as 
tradables I to be invoiced in the home currency of the exporter. However, primary 
products have been found to be priced in dollars ( oil would be an example ). 
Similar evidence was presented by Page (1977). As reported in Table (4), she 
found invoicing of machinery and transport equipment in Sweden and the U.K. to 
be invoiced in the exporter's currency. Moreover, Page found oil to be invoiced in 
dollars for all of the countries considered in the estimation. 
Although these invoicing schemes seem to be confirmed by the data, Magee 
(1974) found some surprising results. Commodity comparison of German and 
Japanese exports to the U.S. shows that while Germany invoiced most of its exports 
in the Deutsche mark, Japanese export contracts have been priced in dollars. These 
products included non-primary goods; almost all manufactured goods exported to 
the U.S. followed this practice. The only commodity Magee found to comply 
with McKinnon's classification for tradables I is organic chemicals, where both 
countries priced them in the exporter's currency. Magee argued that the Japanese 
have built in a tradition of invoicing in dollars, and this practice has been somehow 
maintained by manufactures even at a time of a decline in the purchasing power 
of the dollar. For example, when the dollar was devalued in 1971 relative to 
other currencies, including the yen, Japanese exports continued to be contracted 
in dollars; the denomination of such contracts actually increased from 61 percent 
in 1971 to 72 percent in 1973. 
In addition, Japan has a long official financial preference for the dollar. Magee 
(1974) reported that two factors could be identified as constructive in promoting 
the role of the dollar in denominating Japanese exports. Firstly, some Japanese 
banks find it easier to finance foreign trade contracts in dollars due to financial 
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regulations in Japan. The Japanese monetary agencies since the postwar period 
have encouraged and actually subsidized activities that would increase dollar earn-
ings. Secondly, banks prefer dollar-denominated contracts since they find greater 
financial gain in finance charges as a result of financing in dollars. Bilson (1983) 
added that, because most of Japan's inputs in the production process of manu-
factured goods are invoiced in dollars, Japanese exports would be expected to be 
invoiced in dollars. Furthermore, Bilson argued that the management of a firm 
may eliminate the uncertainty in revenue by invoicing Japanese exports in dollars. 
In an attempt to explain the Japanese practice further, Page (1977) argued 
that, although the Japanese practice is an exception rather than a rule, this can 
be attributed in part to the relatively recent rise in Japanese share of the export 
market, and the restrictive use of the yen as a medium for settling international 
payments due to government's policy. 
Further evidence on the issue of invoicing according to commodities was pre-
sented by Carse et al. They examined the U.K. trade invoicing pattern according 
to the classification presented by McKinnon (1979). The presence of the dollar 
was clearly observed in the U.K. imports of both tradables ( Table 5 ). However, 
the dollar played a smaller role in invoicing U.K. exports, whether tradables I or 
tradables II. An analysis of the British total trade invoiced in vehicle currencies, 
accojding to the value of transactions, showed about 77 percent of tradables I and 
tradables II to be invoiced in vehicle currencies ( dollars or pounds ). 
Hi. Market Power 
Theoretically market power which a firm might have, tends to enable a utility-
maximizing consumer or a profit-maximizing producer to influence the outcome 
in a market setting to its own benefit. This market characteristic has a substan-
tial impact on the currency denomination of contracts, since the trader who gets 
contracts invoiced in his currency will avoid exchange risk. 
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Commodity Sweden U.K. 
Food 49.0 67.0 
Fuels 30.0 65.0 a 
Chemicals 62.0 65.0 
Textiles 73.0 66.0 
Metals 64.0 59.0 
Electrical machinery 72.0 76.0 
Other machinery 83.0 88.0 
Transport 77.0 90.0 
Other 65.0 72.0 
Total 66.0 73.0 
Source: Page (1977), p. 79 
a: And basic materials. 
Table 4: Share of exporter's currency in invoicing by commodity (percentage) 
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Value of transactions. 
dollar pound vehicle 
Exports: 
Tradables I 7.0 75.7 82.7 
Tradables II 9.2 77.3 86.5 
Imports: 
Tradables I 37.5 28.7 66.2 
Tradables II 43.2 31.5 74.7 
Total 
Tradables I 16.4 61.2 77.6 
Tradables II 34.8 42.8 77.6 
Source: Carse et al. (1980), p. 71. 
Table 5: U.K. trade invoiced in vehicle and other currencies (percentage) 
Although none of the models surveyed has given an explicit definition of mar-
ket power, there is a general argument that exporters are in a better position to 
specify their preferences during the negotiations of the various aspects of a con-
tract. Magee (1973, 1974) concluded that since sellers are more specialized in the 
production of goods and sell to a number of heterogeneous consumers, sellers are 
expected to acquire greater market power than buyers. Moreover, their demand 
to denominate contracts in their own currency reflects their profit maximizing be-
havior of minimizing exchange risk as well as the cost which may arise if they have 
to approach the forward market to hedge. 
Levi (1983) and Grassman (1973-a) argued that exporters are more likely to 
invoice in their own currency since there is, in general, an exchange risk involved. 
However, their success in achieving such a target will depend crucially on their 
negotiation power. 
Although the former authors may have successfully presented the importance 
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of market power in affecting the conditions of a contract invoicing process as well as 
its outcome, the empirical evidence on the invoicing practice adopted by Japanese 
firms is contradictory. As we have emphasized earlier, Magee observed Japanese 
firms invoicing most of their exports to the U.S. in dollars not in yen, as would 
be expected, it is assumed that sellers tend to insist on contracts being in their 
currency. 
Bilson (1983) found a considerable interdependence between the firm's degree 
of risk aversion and market power on the one hand, and the practice of invoicing in 
the exporter's currency, on the other. If the exporter is risk neutral, he would make 
the importer choose any arrangement of the foreign and domestic currencies, since 
the exporter is only interested in the total revenue from the transaction. However 
if in addition to this degree of riskiness, the exporter 's market power increases, 
then the proportion of the contract denominated in his currency will rise relative 
to that invoiced in the importer's currency. Thus the equilibrium point, in the 
microeconomic utility-maximization framework presented by Bilson (1983), will 
be affected by the market strength of the two trading partners. However, it is 
not necessary for an exporter who possesses market power to be able to invoice 
contracts in his currency; rather, the outcome will depend on the risk aversion of 
the importer. If an importer who is risk averse is considered, then a rise in the 
exporter's market power will not lead to the exporter demanding invoicing in its 
own currency, instead it is more likely that the elaboration of this power will be 
reflected in higher" export prices; Consequently, Bilson argued, the .rise_in prices 
would Increase the profit margin of the exporter, and this would put him in a 
better position to negotiate invoicing a higher proportion of the contract in his 
own currency. However, Bilson, who defined market power as being dependent 
on the availability of alternative suppliers, the market structure and factors like 
regulation and tariffs, argued that exporters are expected to devote their market 
power to increasing the proportion of contracts denominated in their currency, 
rather than charging importers higher prices. 
The exporter's ability to shift exchange risk to the importer, once contracts 
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have been invoiced in the former's currency, is supplemented by the importer's 
ability to adjust selling prices if an unexpected devaluation occurs. Importers are 
believed to be more capable of adjusting their selling prices in response to exchange 
rate fluctuations. On the contrary, exporters tend to face resistance to adjusting 
their wage bill as well as interest payments in response to a decline in earnings 
whenever the currency of invoicing experiences a reduction in its purchasing power. 
The premium paid to the importers, to compensate them for bearing the risk, may 
come, for example, in the form of extended time of credit or discounted prices 
( McKinnon, 1979 ). 
The models presented by Baron (1976), Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978), and 
Bilson (1983), are based on microeconomic foundations. They derived the strategy 
of an importer and an exporter who maximize their utility over both expected 
profit, from which they gain utility, and also over the expected variance in profit, 
from which they receive disutility. Accordingly, whether the exporter likes to 
invoice in his currency is seen to depend on the expected utility as a function 
of profit under the two alternative schemes of invoicing, i.e. the domestic or the 
foreign currency, not just the market power possessed by traders. 
iv. Inflation Differentials and the Stability of Inflation Rates 
The real value of a currency depends on the general price level in a given coun-
try. A rise in the inflation rate is expected to reduce the purchasing power of an 
- asset or revenue which-a firm .holds or _expects_to earn at a future date. Conse-
quently, both exporters as well as importers would prefer to minimize the negative 
impact of a rise in the inflation rate on the value of a contract20. Models such as 
those presented by Baron (1976), Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) and Bilson (1983) 
defined the utility functions of an importer as well as an exporter to include the 
variance of expected profit, which measures the risk involved, where the variance 
is determined in part by the actual price a firm expects to receive at the time of 
payment ( note that this price is a function of the exchange rate ). Bilson argued 
2 0Stiglitz (1972), and Sandmo (1971), have demonstrated separately the impact of price sta-
bilization on the behavior of the consumer and the firm. This was discussed in Chapter III . 
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that, although the currency of the exporter is more likely to be the currency of 
a contract, a high inflation rate in the exporter's country or greater variations in 
that rate would lead the exporter ( and the importer ) to invoice contracts in the 
currency which is considered to be relatively stable and experiencing a lower rate 
of inflation. 
Furthermore, Bilson argued that there is a negative covariance between the 
revenue of an importer and his costs, which constitutes a strong incentive to invoice 
in currencies with low inflation whenever the domestic price level is more variable. 
To see this, assume a domestic importer who is selling in the domestic market 
an imported product from a foreign country. Furthermore, assume the contracts 
are invoiced in the foreign currency. Then an unexpected decline in the domestic 
inflation rate will reduce domestic revenue, thus making the importer worse off. 
However, the price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency is 
lowered, i.e. the importer's cost has declined. In contrast, had contracts been 
invoiced in the domestic currency, domestic revenue would have declined, but the 
domestic value of the contract, taking into consideration the appreciation of the 
domestic currency, would have risen. Thus contracting in the stable currency is 
preferable from the standpoint of a utility-maximizing importer. 
The preference of the exporter does not differ from that of the importer. Con-
sider an unexpected depreciation in the exporter's currency. This will raise the 
exporters production costs and lower the price of its currency in terms of the cur-
rency of the importer. Consequently, there is a rise in~ costs .'and' a decline in rev-
enue, in terms of the relative value of earnings. Therefore, exporters should avoid 
invoicing in the more variable currencies. The survey reported by Page (1977) 
seems to support these arguments. She found a negative correlation between the 
inflation rate in the exporter's country and the use of the exporter's currency in 
denominating international transactions. 
Dunn (1971) examined the question of whether firms respond constantly to 
deviations from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) due to exchange rate changes 
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by adjusting the prices of their contracts or output. Dunn stressed that firms, 
or exporters in this case, do not respond to transitory deviations from P P P by 
adjusting the prices of their output. The reason for this is embodied in the firms' 
practices which take into account expected deviations of this sort. For a firm that 
invoices its exports in a certain currency, not to worry about transitory deviations 
from PPP, requires certain conditions to hold. Firstly, the profit margin must be 
set so as to absorb variations in its real return. Secondly, variations in the exchange 
rate should remain within a range which would enable the firm to observe such 
variations without the need to respond by changing prices. Lastly, the foreign 
market must be viewed as important by the exporter, so that the firm views varying 
prices to be counter-productive and likely to reduce its competitiveness in the 
foreign market. Empirical evidence presented by Dunn supports his argument, 
and data for Canada yielded no significant values when the relationship between 
changes in the price level and the exchange rate was tested statistically. 
Aliber (1976) estimated price risk as short-run deviations from P P P induced 
by changes in exchange rates. Empirical estimation of the price risk for eight 
industrialized countries revealed that there is a positive relationship between the 
price risk and the variance of the exchange rate. Although no measure of the 
significance of this impact was presented, Aliber concluded that price risk tends 
to increase uncertainty in trade which may have negative effects on the volume of 
goods traded in the international market. 
Magee and Rao (1980-a) argued that both the exchange rate and the inflation 
rate are random variables at the time of the contract and can affect the relative 
value of a contract. Consider an importer and an exporter in a market setting. If 
the contract is invoiced in the importer's currency, then the relative value of the 
contract is seen to be: 
Py Pzmj Pt 
where 
Rv = relative value of a contract 
Pcm = price of the contract fixed in the importer's currency 
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Pt = the general price level in the importer's country. 
However, the role of the exchange rate is evident if the contract is written in 
the exporter's currency. Then, the relative value of the contract is: 
P**v — Pcx^mx I Pt 
where 
Pcx = price of the contract fixed in the exporter's currency 
Ernx = the importer's currency price of the exporter's currency. 
If the contract is invoiced in the importer's currency, then Pcm is fixed and 
the relative value of the contract is affected by the inflation rate in the importer's 
country, i.e. by Pt. Consequently, a rise in this rate of inflation will reduce the 
relative value of the contract. On the other hand, had the contract been written in 
the exporter's currency, two factors may affect the relative value of the contract: 
the exchange rate and the inflation rate in the importer's country. For example, a 
rise in that rate of inflation would lower the relative value of the contract, unless 
matched by an equal depreciation of the importer's currency vis-a-vis the currency 
of the exporter. 
The distinction between the effect of general price level and the effect of relative 
price level on the choice of currency of denomination of contracts in international 
trade has been explored further by Cornell (1980), who argued that rational eco-
nomic agents would incorporate expected inflationary differentials in their negoti-
ated contracts. Consequently, they would prefer to invoice in the currency which 
was viewed as being stable when expectations were formed, in the sense it has lower 
expected variations in the inflation rate relative to other competing currencies. 
If on the other hand relative price changes are considered, Cornell showed 
that such variations will produce real changes in the exchange rate, even though 
the general price levels in the two countries are constant. Since the effect of 
relative price changes depends on the assumption of different preferences in the 
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two countries ( consumers in each country assign different weights to the various 
goods in a given bundle ), then, in order to bear the exchange risk involved, one 
trader must be paid to accept invoicing to be conducted in the foreign currency, 
since each party would like to write the contract in its own currency. However, 
since future prices are not known with certainty, i.e. both the general price level 
and the relative price level are randomly distributed over time, in general, price 
risk can not be eliminated. Nevertheless, general guidance may be given. If the 
inflation rates are highly variable in both countries, contracts would experience the 
minimum distortion in their real values if they are invoiced in a third currency. In 
the more obvious case, if the inflation rate is more variable in one country relative 
to the other, invoicing would have to be conducted in the more stable currency. 
Lastly, if the levels of variations in both countries follow approximately similar 
behavior, the importer and the exporter are most likely to be indifferent as to 
what currency the contract should be invoiced in. 
In an attempt to explain the effect of inflation differentials on the practice of 
contract invoicing in developing countries, the Bilson-Magee hypothesis, was de-
veloped. This hypothesis states that all traders in countries with the risk of high 
inflation will prefer to price in the stronger ( low-inflation or appreciating ) cur-
rency of the trading partner. Consequently, bilateral trade between developing and 
developed countries is invoiced in the latter countries' currencies. Another reason 
for this type of denomination is the behavior of economic variables in developing 
countries. The hyp~othesis~ argues that economic variables in these countries are 
not consistent with expectations, which inflicts real costs on the value of interna-
tional trade contracts ( Rao and Magee, 1980-b ). This could justify, according to 
the hypothesis, the current behavior of avoiding contracts being denominated in a 
developing country's currency. 
To conclude, there is overwhelming agreement on the method of invoicing if 
there is a differential of the inflation rates of the trading partners. Both the 
importer and the exporter tend to prefer a more stable currency ( in terms of 
variations ), since the choice of a stable currency is positively associated with the 
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real value of the contract. 
vi. Degree of Risk Aversion 
Earlier in the survey we have defined several types of risk which are likely to be 
encountered by a trader in the international market. However, there is no reason to 
believe that individuals faced with the same kind of risk would behave identically. 
Rather, their willingness to bear risk depends to a large extent on their degree 
of risk aversion. While a risk-averse person needs to be paid to take risk, a risk 
lover would bear the uncertainty involved in a given transaction without such a 
requirement; rather, he would pay a premium for the privilege of bearing risk. On 
the other hand, individuals who would take risk even if they are not compensated, 
are called risk-neutral agents 2 1. 
The analysis of the U.S. import invoicing practice conducted by Magee (1974) 
examined some of the determinants of the selected invoicing schemes and argued 
that one of the factors that may explain the differences in the practice of invoicing 
Japanese and German exports to the U.S. is the nature of the risk degree involved. 
Magee viewed Japanese exporters as being less risk averse than U.S. importers, and 
hence accepted the denomination of contracts in the importer's currency. German 
exporters are more risk averse than their U.S. customers, and consequently insisted 
on contracts being written in the Deutsche mark. 
Thus, if traders are risk averse, it is expected that they would react negatively 
to an increase in risk in trade" Nonetheless, if the decline in the-volume of trade,, 
as exchange rate risk rises, results in a reduction in welfare, then increasing the 
volume of trade would constitute a legitimate macroeconomic objective. During 
the period after the Bretton Woods agreement, instability in the exchange rates 
has been blamed for the decline in the volume of trade ( Akhtar-Hilton (1984), 
Cushman (1983) ), and the transmission of inflation which is caused by and passed 
through the exchange rates ( pass-through effect ). Moreover, if contractors are 
2 1 I n the present context, risk aversion refers to the degree of avoiding changes in the expected 
value of a trade contract, which may result from an exchange risk or other types of risk. 
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risk averse, then fluctuations in exchange rates can affect the decision of producers 
and consumers in many ways. Competitiveness is an essential feature of production 
and trade; however, this is affected by exchange rate changes since these changes 
influence the prices producers pay and charge ( their relative prices ). Profit 
margins are thus affected. 
Several studies have analyzed the effect of exchange rate risk on both the equi-
librium price and quantity. Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) tested this hypothesis 
empirically and reported several observations. Firstly, exchange risk was found 
to have a positive impact on the price charged by exporters when they bear the 
exchange risk, and a negative impact when importers bear the risk 2 2 . If exporters 
expect exchange rate uncertainty, they would adjust their prices to include the 
risk factor. However, importers would reduce their demand for imports when they 
bear the exchange risk, thus prices would decline 2 3. Secondly, the effects of ex-
change rate uncertainty in sixteen cases of multilateral and bilateral trade flows 
analyzed for the U.S. and Germany were found to have no significant impact on 
the volume of trade. Furthermore, Hooper and Kohlhagen confirmed the results 
obtained by Magee (1974) and Grassman (1973-a, 1973-b, 1976): trade is invoiced 
predominantly in the exporter's currency and so exchange risk is endured largely 
by importers. For U.S. imports, which are predominantly in dollars, the impact 
of exchange risk on price was found to be negative. Thus, exchange risk is borne 
largely by exporters as a result of this denomination scheme of contracts. 
Another study conducted by Akhtar and Hilton (1984) concluded that there is 
evidence to imply that exchange rate risk does have impacts on the volume of trade, 
as well as the price of traded goods. Exchange rate risk ( uncertainty ) is defined 
to include both an observable component, which is the ex post variability in the 
nominal effective exchange rate index, and an unobservable component which is 
formed on an ex ante basis by economic agents. Simply, using the variability in the 
2 2Hooper and Kohlhagen denned exchange risk as the difference between the current spot 
exchange rate and the forward rate 90 days earlier. 
2 3Exchange rate risk may arise in the present setting if at least part of the contract is invoiced 
in the exporter's currency. 
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exchange rate after variability has occurred undermines the fact that before this 
variability became known, agents could have formed different expectations about 
that variability. However, there is no feasible mean of modeling this component. 
Fitting the model to the U.S. and Germany data revealed that exchange rate 
variability has a negative impact on the volume of trade in manufactured goods. 
Gotur (1985) extended Akhtar-Hilton's model by including a larger sample of 
countries, and tested the robustness of the model over different sampled observa-
tions. She found no significant and consistent statistical evidence to conclude that 
exchange risk had an impact on volume of trade. In an explanation of the findings 
of Akhtar and Hilton, Gotur argued that they had used a less acceptable method 
of correcting for serial correlation in the data, and they should have used a broader 
index of effective exchange rate ( Gotur used the M E R M index ) 2 4 . 
Although Akhtar and Hilton discounted the use of variability in the real ex-
change rate as a proxy for exchange rate uncertainty 2 5. Cushman (1983) used 
this variability as a measure of exchange risk, and argued that some studies which 
did not find a significant impact of exchange risk on the volume of trade failed to 
allow for lags of sufficient length to work through the system. Thus, testing this 
model, Cushman found variability in the exchange rate to have negative effects on 
trade volume, when he fitted the data for six major industrial countries. However, 
potential reasons given as decisive in yielding this conclusion are not simple to 
identify1 In^this respect, Cushman wrote: 
~ The factors making a difference in this current attempt' could be either 
the specifications of the equations in real terms, or the specification of 
the risk variable (standard deviation with quarterly observation over a 
year's time rather than a shorter time period), or the longer lags we 
were willing to try 2 6 . 
2 4 This is derived from the IMF's Multilateral Exchange Rate Model (MERM). It includes 18 
countries, whereas the index used by Akhtar and Hilton includes 10 countries. 
2 5 M . Akhtar, and S. Hilton, " Effects of Exchange Rate Uncertainty on German and U.S. 
Trade, " Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 9 (Spring 1984), p. 10. 
2 f l D . Cushman, " The Effects of Real Exchange Rate Risk on International Trade, " Journal 
of International Economics, vol. 15 (1983), p. 59. 
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A survey of the potential effects of exchange rate variability on international 
trade was conducted by the International Monetary Fund (1984). In general, 
this study reviewed the evidence presented by other authors and analyzed their 
assumptions as well as conclusions. Although the survey found a rise in exchange 
rate instability since the move toward a more flexible exchange rate regime by the 
industrial countries, little evidence was revealed about the negative effects of this 
instability on the volume of international trade. However, this does not undermine 
the importance of exchange rate variability in analyzing international trade. The 
survey concludes: 
The failure to establish a statistical link between exchange rate vari-
ability and trade does not, of course, prove that a causal link does 
not exist. It may be that the measures of variability are inadequate 
measures of uncertainty; that other factors overwhelm the impact of 
variability in the estimating equations; or that the presence of statis-
tical problems . . .interferes with the effectiveness of statistical tests 2 7. 
Clearly, this magnifies the difficulty associated with measuring exchange rate 
variability, and how, in a dynamic world, to separate its causal effect on trade from 
the effects of other factors, where the effects of exchange rate risk may facilitate 
themselves through other variables, such as prices of traded goods. 
The- potential impacts of exchange risk on exporters and importers were dis-
cussed further by Baron (1976), who argued that most studies of the effect of risk on 
the denomination choice of contracts, implicitly have risk embodied in their models 
by allowing for a lag from the time of contracting until the date of payment. Baron 
(1976) argued that theoretically, the seller will still face risk even if contracts call 
for immediate payment. The elimination of payment lag will eliminate part of the 
exchange risk, but not transaction risk ( which is part of the exchange risk ), if 
"Exchange Rate Volatility and World Trade. IMF Occasional Paper, no. 28 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund, July 1984), p. 36. 
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contracts are invoiced in the importer's currency, because the exporter will bear 
the exchange cost of converting the foreign currency into its own currency. On the 
other hand, if contracts are invoiced in the currency of the exporter, the quantity 
demanded will be variable since the exporter does not know prior to the contract 
what the importer's price will be at the time when the importer approaches the 
goods market. Such uncertainties could be eliminated if the exporter can adjust 
the price he is charging for every movement in the exchange rate. For example, if 
the exporter is able to adjust his price, then his revenues from sales will not change 
as a result of changes in the exchange rate, since the selling price can be changed 
so as to offset the effects of fluctuations in the exchange rate on revenues. 
Baron (1976) integrated the theoretical model to account for the effect of ex-
change rate regimes on the choice of invoicing practices. Under the floating ex-
change rate system, Baron argued, the price charged by risk-averse exporters will, 
in general, be higher than the price demanded by the same exporter had the world 
been on the fixed exchange system if the contract is invoiced in the importer's 
currency. In contrast, if contracts are invoiced in the currency of the exporter, a 
transaction carried out under a system of floating exchange rate will induce the 
exporter to charge lower prices in order to induce the importer to buy the goods, 
since the importer will be bearing the exchange risk involved in transacting. 
Aliber (1976) compared the performance of foreign exchange markets during 
the periods of floating exchange rate with that during pegged exchange periods for 
several industrial countries' cross exchange rates. The study $hdwed~that exchange 
risk increased sharply under the floating system (1973-1974), relative to the pegged 
periods (1962-1967). Moreover, price risk, measured as percentage deviations from 
purchasing power parity with the U.S., was found to be significantly larger in the 
period of floating rates compared to the pegged rate period. However, the causality 
is not clearly defined, since other economic variables changed after the flexible 
exchange-rate regime was adopted. For example, monetary and fiscal policies were 
modified so as to help achieve the economic targets in a given economy after 
adopting the new regime. 
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Wihlborg (1978) argued that a particular level of risk need not be a result 
of adopting a certain exchange rate regime, rather, it may be the consequence 
of official policies implemented by governments. For example, if the domestic 
government aims to control the domestic real rate of return, it may achieve that 
by discouraging the outflow of capital from the country. Then it may increase 
currency risk. 
Faced with these uncertainties, firms tend to seek the possible ways of mini-
mizing and thus avoiding risks. Various methods have been developed to provide 
such protection, although their contributions are not equally effective. The for-
ward market by far is the most popular, relative to other methods, despite its 
limitations. 
IV.6. The Forward Market and Covering Risk 
Transactions across national borders involve the possibility of being exposed to 
the various types of risk. Although political risk can not be quantified easily and 
is thus difficult to cover in the financial market, the practice of covering for risks 
which may arise in the financial sense, such as exchange risk, has been adopted by 
the financial community. 
The literature has identified several methods which traders can use to cover 
risk. Firstly, it may be feasible for the traders to include an exchange rate clause 
in tbj2 contract, specifying that any change in the exchange rate will be borne by-
either party. Secondly, traders may seek to transfer their risk to a financial or 
commercial institution, such as a bank, that will implement the payment or the 
collection. Thirdly, traders can hedge the risk by obtaining the required foreign 
currency at the time, and holding it until the maturity date of the contract or 
fourthly, they could acquire the foreign currency at an earlier date and pay at 
the time of entering into the contract or any later date. Fifthly, a multi-currency 
basket of foreign exchange may be held in anticipation of conducting foreign trade, 
and consequently, payments. Finally, a forward transaction may be entered into 
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( Van Nieuwkerk ,1979 ). 
The literature has devoted considerable time to the option of covering forward 
and hedging forward so as to reduce risk in international trade, compared to the 
time allocated to analyze the other methods. Van Nieuwkerk (1979) argued that 
there is evidence to support this practice as other methods have not been as widely 
used in international financing practices as has the forward covering. 
The use of covering or hedging forward may depend on the type of exposure 
a firm is likely to experience. McRae and Walker (1980) clarified this by defining 
covering as the act of: 
Protecting the value of the future proceeds of an international trade 
transaction, usually by buying or selling the proceeds in the forward 
market 2 8. 
Hedging refers to a similar action but under different exposure. Hedging may 
be defined as: 
The protection of the accounting value of foreign currency assets and 
liabilities against unrealized foreign exchange ( translation ) losses, by, 
for example, forward sales or purchases 2 9. 
Although there is some distinction in the definitions of covering and hedging, 
the distinction is very minor and we will, as is often~clorie in theliterature, use these 
two acts of reducing risk interchangeably. Hedging by using the forward market 
may be illustrated by considering a Japanese exporter who is to receive payments 
for his exports invoiced in pounds in 90 days. He can eliminate the exchange risk 
which may affect the real value of the contract by selling the expected pounds in 
the forward market, i.e. to deliver the pounds at a future date. Alternatively, the 
exporter can approach the British financial market and borrow pounds, convert 
2 8 T . W. McRae and D. P. Walker, Foreign Exchange Management (N.Y.: Prentice-Hall Inter-
national, Inc., 1980), p. 273. 
2 9 McRae and Walker, p. 276. 
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them into yen and invest the amount in Japan for a period equal to that of the 
contract. In addition, the exporter would have to purchase in the forward market 
an amount equal to that expected to be paid on the borrowed principal. Then, 
when the exporter receives the pounds agreed upon in the contract, he would use 
that to pay his liability in pounds in the British market, and use the interest 
received from his investment to pay for the forward contract, which covers the 
interest on the principal. 
Grassman estimated the use of forward contracts in covering exchange risk in 
Sweden in 1968 and in 1973. In 1973 about 11 percent of foreign trade trans-
actions were covered by forward contracts, compared to only about 5 percent in 
1968. Furthermore, the data for 1973 show that large transactions are normally 
covered by the forward market. Grassman argued that there is no clear evidence 
on correlation between the use of cover and the currencies used to denominate 
contracts per se. However, covering is found to be associated with particular types 
of goods, i.e. transactions of certain goods were covered, whereas those involving 
other types of goods were not. 
Carse et al. (1980) analyzed the behavior of British firms and estimated the per-
centage of forward covering according to the value of transactions and the number 
of transactions sampled. As reported in Table (6), forward covering is very small 
for exports, where only 4 percent of contracts classified according to the value of 
transactions were covered by the forward market and 2 percent classified accord-
ing to numbers of transactions. However, the percentage of- imported transactions 
covered by forward contracts was substantially greater, using either classification. 
In spite of the use of the forward market in the U .K. , the survey conducted 
by the authors revealed that market participants have sought invoicing in pounds 
as the best possible protection against risk. As it can be inferred from Table 
(6), in many cases importers and exporters invoiced their contracts in pounds, or 











Sterling invoicing 75.9 85.5 30.3 28.2 
Covered forward 3.7 1.9 25.3 15.4 
Other methods 7.9 1.7 5.2 3.80 
Exposed to risk 12.5 10.9 39.2 52.6 
Source: Carse et al. (1980), p. 67. 
Table 6: Methods of reducing foreign exchange risk in the U.K. (percentage) 
Testing McKinnon's classification with respect to covering, they found no con-
sistent pattern. According to the types of goods traded, if the number of transac-
tions in exports and imports is used, about 1 percent of exports of tradables I and 
7 percent of tradables I I were covered by forward contracts. However, the figures 
for imports are higher, where about 24 percent of tradables I and 18 percent of 
tradables I I were covered by the same method. 
Since forward cover is a method of covering for expected risk, we may expect 
covering international transactions to increase during periods of instability in the 
exchange market. Van Nieuwkerk (1979) tested this hypothesis for the Netherlands 
and found a rise in the use of the forward market during the period from 1968 
to 1Q.73, which was a period of relative instability in the international monetary 
system, and a period of unrest for some vehicle currencies such as the dollar and 
the pound ( Table 7 ). 
Limited use seems to be made of the forward market relative to what might be 
expected in view of the risk involved in contracting across countries and time. As 
the evidence from the data analyzed for Sweden, U .K. and the Netherlands shows, 
firms have minimized the covering of their transactions and preferred to have an 
open position for the duration of contracts. In spite of the availability of the 
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1968 1973 1976 
Imports. 
Guilders 23.5 26.2 31.4 
Forward market 14.3 32.4 31.6 
External compensation 7.10 7.60 13.0 
Total covered imports 44.9 66.2 76.0 
Uncovered imports 55.1 33.8 24.0 
Exports. 
Guilders 42.3 45.3 50.2 
Forward market 18.4 22.5 22.7 
External compensation 1.0 2.0 4.4 
Total covered exports 61.7 69.8 77.3. 
Uncovered Exports 38.3 30.2 22.7 
Source: Van Nieuwkerk (1979), p. 90. 
Table 7: Various methods of covering exchange risk in the Netherlands (percentage) 
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forward exchange markets in all the industrial countries, except Iceland, and the 
emergence of this market or similar alternatives ( for example options, swaps and 
futures ), there has been limited use of forward cover in international trade 3 0 . There 
are several possible factors which may affect the use of the forward exchange rate 
market. Among these are: firstly, borrowing and lending in the foreign exchange 
market involve transactions and administrative costs, and in covering forward, the 
costs may exceed the expected benefits. Secondly, Grassman (1973-b), indicated 
that the forward markets are technically complicated. Thirdly, the maturity date 
on a forward contract, under present arrangements, may not conform with that 
period over which contractors like to cover, or the time when a contract matures 
( Carse et al. (1980), Magee and Rao (1980-b) and McKinnon (1979) ). 
Empirically, there appears to be a general reluctance to use hedging forward 
across firms, commodities and countries. Another method of covering risk, how-
ever, adopted on a smaller scale, involves the timing of payments. 
IV.7. Leads amd Lags 
In view of an anticipated devaluation of the contracted currency, firms may adopt 
the option of leading or lagging the payments involved. Leading, the act of acceler-
ating the settlement of payments, and lagging, the practice of delaying payments, 
if allowed for by a clause in the contract and the political institutions, could play a 
major role in shifting exchange risk and political risk between the various parties 
in international trade. Nevertheless, this technique may be used for the purpose 
of speculation with respect to interest rates. 
To clarify, consider two trading partners, a British importer and a U.S. exporter, 
who have agreed at a prior date to invoice the transaction in terms of the pound. 
Further, within the time that separates the contracting and the delivery dates, 
3 0 A n IMF study shows that all industrial countries, except Iceland, have forward exchange 
markets, with a few number of countries limiting the maturities on these. The reference is: 
Policies for Developing Forward Foreign Exchange Markets. IMF Occasional Paper, no. 60 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, June 1988). 
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expectations form in which the pound is expected to depreciate. Accordingly, the 
importer would have little incentive to alter the date of the contract's payments. 
However, the American exporter would be better off if it could accelerate the 
collection of the payments, so as to convert them into another currency and thus 
hope to avoid the lower purchasing power of the pound after the devaluation takes 
place. Had the contract been invoiced in terms of dollars, the importer would have 
wished to lead the payments, since the pound would be expected to loss some of 
its purchasing power in terms of the dollar. Meanwhile, the exporter would prefer 
to extend the credit to the importer, i.e. the exporter would lag the payments, so 
that the dollar would be worth more in terms of the pound. A similar argument 
would hold had there been expectation of the pound being revalued. Then, the 
importer would like to lag the payment, while the exporter would favor leading. 
Since this risk-minimizing scheme implicates a conflict of interests if used be-
tween traders of different interests, there is very little discussion of it in the con-
temporary literature. The use of leads and lags is adopted more frequently between 
the various affiliates of a multinational corporation, since it could serve as a tool 
to shift liabilities, assets, risks, taxes and capital, and is often used to speculate 
on interests. Einzig (1967) referred to the situation involving sterling in 1957 as 
an example of leads and lags. In 1957, sterling was anticipated to depreciate, thus 
people who had expected to receive payments in sterling sold forward, to avoid 
holding sterling at a time when its relative value would be lower. On the other 
hand, those"expecting to make payments left their position in the foreign exchange -
marker uncovered, in anticipation of relatively cheaper sterling in the future. 
In summary, invoicing contracts in international trade tends to be correlated 
with the perception of stability in the exchange rate by traders, although this risk 
is not the only one a firm may be exposed to. 
Bilson (1983) has neatly summarized the main generalizations of the empiri-
cal studies conducted into the issue of contract invoicing in international trade. 
Firstly, according to Grassman's rule, as Bilson calls the formula labeled by others 
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as Grassman's law, the exporter's currency is likely to be the dominant currency in 
invoicing trade in manufactured products between developed countries. Secondly, 
the use of the forward market as a hedging device has been very limited, although 
the introduction of the flexible exchange rate regime may have increased its appeal. 
Thirdly, trade in primary products and capital assets is typically denominated in 
a vehicle currency; the U.S. dollar remains the most popular currency. Fourthly, 
the currency of a developed country tends to dominate invoicing of trade between 
developed and less developed countries. Lastly, in international contracting cur-
rencies of countries with relatively more stable inflation rates than others tend to 
be favored over currencies which experience a greater degree of variation in their 
market values. 
The empirical as well as the theoretical work conducted in the field of contract 
invoicing builds on the results reported by Grassman in the late 60's and the early 
70's. From his analysis of the Swedish foreign trade invoicing practices, Grassman 
found about 66 percent of Sweden's export contracts to be invoiced in the Swedish 
domestic currency. When considered as an importer, its currency was used about 
26 percent to invoice trade contracts, and a smaller percentage was denominated 
in a vehicle currency. Later, Grassman found a similar pattern of invoicing was 
adopted in Denmark. 
The literature which followed that concentrated most of its efforts on explaining 
Grassman's findings and tried to determine the various factors involved in affecting 
the currency of denomination of trade contracts. ~ 
The empirical models described the problem facing a trader as one of mini-
mizing the loss of profitability, and thus minimizing the possible risks involved in 
dealing in the foreign market. Exchange risk, price risk and political risks are con-
sidered to be the most important types of risk a firm must aim at reducing. The 
firm's success depends to a large extent on the choice of the currency of invoice , 
which itself is determined by a variety of factors. Among these are: i) tradition 
and habit; ii) type of goods; iii) market power; iv) inflation differentials and the 
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stability of inflation rates; v) degree of risk aversion. 
Grassman similar to most other authors, found tradition affects the choice of 
invoicing currency for oil. McKinnon, Page and Magee, have specifically con-
cluded that certain goods tend to be invoiced in a particular currency, whereas 
others are very likely to be invoiced in another currency. Since producers tend to 
be smaller in numbers and face heterogeneous consumers, many authors believe 
that exporters have greater market power and use it to get contracts invoiced in 
their own currencies. The major deviation from this hypothesis was the Japanese 
invoicing practice, where Japanese firms denominate most of their exports in the 
U.S. dollar. 
Since inflation erodes the purchasing power of a currency, inflation differentials 
and the level of variations in the inflation rates are seen to constitute a major 
determinant of the choice of invoicing contracts. Hooper and Kohlhagen, Bilson, 
Magee and Rao and Aliber, among others, have stressed the importance of this 
determinant. They concluded that a currency which could qualify as an invoicing 
currency for international contracts would have to have the least variations in its 
purchasing power relative to other competing currencies. 
In addition, degree of risk aversion plays a prominent role in affecting the 
currency of denomination of trade contracts. Although the risk aversion factor is 
a leading determinant under the flexible exchange regime ( or adjustable peg ), 
its-importance _tends_to decline if the world adopts a, fixed exchange rate regime. 
Empirical evidence shows that exchange risk has a tendency to rise under a flexible 
exchange rate regime compared with a fixed exchange rate regime; however, these 
results must be treated with caution. The data analyzed in the models considered, 
covered in most cases the transitional period of the early 70's. 
Faced with these uncertainties even in the behavior of the determinants of the 
choice of the invoicing currency, firms have a tendency to cover their transactions. 
Such cover has usually taken the form of writing contracts in the domestic currency 
of the firms, and to a smaller extent, the forward market has been approached. 
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A summary of what different models have defined as the major determinants 
of the choice of currency used to denominate international trade transactions is 
provided in Table (8). 
It may be argued that the alternative issues raised in this survey are of impor-
tance to the discussion of the choice of the optimal currency for invoicing oil. In 
particular, for the Gulf Cooperation Council member states, any model which is 
designed to examine the impact of the choice of an optimal currency for invoicing 
oil must incorporate the behavior of their domestic currencies with respect to the 
currency in which oil is invoiced, and with respect to the currencies of their major 
trading partners. As we have demonstrated in the present review, the value of an 
expected level of income is a function of exchange rate fluctuations. Thus, for the 
G C C countries, invoicing oil in every currency of theirs, i.e. each country invoices 
oil in terms of its currency, does not eliminate the exchange rate risk which may 
emerge due to denominating their imports in terms of other currencies than the 
currency(s) in which oil is invoiced. Accordingly, the methodology constructed in 
the next chapter aims to integrate both issues, that is the invoicing currency for 
oil as well as the choice of exchange regime adopted by the G C C member states. 
113 
Author/(Model ) The determinants of the currency choice 
Aliber (1976) Costs risk, exchange risk, price risk, 
inflation differentials. 
Grassman (1973,a,b,1976) Tradition and habit, size of transaction, 
market power, types of goods, 
availability of forward market. 
Page (1977) Market power, types of goods, the trading 
partner's country, inflation differentials 
Magee (1973,1974) Tradition, types of goods, government 
regulations, degree of risk aversion, 
market power 
McKinnon (1979) Types of goods, the importer's ability 
to adjust its selling prices 
Bilson (1983) The currency of invoicing inputs, 
degree of risk aversion, market power, 
inflation differentials 
Baron (1976) Comparison of costs and benefits of 
various invoicing, degree of risk 
aversion, market power, inflation 
differentials 
Magee and Rao (1980,a,b) Inflation differentials, degree of risk 
aversion,-deviations-from PPP 
Cornell (1980) Inflation differentials, relative price 
changes 
Hooper and Kohlhagen 
(1978) 
Degree of risk aversion, inflation 
differentials 
Carse et al. Types of goods 
Table 8: Comparison of the determinants of the choice of invoicing trade contracts 
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V 0 The Methodology 
In a closed economy, policymakers have to concentrate on internal objectives, 
and do not need to worry about external objectives. However, once an economy 
trades across its borders, both of these objectives tend to be taken into considera-
tion. Internal objectives ( or internal balance ), in general, refer to full employment 
or a rate of unemployment which is about the natural rate, i.e. corresponding to 
the level of employment such that labor demand equals labor supply at an equilib-
rium real wage 3 1 and a rate of inflation of no more than 2 to 3 percent per year.32 
External objectives ( or external balance ) refer to equilibrium in the balance of 
payments, or maintaining disequilibrium below a certain level. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council member states may be classified as open economies, 
according to the criterion specified by Heller (1978). The figures for imports as a 
proportion of Gross Domestic Product for the G C C countries, are reported in Ta-
ble (9). The rates recorded in 1988 vary from more than 73 percent for Bahrain, to 
as low as 17.48 percent for Qatar. This may be explained by the small contribution 
from the oil sector to the gross domestic product in Bahrain, with a value of about 
17.3 percent in 1987, compared to 30.3 percent for Qatar 3 3. However, Bahraini 
imports include oil imported from Saudi Arabia, which is mainly re-exported, thus 
raising the contribution of imports to the total gross domestic product. Qatar, 
however, lacked the re-export market that emerged for other GCC states such as 
the U.A.E.; thus formedli smaller proportion of the gross domestic product. Aside 
from these observations, the G C C member states have shown a similar degree of 
openness. 
Moreover, the ratio of imports to aggregate consumption ( private and public ), 
remains high. This is shown in Table (10) for the member states of the Gulf 
3 1 Milton Friedman, " The Role of Monetary Policy, " American Economic Review, 58 (March 
1968), p. 1-17. 
3 2Dominick Salvatore, International Economics. 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1987), p. 
459. 
3 3 Gulf Economic and Financial Report, vol. 4. no. 10 (Manama: Gulf International Bank. 
December 1989), p. 2-8. 
115 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
1980 93.04 23.70 28.97 18.36 26.24 31.06 
1981 96.47 28.87 31.72 17.50 22.58 29.39 
1982 78.47 38.38 35.47 25.58 26.17 30.95 
1983 63.00 32.56 33.06 22.45 27.64 29.54 
1984 68.31 30.34 33.25 16.91 29.05 25.10 
1985 65.59 28.69 33.62 18.51 23.64 24.19 
1986 65.97 30.14 35.49 21.91 22.96 28.84 
1987 78.92 22.50 25.54 21.53 24.85 29.33 
1988 73.85 25.88 31.31 17.48 28.40 35.75 
Source: Data from 1980-1982 are derived From: G.C.C. M ain 
Economic Indicators (1989), vol. 4, Dhahran: King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals, 1989, p. 85, and p.-98. Data from 1983-1988, 
^were derived from: Gulf Economic and Financial Report, vol. 4, no. 10 
(Manama: Gulf International Bank, December 1989), p. 2-7. 
Table 9: Shares of imports to total gross domestic product (1980-1988), % 
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Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
1980 101.2 81.59 72.30 n.a. 122.2 
1981 98.75 73.50 66.80 80.00 87.93 
1982 91.25 72.06 65.63 73.62 82.38 
1983 87.18 74.80 57.27 67.90 78.92 
1984 74.49 71.69 58.00 66.88 72.35 
1985 69.82 71.01 56.23 60.93 69.25 
1986 63.47 61.22 n.a. 55.66 64.56 
1987 n.a. 57.04 n.a. 50.39 65.89 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1989. 
Country page. 
n.a.: Not available. 
The ratio is defined as the sum of government and private 
consumption in the denominator, whilst imports are in the 
numerator. For Bahrain oil imports were excluded, because 
they were for re-export. Data for Qatar were not available. 
Table 10: The ratio of imports to aggregate consumption (1980-1987), % 
Cooperation Council. Countries with a more active re-export sector, such as the 
-U.A.E., have recorded the highest ratios. The reductions in_the ratiqsare observed 
to be -related to oil revenues. One may observe that during periods when oil 
revenues rose, imports have also risen, but by more than consumption. During the 
years when oil revenues experienced a decline, the import sector was affected by 
this more than consumption. In addition, since the upsurge in oil revenues in the 
mid 1970's, domestic production of import substitutes has been stimulated both 
by government legislations as well as by the prospect of profit. 
However, if the degree of openness is measured using the ratio of the sum of 
exports and imports to gross domestic product, a different picture can be drawn. 
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For example, in 1988 this measure indicated an openness degree of 137 percent for 
Bahrain, which reflects the large amount of trade conducted by Bahrain, for whom 
the dependence on oil revenues is the smallest. For the other GCC member states, 
the slowdown of economic activities after the decline in oil revenues in 1988, has 
reduced their degree of openness. For example, this measure had a value of 61.31 
percent for Kuwait and 76.39 percent for Oman. For Qatar, which depended less on 
re-export activity than the other G C C states, the decline in exports has reduced its 
degree of openness in 1988 to about 47.83 percent, compared to about 91 percent 
in 1985. A similar conclusion may be drawn for Saudi Arabia. In 1985 the measure 
recorded 86 percent, compared to about 59 percent reported in 1988. An exception 
is the U.A.E., for which the degree of openness declined from 92 percent in 1985 
to about 87 percent in 1988. This may be explained by the large re-export sector 
present in the U.A.E. Despite the efforts of the G C C member states to diversify 
their economies, the domestic production base is relatively narrow and there is a 
distinct dependence on oil exports as the major item from which most of these 
countries' income is derived (see Table 11 ). Therefore, development plans tend to 
be closely related to the level of revenues received from oil exports34. 
Moreover, government budgets depend on the expected value of oil revenues, 
and private investment and spending rely on these budgets. Governments in the 
region employ almost all the national labor force, as well as providing the vast 
majority of services to the public. Furthermore, as the dominant employer and 
purchaser of services-and goods,-the government can affect investment plans-and 
consumption patterns. Investment is affected both directly, through direct govern-
ment demand, and indirectly as a result of the government influencing the salary 
scale, allowances, cash transfer, and availability of loans to the public. There is 
also the demand for housing units from the public, which affects the demand of the 
latter group for goods and services from the private investors. Thus, for a member 
state of the G C C , the value of oil revenues at any given time is important. As 
a matter of fact, the contribution from these revenues to the total government 
3 4Further discussion of this point is presented in Chapter VI. 
118 
Year Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
1976 77.2 92.5 98.7 96.7 99.7 96.7 
1977 78.4 91.6 97.6 98.3 99.6 95.7 
1978 79.9 91.8 94.5 96.6 99.2 95.4 
1979 81.4 94.0 94.7 95.1 99.1 94.3 
1980 93.2 92.3 96.1 94.5 99.2 93.9 
1981 93.0 87.2 94.1 94.0 99.3 97.9 
1982 85.0 82.7 92.3 93.5 98.8 97.6 
1983 82.9 87.1 91.7 90.8 97.8 87.2 
1984 87.7 89.7 91.7 93.3 96.9 88.9 
1985 86.6 90.3 93.0 93.9 94.4 88.1 
1986 84.1 88.1 89.1 91.7 91.0 92.1 
1987 83.9 90.0 89.8 90.3 - 90.9 72.8 
Source: G C C Main Economic Indicators (1989), vol. 4, Dhahran: King 
Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, 1989, p. 50. 
Table 11: Share of oil in total exports of the GCC countries (1976-1987), % 
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Country- 19861 19872 19883 
Bahrain 61.00 45.00 52.30 
Kuwait 88.00 88.40 87.10 
Oman 75.40 81.60 73.80 
Qatar 75.00 88.00 88.00 
Saudi Arabia 66.60 69.40 59.30 
United Arab Emirates 84.00 82.00 72.40 
(1) Source: Gulf Economic and Financial Report, vol. 2, no. 10 
(Manama: Gulf International Bank, 1987). 
(2) Same source, vol. 3, no. 10, 1988. 
(3) Same source, vol. 3, no. 10, 1989. 
Table 12: Oil revenues as percentage of total government revenues in the G C C 
(1986-1988) 
revenues in the region have remained large. Table (12) shows oil revenues as a 
percentage of total government revenues for the G C C countries, where it is evi-
dent that oil provided the bulk of their governments' sources of income. In latter 
years, these shares begin to decline slightly, which is due mainly to the adoption of 
financing deficits through government borrowing. Nonetheless, the shares remain 
relatively high, and are considered to provide the bulk of funds for government 
budgets in the G C C countries. 
The dependence of the G C C economies on oil revenues as the primary source 
of income exposes them to fluctuations in the price of oil as well as to exchange 
rate risk, if oil is invoiced in a currency which fluctuates vis-a-vis the domestic 
currencies. At present, with oil invoiced in terms of the U.S. dollar, this exchange 
risk has been totally avoided by four of the G C C member states, who practically 
peg their currencies to the dollar, and partially avoided by Kuwait which pegs to 
a basket of currencies in which the dollar retains a large weight. The interviews 
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conducted by the researcher in the period from the 10th of February to the 10th of 
March 1990, which sampled bankers, foreign exchange advisors ( both at the central 
banks as well as commercial banks in the region ), officials at central banks, such as 
the governor of the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, the governor of the 
Qatar Monetary Agency, the deputy governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency, 
and the directors of the Economic and Research departments at the Central Bank 
of Oman and the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, were designed to explore the 
official point of view of the exchange rate arrangements adopted by the G C C 
member states. Through these interviews, it was concluded that a relationship 
between the exchange rate regime adopted and the currency invoicing of oil is 
both essential and influential. 
Thus the argument put forward by the authorities at the central banks and 
the monetary agencies in the G C C countries that pegging to the same currency in 
which oil is invoiced minimizes the uncertainty in government budget processes, 
since the value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currencies is known ( aside 
from possible fluctuations in output or price of oil, which are exogenous ), is 
valid. Note that such certainty is important in economies which are government-
dependent, such as those of the GCC countries35. However, pegging to the currency 
in which these countries receive their income does not imply that this is the optimal 
policy in terms of the purchasing power of oil revenues, because this ignores the 
potential effects of price fluctuations caused by exchange rate changes amongst the 
trading partners, or between the domestic currencies of the~GCC member states 
and "the currencies of their trading partners. These revenues are used to finance 
imports, where imports axe not totally invoiced in dollars. 
In an attempt to analyze the import invoicing currency practices in the GCC 
member states, about 1000 questionnaires were mailed to importers, supplemented 
by 50 questionnaires dispatched to bankers. The purpose of both sets of question-
naires was similar; however, the one mailed to importers was designed to provide 
3 5 This argument is based on the author's interviews with the Governors of the central banks 
or other officials in the G C C member states. Complete references to these interviews are listed 
in the bibliography. 
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Dollar Pound Mark Lira Yen Franc Others 
1984 59.24 4.36 7.65 2.05 10.09 1.72 14.89 
1985 52.28 5.49 8.41 2.50 10.65 2.03 18.64 
1986 51.63 5.18 8.30 3.28 9.66 2.20 19.75 
1987 57.44 4.88 6.48 2.97 7.65 1.82 18.75 
1988 59.65 3.88 6.66 3.02 6.69 1.57 18.53 
~ ^ ^ 7 . , — y 
Central Bank of Kuwait, January-March 1989), p. 19. 
Table 13: Financing Kuwaiti imports according to currencies (1984-1988), % 
more detailed information, than that posted to bankers. Although the rate of re-
turn from both sets was relatively low ( only 37 of the 1000 were received back, and 
only 5 of the 50 questionnaires ), they have provided some information about the 
invoicing practices and the use of risk covering. One may argue that, domination 
by expatriate entrepreneurs, the lack of taxation and the conservative nature of 
family-based businesses, have contributed negatively to the rate of response. The 
interviews reveal that not all imports are denominated in dollars. Bankers and 
importers have admitted that the dollar is used as a vehicle currency for invoic-
ing imports from developing countries, but imports from industrial countries are 
invoiced in the exporter-'s-currency.- -
The evidence provided by the authorities in Kuwait shows that in 1988 about 
50 percent of imports were invoiced in dollars. Meanwhile, as indicated in Table 
(13), the other currencies of the major industrial countries played a less prominent 
role. Nonetheless, one may argue that because of the similarities in the structure 
of the financial and commodity markets of the G C C countries, a similar invoicing 
scheme may be expected to characterize the import patterns of all other GCC 
member states. 
Furthermore, the results of data collected from questionnaires mailed to im-
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porters in the G C C member states reveal various kinds of currencies used to de-
nominate their imports. However, the dollar remains as a major currency. It 
emerges that trade amongst the G C C countries is denominated in the exporter's 
currency and the currency of the exporter tends to dominate the contracts of 
imports from the industrial countries. About 49 percent of importers surveyed 
indicated the use of the exporter's currency, whilst 33.3 percent have had their 
contracts denominated in dollars. As mentioned above, the role of the dollar in 
denominating imports to the GCC is further strengthened by their imports from 
developing countries in Asia, where exporters are encouraged by their economic 
institutions to obtain " hard currencies ". Evidence from sampled importers indi-
cates that the choice of the currency of invoicing in trade in the GCC countries, 
rests to a large extent on exporters, where 78.8 percent of sampled firms cited 
this behavior. Moreover, only 15.15 percent admitted their role in determining the 
choice of the currency invoicing of imports. Thus, the potential of an exchange risk 
is present, even if the domestic currencies of the G C C are pegged to the dollar36. 
Thus it may be argued that an optimal policy of invoicing must be chosen 
according to its ability to minimize fluctuations in the real value of oil revenues, 
which may originate from the exchange rate between the domestic currencies of 
the G C C member states and the currency in which oil is invoiced ( assuming the 
output of oil and the price level are given ), and from a weighted import price 
index used to determine the real value of oil revenues ( the nature of this price 
index will be cliscussed in the next section ). Consequently^ diseussing-the optimal 
currency invoicing for oil, while ignoring the relationship between the domestic 
currencies of the GCC countries and those of the countries from whom the G C C 
countries import, would not yield optimal results, since we would be then talking 
about the nominal value of oil revenues, which can be misleading. Given that the 
G C C member states are concerned with the value of oil revenues, the model may 
specified accordingly. 
3 6Bankers concluded that less than 5 percent of importers cover for risk, using any technique 
( see section B in the historical review in Chapter V I , for a possible justification for this). 
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Consider revenues from oil exports by a member state of the GCC, to be referred 
to as the domestic country. This may be specified as 
where 
NVORi —nominal value of oil revenues expressed in currency i 
P, = price of oil in currency i 
Q=quantity of oil 
i= currency(s) in which oil is invoiced, where i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n. 
For the domestic country, oil revenues would have to be converted into the 
domestic currency, unless i represents the domestic currency where oil is invoiced 
in i. However, if oil is invoiced in currency i, and i is not the domestic currency, then 
the exchange rate factor must be used to determine the domestic currency value of 
oil revenues. Assume that subscript h is associated with variables expressed either 
in the domestic currency, or associated with the domestic country. Then, if oil is 
invoiced in currency i, and i ^ h, the nominal value of oil revenues in terms of the 
domestic currency would be 
where 
NVORh =nominal value of oil revenues in currency h 
Eh/i*^ number of units of h per unit of i. 
Thus, the nominal value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency is the 
product of the nominal value of oil revenues in currency i, where i ^ h, multiplied 
by the exchange rate between the domestic currency and currency i. Obviously, if 
the currency in which oil is invoiced is the domestic currency, then the domestic 
currency value of nominal oil revenues is not affected by the exchange rate factor. 
However, once h is excluded as the currency of oil denomination, it is crucial to 
consider the relationship between the domestic currency and the currency in which 
oil is invoiced. 
NVORi = PiQ (1) 
NVORh = NVORiEh/i (2) 
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Equation (2) defines oil revenues as a nominal value. However, it is the real 
rather than the nominal value of oil revenues which occupies the authorities. Ac-
cording to macroeconomic theory, it is argued that economic agents, given a par-
ticular level of income, would be concerned with the purchasing power of that 
income. This purchasing power is inversely related to the price level. Thus, for 
the present analysis it is the real value of oil revenues which is assumed to be the 
relevant variable that the authorities are concerned with, i.e. no money illusion. 
Accordingly, assuming oil is invoiced in currency i where i ^ h, the real value 
of oil revenues may be defined as 
RVORh = NVOIUEh/i/Pk 
where 
Pk = a relevant price index. 
There are many candidates that may be used to represent the price deflator. A 
domestic, foreign, or import price index may be used; however, since oil revenues 
are used primarily to finance imports directly by the public sector, and indirectly 
by the private sectors, it may be reasonable to deflate the nominal value of oil 
revenues by a weighted import price index of the G C C member states. Considering 
this alternative, the real value of oil revenues in the domestic currency would be 
RVORh = NVORiEh/ilPh 
where 
Ph = weighted import price index of the GCC member states. 
Under a floating exchange rate regime, the domestic currency value of real oil 
revenues would change as a result of fluctuations in NVORi, E^/,, and Ph- In this 
case, a member state of the G C C would receive NVORi, and convert them into 
the domestic currency using the market determined exchange rate, Eh/i- Then 
using the weighted import price index, which is a weighted average of the price of 
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imports ( using trade shares ), and adjusted for the exchange rate, the real value 
of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency may be derived. The weighted 
import price index would be 
PH = (PiEh/1)a> + (P2Eh/2)a2 + ••• + (P«£fc/«) a n (3) 
where 
a i , 0:2,.. •, an = import shares from trading partners, 1, 2, . . . , n. 
However, if the domestic currency is fixed in terms of a single currency of 
a trading partner, or alternatively, to a basket of the currencies of its trading 
partners, variability amongst the currencies of the trading partners, would be an 
essential factor affecting the domestic price level via trade. At present, the curren-
cies of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and to a large extent, of 
Kuwait, have shown limited flexibility against the dollar. However, neither their 
imports nor their total trade is concentrated exclusively with the U.S., and neither 
is totally invoiced in dollars. Thus, pegging to the dollar ( or any other single 
currency ) would not insulate the domestic economy from those changes in the 
prices of traded goods, that are induced by exchange rate fluctuations, so long as 
not all currencies in the system are fixed in terms of the dollar ( or the currency 
concerned ). A mechanism designed to capture such a potential impact is provided 
by the Purchasing Power Parity relationship, as will be evident from next section. 
V . l ^ FoffHiulatiom of the M o d e l 
The following analysis is based on several assumptions. Firstly, the GCC member 
states trade with six major industrial countries: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the U.K., the U.S. Secondly, the economies of the G C C are small, in the sense 
that they take world prices as given, and open, so that import prices and exchange 
rate fluctuations can be transmitted to the domestic economies via trade. Thirdly, 
the floating exchange rate alternative is excluded from the possibilities considered 
for the G C C . Consequently, the currencies of the G C C member states are either 
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pegged to a single currency or to a basket of currencies. Fourthly, oil may be 
invoiced in a single currency or a basket of currencies. 
The discussion of the methodology is divided into two major sections. The 
first section derives the equations for the real value of oil revenues in terms of 
the domestic currency, if oil is invoiced in a single currency. The second section 
models the issue under the assumption that oil is invoiced in a basket of currencies. 
However, within each section, the analysis allows for many alternatives to which 
the domestic currencies of the GCC member states may be pegged. 
1.1. Single Currency Invoicing of Oil 
Assume that oil is invoiced in currency j , where j / h. Then the nominal value of 
oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency would be 
Expressing this value in terms of percentage change by using the logarithmic ap-
proximation, yields 
NVORh = NVORjEh/j (4) 
and the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency is 
RVORh = NVORh/Ph-
rvoTh = nvoTj + e^/j — Ph 
rvorh = nvorh — Ph (5) 
and the variance is 
rvori. = elver) + ° e h / } + ° l h 
rvoTh nvorh ' Ph (6) 
where 
Ph = ai{jPl + Cfc/0 + a2(P2 + eh/2) + 1" <*n(Pn + C f c / n ) . (7) 
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Note that throughout the presentation, the lower case letters represent percentage 
change in the relevant variable, except for the trade shares. For example, 
rvorh = lOOllniRVORl/RVORi-1)} 
where 
RVORlh = real value of oil revenues in currency h at time t 
RVORfj^1 = real value of oil revenues in currency h at time t-1. 
The percentage change in the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues 
is a function of the changes in the nominal value of these revenues, as well as 
the weighted import price index. Thus, it is important to consider the exchange 
rate factor, where the exchange rate between the domestic currency and that in 
which oil is invoiced directly affects the nominal value of oil revenues in terms of 
the domestic currency, and the exchange rates between the domestic currency and 
those of its trading partners affect the import price index, thus affecting the real 
value of oil revenues in terms of currency h. 
Furthermore, if the domestic currency is pegged to any of the six currencies 
of the industrial countries, or to an alternative basket of these currencies, or to 
predetermined baskets such as the S D R or the E C U , then the behavior of the 
exchange rates between the currency(s) to which the domestic currency is pegged 
vis-a-vis the rest of the currencies in the system, would be vital. Therefore, there 
is a seed to develop a mechanism via which these rates can be determined 3 7. 
In this regard, the monetary model presents the principle of purchasing power 
parity, PPP, which is assumed to reflect movements in exchange rates between the 
trading partners. These movements are assumed to be a function of inflation rates 
in these countries, as well as a random variable which may reflect random shocks 
to the exchange rates due to some other changes which affect the exchange rates, 
"Connol ly (1982, 1983) and Connolly and Yousef (1982), have derived expressions for the 
imported component of the domestic inflation rate under both single currency and a basket of 
currencies pegs. Explicitly, the derivation of makes use of their analysis. 
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and do not act through the inflation rates. P P P between currency i and currency 
j may be defined as 
Em = {Pi/Pj)ex^ (8) 
where 
Ei/j = units of currency i per unit of currency j 
Pi, Pj = inflation rates in country i and country j , respectively 
(ji = deviations from purchasing power parity due to random shocks to the P P P 
relationship. 
The error term (ji is assumed to be randomly distributed with zero mean and 
a variance which is given by cr| . Furthermore, adjacent observations of (^ are 
assumed to be unrelated. 
The domestic currency is related to currencies j and i through similar rela-
tionships. Therefore the relative purchasing power parity between the domestic 
currency and each of these currencies may be expressed as ( using logarithmic 
transformation ) : 3 8 
efc/i = Ph ~ Pi + (hi 
Zk/j = Ph~ Pj + (hj- (9) 
Subtracting the second expression from the first gives 3 9 
eh/i - e-hH= Ph - Pi ~ Ph + Pj+ (hi ~_(hj 
th/i ~ eh/j = Pj ~Pi + [(hi - (hj)- (10) 
Note that if either (hi or (hj is positive, then the domestic currency, h, has depre-
ciated vis-a-vis i in the first case, or j in the second. However, if (hi > (hj, then 
h has depreciated against i more than against j . Thus, relative to h, it may be 
3 8 Note that since the expected value of the error term is zero, taking the log of equation (8) 
yields: In Ei/j = In Pi — \npj + £ji \nexp. 
3 9 Note that, in terms of percentage change, e^/i — e^/j = e^/j, since Ej/i = Eh/i/Eh/j- How-
ever, eh/i =ph - Pi, and e h / j = pn - Pj- Substituting for eh/i and e^/j in e^/j, and substituting 
the new disturbance term, yields equation (11). 
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said that i has appreciated in terms of j , which is represented by [fa — fa] = 
Substituting this equality in equation (10) yields 
eh/i ~ e h / j = pj -Pi + Zij. (11) 
Accordingly, deviations of the exchange rate between any two currencies from their 
corresponding price ratio, i.e. deviations from the P P P condition, can be negative 
or positive, depending on the value of If £^ is positive, currency i appreciates 
relative to currency j more than suggested by the P P P condition. On the other 
hand, a negative value for f^ implies that currency i depreciates against currency 
j -
In general, the P P P condition may be generalized as 
e^/i - eh/2 = P2 - Pi + 62 
- *h/3 = P3 - Pi + (13 
: (12) 
e/,/1 - e h / n = Pn - Pi + f i n -
Although the exchange rates are assumed to be functions of the relative price ratios, 
these ratios are assumed to be determined by the relative money process. Thus, 
adopting the rational expectations framework, the monetary rule in the trading 
partners is assumed to be known. However, the actual money supply may differ 
from what is targeted by innovations, which are random.-Thus, the-actual inflation 
ratef in the trading partners may be written as 
pi = pi + Vi 
P2 = P2 + 2^ 
; (13) 
Pn = Pn + vn-
The expected component is represented by pi, whereas the random component is 
captured by V{. The term pi is assumed to be constant, while v± is assumed to be a 
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normally distributed, serially uncorrected independent random variable with zero 
mean and a variance equal to o\ . 
Although we are assuming that oil is invoiced in a single currency, the domestic 
currency may be pegged to a single currency or a basket of currencies. In this 
presentation, the currencies of the G C C member states may be pegged to a single 
currency of a trading partner, or to a weighted basket of the six currencies, the 
SDR, or the E C U . A chosen peg would affect the domestic price of imports, which 
may be used as a measure of the imported component of domestic inflation. Thus, 
if oil is invoiced in a single currency and the domestic currency is pegged to a 
single currency, there are a vast number of alternative currencies for pegging as 
well as invoicing. Furthermore, oil may still be invoiced in a single currency, whilst 
the domestic currency is pegged to a basket of currencies. In the next sections, 
oil is assumed to be invoiced in a single currency. However, the analysis can be 
extended to allow for the possibility of the domestic currency being pegged to a 
single currency or a basket of currencies. 
1.1.A. Single Currency Peg 
Pegging the domestic currency to a single currency implies floating with that cur-
rency vis-a-vis the other currencies in the system ( assuming the other currencies 
are not pegged to the currency to which the domestic currency is pegged ). Ac-
cordingly, there will be no deviations in the exchange rate between the domestic 
currency and that currency, if the peg is to be maintained. Thus, if the domestic 
currency is pegged to currency 1, then by definition 
Cfc/ i = ° - ( 1 4 ) 
Then, the percentage change in the domestic price level would be related to the 
price level in country 1, so that the purchasing power parity relationships between 
the domestic currency and the other currencies may be expressed as 
en/2 = Pi - P2 - £12 
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eh/3 = Pi ~ P3 ~ f 13 
( 1 5 ) 
= Pi - Pn ~ fin-
This information may be used to derive the percentage change in the domestic 
country's weighted import price index ph, as defined earlier, which is required for 
the definition of the domestic currency real value of oil revenues, as indicated by 
equation (5). Substituting for e^/i, e^/2, • • •, e/,/n, in the imported component of 
the domestic inflation rate, p^, defined by equation (7), yields 
Ph = a iPi + <*2(Pi + P2 - P2 - 62) + <*3(pi + p 3 - P3 - £13) 
+ • • • + <*n(pi + P n - P n ~ 6n)-
Canceling terms and multiplying out gives 
Ph = <*lPl + <*2Pl - 0:262 + «3Pl - "3^ 13 
H 1- anpi - a n f !n 
which allows for grouping terms with pt together, giving 
Ph = Pi(<*i + &2 H h a n ) - (a 2 f i2 + 013(13 
+ ••• + a „ 6 n ) . 
Utilizing the fact that the sum of trade shares is unity and using the summation 
operator yields a more compact expression for p^: 
If the domestic currency is pegged to a single currency, then this price formula 
reflects the relationship with the domestic price level, as well as how the domestic 
price is affected by changes in the domestic currency vis-a-vis the currencies of the 
other trading partners ( via trade ), to whose currencies h is not pegged. Note 
that although we have started by assuming a; to represent import shares, there 
is no reason for them not to be defined as export or total trade shares. One may 
n 
Ph = pi-J2 ( 1 6 ) 
1=2 
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argue that once the domestic currency is pegged to a single currency, then the 
relevant a; would be those of total trade. That is because deviations from P P P 
between the exchange rates of the currency to which h is pegged, and the other 
trading partners, would affect both the export and import sectors of the domestic 
economy. The relevance of the distinction is more important for a basket peg, as 
will be evident in later sections. Then, if the domestic currency is pegged to the 
currencies of the countries to which it exports, will be set to correspond to export 
shares. Moreover, prices of exports ( revenues from exports ) will not be affected 
by changes in exchange rates amongst the currencies included. However, import 
prices may vary. Alternatively, if cti are set to equal import shares, then import 
prices would not vary, although export prices may fluctuate. An average outcome 
may be achieved if the domestic currency is pegged to total trade shares. Note 
that the choice of alternatives is concerned with minimizing imported variation in 
prices due to exchange rate changes, not prices changes per se. 
The choice of either set of weights as well as the currency(s) to which the do-
mestic currency, h, is to be pegged depends on the objective the authorities wish 
to attain from the policy of pegging the domestic currency. Thus, it is essential 
to determine the optimal currency peg for the domestic currency, which requires 
developing a criterion upon which a peg may be preferred over another. As dis-
cussed in Chapter I I I , the literature has provided many criteria upon which a peg 
to a particular currency may be adopted. Since in the present analysis we aim 
at minimizing the variance of the_real~value of oil revenues expressed in terms of 
the domestic currency, minimization of ph for member states of the G C C would 
contribute to the aim of choosing the currency for invoicing oil, because rvorh is a 
function of ph- Furthermore, minimization of the variance may be justified accord-
ing to the assumption of risk aversion. If the analysis assumes that the authorities 
in the G C C member states are risk averse, where the variance is used as a measure 
of risk, then it is perfectly logical to assume that they would attempt to minimize 
variations in the real value of oil revenues. 
As mentioned in Chapter I I I , Stiglitz (1972) and Sandmo (1971) have argued 
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that economic agents tend to favor small variations in prices over large variations. 
Beyond the political effects of inflation, rapid inflation can distort many economic 
variables. Inflation, defined as a general increase in the price level, will lead to a 
distributive effect as well as generate events which tend to contract the economy. 
It reduces real income for a given level of nominal income, or for a rise in nominal 
income that is less than the change in the price level. Furthermore, since the 
purchasing power of money declines as the price level rises, economic agents whose 
wealth is defined in terms of financial assets will lose relatively in terms of wealth 
as inflation rises. Consequently, their real income diminishes as the rate of inflation 
accelerates. In addition, for a given nominal interest rate, or a rate which grows 
by less than the rate of inflation, saving will be reduced as inflation erodes its 
purchasing power. The rises in demand for cash balances would be reduced if 
the nominal interest rate is raised sufficiently, making it difficult for investors to 
plan future investments. There would also be increases in the uncertainty about 
outstanding investments. 
Moreover, the studies by Thirwall and Barton (1964) and Jung and Marshall 
(1986) provided evidence to support the monetarist belief that inflation tends to 
cause a lower rate of economic growth. The effects of inflation upon an open 
economy are more serious, because as the prices of domestic exports rise, the 
economy will face lower real net exports ( postulating that not all competitors 
inflate at the same rate ). Since open economies tend to depend on international 
trade, inflation originating in the rest of the world may be transmitted to these 
economies via many means. Among them are the exchange rates between the 
domestic currency and those of its trading partners, and changes in the prices of 
imported goods and inputs used in the domestic economy and imported from the 
rest of the world. These changes may be caused by real changes in the production 
cost of these goods and inputs. The rises in the prices of imported goods will inflict 
similar consequences on domestic consumption and on the prices of goods produced 
domestically using imported inputs. It may be argued, therefore, that minimizing 
variations in imported inflation is desirable, and constitutes a target upon which 
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a peg may be evaluated. Empirically, Connolly (1982, 1983) and Connolly and 
Yousef (1982) have used the measure of stability in p^ to determine the optimal 
currency peg for developing countries. 
Economically, agents should be concerned about inflation although they may 
not concede that this is so. The shortage of accurate data on the prices of imports 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council member states may hide such a concern. How-
ever, examination of available data on exchange rates may reveal some facts about 
the concern of the G C C member states about imported inflation. During times 
of increasing oil revenues, the domestic governments had no rigid constraint on 
spending and, consequently on balancing government budgets. Therefore, these 
governments were able to revalue their currencies vis-a-vis the dollar, although 
that action led to a reduction in oil revenues in terms of the domestic curren-
cies. It may be argued that this policy was aimed at diminishing the effect of 
imported inflation. Indeed, some of the G C C member states undertook such a 
step: Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the U . A . E . officially revalued their currencies. 
On the other hand, once oil revenues began to decline, a constraint on government 
budgets started to develop, thus inducing, as would be expected, the authorities 
to devalue their currencies vis-a-vis the dollar. Examination of most recent data 
on exchange rates reveal this trend. For example, Oman devalued its currency by 
more than 10 percent in 1986. Furthermore, the Saudi riyal was also devalued 
vis-a-vis the dollar in 1986. The other governments have been more reluctant to 
adopt that strategy,"although several officials have-admitted that there were plans 
to move into that direction, but that these were postponed as oil prices started 
to recover recently 4 0. Devaluation would imply that imported inflation is of less 
importance than the state of government budgets; however, this does not imply 
that imported inflation is not an absolute concern to officials. Moreover, the move 
toward devaluation was supported by the fact that inflation originating in major 
developing countries has, on average, declined in recent times. 
4 0 T h i s argument was brought to the attention of the researcher by Usama Almaliki, who is the 
economic advisor at the U . A . E . Central Bank. 
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Adopting the same objective function of a peg, the variance of ph, as defined 
by equation (16), may be expressed as 
<=<+±«l*l (17) 
where 
a2px =variance of the inflation rate in country 1 
cr? — variance of deviations from PPP. 
c 11 
This assumes that the domestic currency is pegged to currency 1, where 1 ^ i. 
Moreover, the variance of the rate of inflation imported by a G C C member state 
is a function of the variance of the rate of inflation in country 1, the variance of 
deviations from PPP, and trade shares. 
Recall that the purpose of the derivation of ph. and its variance, a2h is to use 
this information to substitute for ph and a* in the equations for the domestic 
currency real value of oil revenues, rvorh and its variance, a2rv0Th. Accordingly, 
conducting such substitutions into equations (5) and (6) implies 
rvor^ = nvorj + e h / j - ph 
5 
rvorh = nvor3 + e h / j - [p, - J ^ a , ^ , ] . (18) 
The variance of this would be 4 1 
2 __ 2 , 2 , r 2 i 
TVOTI, nvorj ' eh/j I Ph' 
m=l 
4 l T h e covariance terms between the exchange rates, nominal value of oil revenues and inflation 
rates are assumed to be zero throughout the thesis. However, the implicit covariance between 
the numeraire's exchange rate with respect to any of the other trading partners, and oil revenues 
in terms of the numeraire currency, which is implicitly included in the conversion of oil revenues 
from the numeraire currency into another, will prove to be important in the estimation. This 
covariance was solved for using: 
Var(nvorj) = Var(nvori) + F a r ( e ^ / , ) + 2Cov{nvori,ej/i) 
where i is the currency in which oil is initially denominated, i.e. the dollar in the present analysis, 
and j is the currency in which oil revenues are converted. Note that, nvorj = nvori + e j / i , since, 
NVORj = NVORiEj/i. 
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where 
m = currencies of trading partners excluding currency j 
( assuming six trading partners ). 
If the domestic currency is pegged to the same currency in which oil is invoiced, 
then the percentage change in the exchange rate between the domestic currency 
and that currency will be zero. So, if oil is invoiced in currency j and the domestic 
currency is also pegged to j , then the variance of e^/j equals zero, and the variance 
of the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency would be 
5 
° 2 r V O r h = V l a r j + + £ ^ (20) 
TO=1 
However, a potential alternative may exist when the domestic currency is pegged 
to one currency, while oil is invoiced in another. Thus, assuming the domestic 
currency is pegged to currency j , whilst oil is invoiced in currency k, the real value 
of oil revenues in the domestic currency 
rvoTh = nvork + e^/k — Ph-
Substituting for pn from equation (16), and assuming j instead of 1 yields 
5 
rvorh = nvork + e j / k - [?>j - £ a m£jm]' ( 2 1 ) 
m=l 
Similarly, the variance may be expressed, after similar substitution from equation 
(17), as _ 
5 
= "«„ort + < / t + K + £ a2m°iJ' ( 2 2 ) 
171=1 
Note that here the variance of rvorh. is affected by the exchange rate between the 
domestic currency or the currency to which the domestic currency is pegged, j in 
this case, and the currency in which oil is invoiced, i.e. k. 
1.1.B. Trade-Weighted Basket of Currencies Peg 
On the other hand, oil may still be invoiced in a single currency, whereas the 
domestic currency is pegged to a basket of currencies. If this were the case, then 
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the exchange rates of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the currencies of the trading 
partners would have different effects on the imported component of the domestic 
rate of inflation. In order to show these effects, an alternative ph must be derived 4 2. 
A basket peg may be defined as fixing the value of the domestic currency in 
terms of a sum of a specific number of units of the foreign currencies, converted 
by the exchange rates of each of the foreign currencies in terms of the domestic 
currency. Consequently, the determination of the value of the domestic currency 
in terms of a basket implies that the value of the basket must remain constant in 
terms of the domestic currency. This requires appreciation and depreciation in the 
domestic currency value of the foreign currencies included in the basket, if any one 
of these currencies appreciates or depreciates against the others. However, as the 
example provided in Appendix I I I . A at the end of Chapter I I I shows, the domestic 
currency's appreciations and depreciations against the currencies included in the 
basket are weighted by the weight of each currency in the basket. 
Hence, the following condition must hold if the basket peg is to remain un-
changed: 
Pieh/i + 02eh/2 + ••• + P n e h / n = 0 (23) 
where 
Pi = weight of currency i in the basket, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. 
Summing over /3, and e^/i, yields 
i>e f c / < = 0. (24) 
i=l 
Thus, it is the sum of weighted changes which must be zero, but not necessarily 
the weighted change in each of the exchange rates. We may use this condition and 
the solutions derived from the P P P conditions stated by equation (12) to solve for 
4 2 T h e derivation of ph stems from the two-country model suggested by Connolly (1982). The 
generalization of the two-country derivation may be obtained through algebraic manipulations 
of that model, and making use of note (7) of that article (see Appendix V . A at the end of this 
chapter for a similar derivation in the two-country model). 
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Ph. These solutions yield 
eh/2 = eh/i + Pi - P2 - f 12 
eh/n = e h / x + Pi - p„ - f i n -
Substituting these expressions in the basket peg equation (23) implies 
Afifc/l + &( C ty l + Pi - P2 - 62) + • • • + /3n(Cfc/l + Pi ~ Pn ~ f l « ) = °-
Multiplying out and solving for eh/i gives 
Cfc / l = #2P2 + A>fl2 - AiPl + • • • + finPn + A . f I n ~ PnPl 
( note that we have utilized the condition that the sum of = 1 ). Similar 
expressions can be obtained by substituting for e^/i in 
eh/2 = e h / i - P2+P1- 62 
eh/n = e h / l - Pn + Pi - fin-
In particular, e h / 2 , and e^/n would be 
eh/2 = P2P2 + fo&2 ~ fcPl + •••+ PnPn + A i & n + Pi ~ P2 ~ f 12 
eh/n =: P2P2 -T^/32fl2J^ P2P1 + • " + /?nPn +_/?nfln + Pi ~ Pn ~ fin-
Substituting these expressions for the e^/i in the domestic inflation rate equation 
(7) gives 
Ph = (Xl[(fcP2 + fo{l2 ~ faPl + • • • +PnPn 
+/?„fl„ " PnPl) + Pi] + <*2[(/32p2 + &fl2 ~ foPl + •••+ PnPn + 
£nfln - PvPl) + Pi - P2 - fl2 + P2] + • • • + a»[(&P2 + &fl2 
-P2P1 + • • • + PnPn + A»fln ~ AvPl) + Pi ~ Pn ~ fin + Pn]-
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Multiplying out, note that some terms cancel: 
Ph = aifcpi + anP2Zi2 ~ aifcPi + h on/3npn + ai(3n(Xn - axf5npx + 
+ a2/32p2 + a2/32(i2 - a 2 /3 2 Pi + • • • + a2pnpn + <x2Pn$in ~ 
&2p2P\ + OL2px - a2i12 + • • • + an(32p2 + a n /? 2 f i2 - a„A>Pi + • • • + 
By grouping some terms together, this may be written as 
Ph = (aiPi + c*2Pi H 1- otnPi) - ( a i & P i + a 2/3 2p x + h 
a20npi) (<*iAiPi + +a2j3npi + • • • + an0npi) 
+ (ai/32p2 + a2(32p2 + ••• + anj32p2) H + (ai /3 n p» + 
CC2pnPn H + 0Cnf3npn) + (ai/3 2 £l2 + a 2 j 0 2 £ 1 2 + ' • • + 
anP2tn - a2(i2) + h ( a i / 3 „ f l n + at2/3nZln + • • • + a n / 3 n f l n 
By factoring out p i , p 2 , . . . ,pn, f i 2 , . . . , f i n , we can re-express this as 
Ph = Pi(<*i + <*2 + • • • + an) - pi(ai(32 + a 2 /3 2 + • • • + an(3n) 
Pi(ai/3„ + a2/32 + ••• + ctn/3n) + p2{a\p2 + a 2 / ? 2 
+ • • • + a n /3 n ) + • • • + p n (a i /3 n + ot2/3n + • • • + a B /3 n ) + 
£i2(aiAs + "2/32 + • • • + - "262 + • • • + 
fin(ai/9 n + a2(3n + ••• + an(3n) - an£ln. 
Furthermore, merit may be seen in further factorization, thus 
Ph = Pi(<*i + a 2 + H a n ) - pi /S 2 (a 1 + a 2 + • • • + a n ) 
P i#» (a i + a 2 + • • • + a„ ) + pa&tei + a 2 + • • • + a n ) 
+ • • • + p„/3n(a 1 + a 2 + • • • + an) + f w & f a i -f a 2 + • • • + 
"n) - «2^12 + • • • + 6n/?n(ai + Q!2 + • • • + a n ) - a n £ l n 
making use of the fact that the sum of trade shares is unity, and the sum of basket 
weights is unity. That is: 
oti + a2 H (- Q„ = 1 
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Pi + P2 + •••+(3n= 1. 
So, 
ft = i - ( A » + -•• + £«) . 
The domestic inflation rate may be expressed as 
ph = Pl[ l - ( f t + • • • + Pn)] + P202 +•••+ PnPn + (#2 ~ a 2 ) £ 1 2 + • ' • + (Pn ~ a B ) £ l n . 
Consequently 
Ph = P\P\ + P2P2 + •••+ PnPn + Zu(p2 ~ a 2 ) + 
which may be represented alternatively using the summation sign as 
ph = j h p t p i + j2(Pi-<**)s)i- (25) 
i = i i = i 
The expression for the variance under a basket of currencies peg is: 
1=1 1=1 
However, if the weights used in the basket are equal to trade shares, then Pi = a; 
and ph and o*h may be re-expressed as 
n 
J=l ._ - -




The equation for the imported component of the domestic rate of inflation pn 
can be substituted into the equation for the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues, assuming that oil is invoiced in a single currency, if the domestic currency 
is pegged to a trade-weighted basket. Such a substitution in equation (18) yields 
n 
rvorh = nvorj + e b / j - [Y^PiPi]- ( 2 9 ) 
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Similarly, the variance in the domestic currency real value of oil revenues may be 
expressed as 
6 
°lvorh = Vlvorj + + [ E ( 3 0 ) 
i=l 
where 
i = currencies of the trading partners 
j = currency in which oil is invoiced 
<7g = variance of the exchange rate between the basket, b, and currency j . 
( Where a peg to a basket, call it b, implies that h changes vis-a-vis j in the same 
way as b does, so h is replaced by b. ) 
If oil is invoiced according to this scheme and the domestic currency is pegged 
to a trade-weighted basket ( either total trade or import shares ), then the real 
value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency of a G C C member state is 
a function of several variables. Firstly, if oil is invoiced in the numeraire, then the 
variance of the nominal value of oil revenues in terms of the numeraire may induce 
instability in the real value of oil revenues in the domestic currency. Implicitly, 
this induced variability is affected by two exogenous variables, namely the quantity 
and the price of oil. Secondly, it is affected by the variance of the exchange rate 
between the currency is which oil is invoiced and the basket to which the domestic 
currency is pegged, which is represented by o\blj- Thirdly, it is affected by imported 
weighted" inflation rates, which would be used to determine-the real value-of oil 
revenues. However, this is affected by the choice of the peg scheme. Thus, in this 
case, the imported weighted inflation rates are those which the domestic country 
expects to import, if its currency is pegged to a trade-weighted basket. Moreover, 
if j does not refer to the numeraire currency, then an additional source of shock 
may inflict instability on the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues, namely, 
the variance-covariance factor which is implicit in the conversion of the nominal 
value of oil revenues from the numeraire currency, into any other currency in which 
oil may be used. This factor will prove to be important in shaping many results 
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Percentage of weight Number of currency units 
Dollar 42 0.452 
Mark 19 0.527 
Yen 15 33.4 
French franc 12 1.02 
Pound sterling 12 0.0893 
Source: The Role of the S D R in the International Monetary 
System, I M F Occasional Paper, no. 51 (Washington: I M F , 
March 1987), p. 54. 
Table 14: The valuation of the S D R basket from January 1, 1986 
in Chapter V I . 
Rather than pegging the domestic currency to a trade-weighted basket, it may 
be pegged to baskets in which the weights are determined exogenously. This al-
ternative includes the IMF-defined basket, the SDR and the EEC-created basket, 
the E C U . The real value of the oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency if 
oil is invoiced in a single currency, while the domestic currency is pegged to either 
the SDR or the E C U , will be examined next. 
l . l . C . Special Drawing Rights Basket Peg 
In 1970, the first Special Drawing Rights were issued by the International Mon-
etary Fund, I M F , to be used as a reserve. Although the weighting scheme went 
through some changes, as of November 1989 there were five currencies included in 
the configuration of the SDR. These currencies are: U.S. dollar, Deutsche mark, 
Japanese yen, U .K . pound, and the French franc, with initial weights and number 
of units as shown in Table (14). 
However, because of its weighted value in terms of the most transacted curren-
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cies in international trade, many believe that a peg to the S D R could minimize 
imported inflation, if a domestic country's trade shares from the countries included 
in the S D R approximate to the weights of the currencies of those countries in the 
basket. A peg to the S D R would insulate the domestic country from the imported 
component of inflation which may be caused by fluctuations in the exchange rates 
amongst the currencies included in the SDR. 
The imported inflation component of the domestic rate of inflation with the 
S D R peg may be derived from equation (25). However, this equation would have 
to be modified to accommodate the fact that the SDR does not include the cur-
rencies of all trading partners of the domestic country, as assumed in this analysis. 
Extending equation (25) for the S D R and assuming the dollar is the numeraire 
implies that ph can be expressed as 
Ph = PusPus + PukPuk + P f f P f f + PdmPdm + PyyPyy 
+ (Puk — <*uk)£usuk + ( P f f — a f f ) € u s f f + (Aim — OLdm)iuadm 
+ (Pw ~ ayy)€usyy + (-aU)tuM. (31) 
Thus if the domestic currency is pegged to the SDR, then the imported component 
of the domestic inflation rate is a function of the weighted rates of inflation in 
France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.; as well as weighted deviations from 
the P P P of the dollar with respect to these currencies. However, these deviations 
are weighted by the differences between the S D R weights and the trade shares. It 
is only for the lira that deviations are weighted by the trade share, because the 
weight of the lira in the S D R is zero. 
Essentially, deviations from purchasing power parity reflect the effects of changes 
in the exchange rates between the numeraire currency, the dollar, and the other 
currencies of the industrial countries. This can be seen from the purchasing power 
parity conditions defined earlier. Therefore, if we assume that the dollar appre-
ciated against the pound by 10 percent, cetris paribus, then this would lead to 
an appreciation in the domestic currency against the pound by /3U3 times the ap-
preciation rate. Nevertheless, the domestic currency would depreciate against the 
dollar by the weight assigned to the pound in the basket, i.e. (3uk, times the rate 
of depreciation of the pound against the dollar. The effect of these deviations 
from P P P on depend on the difference between the pound's weight in the S D R 
and the domestic country's trade share with the U .K. For example, if ,8uk corre-
sponds to import share from the U.K, then a negative value for ({3uk — ct„fc), given 
appreciation of the dollar, i.e. ^uauk > 0, would reduce p^. 
A similar argument may be constructed for the lira. Assuming that £usu > 0, 
given that the lira has zero weight in the SDR basket, the domestic currency will 
appreciate against the lira by the weight assigned to the dollar in the SDR. Thus 
as long as a« is positive, appreciation of the dollar would imply that [— 
is negative, i.e. it contributes to the reduction in the inflation rate imported by 
the domestic country. 
Consequently, for a peg to the SDR, the inflation rate imported by a small 
developing country can be expressed as 
5 4 
Vh = E + E ( & - + ( - « « ) & « ( 3 2 ) 
i=l 3=1 
where 
i = currencies included in the SDR, including k 
s= currencies included in the SDR less k 
k = numeraire currency ( dollar ) 
a//-— trade share with-Italy 
£m — deviations from P P P using currency k as the numeraire, and 11 represents 
the Italian lira, 
and the variance is 
< = t + B A - "<)2*L + «>L (33) 
1=1 3 = 1 
where the number of currencies included is five and the dollar is used as a numeraire 
to measure deviations from PPP. Note that, unlike the trade-weighted basket peg, 
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where f33 = as, deviations from P P P are not neutralized in the present basket. 
Furthermore, the Italian currency is not included in the composition of the SDR, 
whilst it is included as a trading partnt ;. Thus, adjustments would have to be 
made for this fact, as has been done above. 
A peg to the S D R while oil is invoiced in a single currency, j , allows us to 
express the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency and its 
variance accordingly as 
5 4 
rvorh = nvovj + e h / j - [Y^PiPi + ~ a *)&* + (-<*«)&«] (34) 
» = 1 3 = 1 
* U = anvorj + <dr/j + it ft< + B A - "IK. + J ( 3 5 ) 
«=1 3=1 
where 
a* = variance of the exchange rate between the S D R basket, sdr, and currency 
j 
i = currencies included in the S D R 
s = currencies included in the SDR, excluding k 
j = currency in which oil is invoiced. 
Although the factors affecting equation (30) may continue to exhibit similar 
roles, in the present setting the S D R replaces the trade-weighted basket assumed 
in equation (30). Moreover, since S D R weights do not correspond to trade shares, 
deviations from purchasing power parity may induce further instability in the do-
mestic currency's real value of oil revenues. In addition, since the lira is not 
represented in the S D R weighting scheme, whilst the countries of the G C C are as-
sumed to trade with Italy, deviations from P P P with respect to Italy are weighted 
by trade shares, not by the difference between SDR and trade shares, as is the case 
with respect to the other trading partners. 
In addition to the S D R basket, the member states of the G C C may choose to 
peg their currencies to the European Currency Unit. Undoubtedly, the E C U may 
qualify as an optimal peg for countries which trade less with the countries whose 
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currencies are not represented in the E C U , the U.S. and Japan in our example. This 
is helped by the fact that the member states whose currencies are included in the 
E C U have the objective of stabilizing the exchange rates amongst their currencies. 
Furthermore, if the domestic country trades more with these countries, the move 
toward reducing variations in the inflation rates among the countries represented 
in the E C U should contribute to the domestic rate of inflation. In contrast, the 
objective of stabilizing exchange rates amongst the SDR member currencies is not 
officially targeted by the countries whose currencies are represented in that basket. 
l . l . D i E u r o p e a n C u r r e n c y U n i t Basket Peg 
In addition to the trade-weighted basket and and the SDR-weighted basket, the 
domestic currency may be pegged to the newly created accounting unit; the Euro-
pean Currency Unit ( E C U ) . As of November 1989, the European Monetary System, 
E M S , included twelve member states, although the U.K. , Greece, and Portugal do 
not participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism 4 3. The members of the E M S 
are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the U.K. However, as of November 1989, the 
currencies of Spain and Portugal were not included in the calculation of the E C U . 
The inception weights and the number of units of each national currency included 
in the E C U are shown in Table (15). 
In~a similar manner to"the derivation conducted for the SDR, pn may be found 
by extending equation (25), and making use of the fact that the dollar and the yen 
are not assigned weights in the E C U basket. Accordingly, Ph may be written as 
Ph = PukPuk + PdmPdm + PuPll + PbfPbf + PlxPlx + P f f P f f + PglPgl + 
PdkPdk + A r P i r + {Puk - + (Pdm ~ (Xdm)£usdm + 
( P f f - <Xff)Zusff + ( A l - <Xu)ZuaU + (-<Xyy)(uayy (36) 
4 3 This mechanism aims at limiting fluctuations in the exchange rates amongst the member 
currencies, using intervention in the exchange rate market, and/or realignments. 
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Percentage weight Number of currency units 
Belgian franc 8.2 3.71 
Danish krone 2.7 0.219 
French franc 19.0 1.31 
Deutsche mark 32.0 0.719 
Irish pound 1.2 0.00871 
Italian lira 10.2 140 
Luxembourg franc 0.3 0.14 
Netherlands guilder 10.1 0.256 
Pound 15.0 0.0878 
Greek drachma 1.3 1.15 
Source: The Role of the S D R in the International Monetary 
System, I M F Occasional Paper, no. 51 (Washington: I M F , March 1987), 
p. 43. 
Table 15: The valuation of the E C U basket at September 17, 1984 
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which may be conveniently expressed as 
9 4 
Ph = + ~ ac)tkc + (-<Xyy)£kyy (37) 
i=l c - 1 
where 
i = currencies included in the E C U 
c — currencies of the trading partners which are included in the E C U 
£ t c = deviations from P P P between the dollar and each of the pound, mark, franc, 
and the lira 
ikyy = deviations from P P P between the dollar and the yen 
oiyy = trade share with Japan. 
The index on the first summation represents the number of currencies included 
in the E C U . However, since it has been assumed that the G C C member states 
trade with only six countries, am for the other member states of the E C U apart 
from Germany, Italy, France and the U .K. is zero. Moreover, since the E C U does 
not include the currencies of the U.S. and Japan, with whom the domestic country 
trades, we have added the trade share of Japan, while the U.S. share is excluded, 
since we are assuming the dollar is the numeraire currency. 
Similarly, the variance in the imported inflation rate in the domestic country 
would be given as 
< = £ AH + DA - * c ) a 4 . + « v • ( 3 § ) 
»=1 -— c = l _ 
Having- obtained an equation for the imported component of the domestic infla-
tion rate and its variance, the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic 
currency, when the domestic currency is pegged to the E C U and with oil invoiced 
in a single currency j , may be defined as 
9 4 
rvorh = nvorj + e h / j - E f t P i + J3(/3C - a c)& c + ( -a w )£fc w ] (39) 
1=1 c=l 
and the variance is 





 = variance of the exchange rate between the E C U basket, ecu, and currency 
j 
j = currency in which oil is invoiced. 
An E C U peg with a single currency invoicing scheme for oil would introduce 
further factors that would affect the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues, 
as did the S D R peg combined with single currency invoicing. In addition to o\vor., 
and the variance of the exchange rate between currency j and the E C U basket, 
a e e c u / j i ^e weighted inflation imported by a member state of the G C C is affected 
by the variance of inflation rates in countries which are members of the E C U 
scheme. Moreover, deviations from P P P are weighted by the differences between 
basket weights and trade shares for the French franc, German mark, Italian lira, 
and British pound; however, for Japan they are weighted by trade shares only, 
since the yen is not a member currency of the E C U . 
The above derivations describe the potential effect on the real values of oil rev-
enues expressed in terms of the currencies of the G C C member states, of invoicing 
oil in a single currency while the domestic currency is either pegged to a single 
currency or to a basket of currencies. Furthermore, it may be envisaged that there 
exists a relationship between the revenues from oil exports and their potential 
contribution to the ability of the G C C member states to import. Fluctuations in 
oil revenues would, therefore, tend to be reflected in the domestic economy, and 
if these fluctuations are undesirable, as assumed in the present analysis, a way to 
minimize them is worth seeking. It may be argued that invoicing the price of oil 
in terms of a basket of currencies may fulfill that objective. 
1.2. Invoic ing O i l in a Basket of Currenc i e s 
Evidence about the behavior of exchange rates amongst the currencies of the ma-
jor industrial countries reveals continued large fluctuations even throughout the 
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1980's . A potential impact of this behavior is reflected in uncertainty regarding 
expected prices of imports and exports. Although the narrow and less diversi-
fied domestic production of import substitutes has constrained the ability of these 
economies to insulate themselves from external shocks to exchange rates ( as well 
as real price shocks ), the stream of oil revenues may be diversified in terms of their 
component currencies so as to match those used for financing imports. That is to 
say, since imports are denominated in a multicurrency scheme, the same scheme 
may be used to denominate oil. Also if oil is invoiced in a basket of currencies 
in which the weights and currencies correspond to the basket of currencies used 
to finance imports, potential exchange risk involved in trade between the G C C 
member states and the rest of the world can be eliminated. 
As there were alternatives available to the G C C member states in choosing 
the exchange rate regime they would adopt, oil may be invoiced in a basket of 
currencies. The aim of adopting a basket invoicing scheme may rest on the desire 
of the domestic authorities to diversify the potential exchange risk, which can 
affect the stream of income from oil exports. The weights of this basket may be 
identical to those assigned to the various currencies in the optimal currency peg, if a 
basket peg is adopted, or may be different. Thus, with the objective of minimizing 
variability in the real value of oil revenues expressed in terms of the domestic 
currency, the domestic country is assumed to import a weighted average of inflation 
rates from countries included in the currency basket, as well as weighted deviations 
-from-PPP. However, in the current analysis^ the imported component of inflation 
will have effects on the real value of oil revenues, whether the domestic currency is 
pegged to a single currency, or to a basket of currencies. It is important to realize 
that invoicing oil in a basket of currencies does not preclude the essential role the 
choice of pegging the domestic currency may play in the analysis. Nevertheless, a 
choice of a basket for pricing oil may have different effects on the real value of oil 
revenues, since the receipts from oil exports would differ in terms of the basket of 
currencies that the domestic country receives. However, in terms of the domestic 
"Managing Financial Risks in Indebted Developing Countries, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 65 
( Washington: I M F , June 1989). 
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currency, the real value of oil revenues is affected by the exchange rate arrangement 
that is adopted by the domestic authorities. 
Evidence regarding the behavior of exchange rates between the currencies of 
major industrial countries reveals large fluctuations that have not exhibited any 
stability even in the 1980's, a period that has witnessed the Louvre Accord. The 
standard deviation of both the nominal and real effective exchange rates has been 
large 4 5. A potential impact of this behavior is reflected in the uncertainty associ-
ated with expected prices of imports and exports of the G C C member states. Thus, 
neither the nominal nor the real values of oil revenues would be stable, unless an 
exchange rate arrangement between the currency(s) in which oil revenues are in-
voiced and the domestic currencies of the G C C , and between the latter currencies 
and the currencies in which imports are denominated, is established. Indeed, the 
alternative of matching the currencies in which oil is invoiced to those used for 
denominating imports would to some extent minimize the impact of exchange risk 
on the G C C economies. 
Although oil is assumed to be invoiced in a basket of currencies, there are three 
potential baskets considered in the present presentation: trade-weighted, S D R and 
E C U baskets. The relationship between the choice of any one basket, based on 
the optimality condition, i.e. minimizing the variance of the domestic currency's 
real value of oil revenues, and the exchange rate regime adopted by the domestic 
country, can be stated for three possible alternatives: 
Case 1: Oil is invoiced in a basket of currencies, whereas the domestic currency 
is pegged to a single currency. 
Case 2: Oil is invoiced in a basket of currencies, and the domestic currency is 
pegged to the same basket. 
Case 3: Oil is invoiced in a basket of currencies, while the domestic currency 
is pegged to another basket. 
4 5 Managing Financial Risks in Indebted Developing Countries, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 65 
(Washington: I M F , June 1989). 
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It is worth noting that, by " another basket " we do not imply that both baskets 
should be composed of different currencies; although this is a sufficient condition, 
it is not a necessary one. A sufficient and a necessary condition would be met if the 
weight of at least one currency which is present in both baskets, differs between 
them. 
Due to the relative complexity of these alternatives, a derivation of the real 
value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency is pursued for each case. 
1.2.A. R e a l Value of O i l Revenues In C a s e 1 
If the weighted imported component of the domestic inflation rate is assumed to 
be given by p^, then the nominal value of oil revenues would be expressed as 
nvorl = 9i(nvori + eh/i) + 92(nvor2 + e h / 2 ) + h 9n(nvorn + e k / n ) (41) 
which may be summed into 
where 
nvor\ = percentage change in the nominal value of oil revenues expressed in terms 
of the domestic currency in case 1 
&i = share of oil revenues denominated in currency i, and £?=i 0i = 1. 
Accordingly, the percentage change in the real value of oil revenues in terms of 
the domestic currency in this case, assuming that oil is invoiced in a trade-weighted 
basket, and that currency h is pegged to currency j , is 
n 
nvor\ = y Z e ^ n v o T i + eh/i) (42) 
i=i 
6 
V0i(nvori + eh/i) - ph rvor (43) 
Substituting for p^, assuming a single currency peg, implies 
6 5 
rvorh \ = J2
 9i(nvori + e j / b ) - \pj - J ] am(: (44) 
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and the variance is 
^ = E ^ U + o*J + [a* + £ alalJ (45) 
8 = 1 T7l=l 
where 
j = currency to which h is pegged 
i = currencies of the trading partners 
m = currencies of the trading partners less j 
<7g = variance of the exchange rate between currency j and the basket in which 
oil is invoiced, b. 
( Note that pegging h to j implies that e^/b ~ ej/b- ) 
Whenever oil is invoiced in a basket of currencies, the nominal return from 
oil exports must be converted into domestic currency units. Alternative multi-
exchange rates would be used. However, since h is assumed to be pegged to 
a single currency, j in this case, oil revenues denominated in various currencies 
would exhibit the same degree of variability in terms of j as that in terms of 
h. Accordingly, stability of the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues is 
influenced by the variance of the exchange rates between the currency to which h 
is pegged and the currencies in which oil is invoiced, weighted by the share of oil 
exports denominated according to trade shares. 
Alternatively, while h is pegged to j , oil may be invoiced in the SDR. Then 
the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency of any of the G C C 
member countries would be 
5 5 
rvorl = Y ^ e i { n v o r i + ej/sdr) ~ [p j ~ E a » » f j m ] (46) 
i = l m=l 
and the variance would be 
olv< = E + °h*r) + K + E J ( « ) 
1=1 m = l 
where 
i = currencies included in the S D R 
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m — currencies of trading partners less j 
j = currency to which h is pegged. 
Stability of the real value of oil revenues expressed in terms of the domestic 
currency is influenced by the variance of the nominal value of oil revenues expressed 
in each currency included in the SDR and the variance of the exchange rate between 
j , the currency to which h is pegged, and those currencies included in the SDR. 
Moreover, the variance of p^ ( which is represented by the right hand side bracket ) 
would affect the optimality of this pegging and invoicing scheme. 
A third possibility is feasible if oil is invoiced in the E C U basket, with h fixed 
in terms of currency j . Then 
9 5 
rvor\ = ^2&i(nvori + e j / e c u ) - \p} - $ Z a T O f j m ] (48) 
1=1 1=1 
and variability is given by 
*Lri = X>,VLO T , + < / E C U) + K + t «KJ 
i = l m = 1 
where 
i = currencies included in the E C U 
m = currencies of the trading partners which are included in the E C U 
j = currency to which h is pegged. 
In addition to the variance of p^, in this case, the variances of the exchange 
rates between currency j and the currencies included in the E C U are of importance 
to tSe stability of the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues. 
I . 2 . B . R e a l Value of O i l Revenues in C a s e 2 
If the weights of the currencies included in both baskets correspond perfectly to 
each other, then the percentage change in the real value of oil revenues in terms 
of the domestic currency would be 
rvorl = j^Otinvor,) - [j^PiPi + E ( A » ~ (50) 
t = l i = l m = l 
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However, since the assumption of equal weights implies that 0, = /3, for all i, as in 
the trade-weighted basket, then 
6 6 rvorl = EA'(™on) - E&1 (51) 
8=1 8 = 1 
and the variance is 
= E ( < 4 o r ( ) + E *£] (52) 
8=1 «=1 
where 
i = currencies of the six trading partners 
rvorh2 = percentage change in the real value of oil revenues in terms of currency 
h in case 2. 
On the other hand, if the S D R basket is used for pegging the domestic currency 
as well as invoicing oil, then the percentage change in the real value of oil revenues 
in terms of the domestic currency is given by 
5 5 4 
rvorl = J20i(nvori) - E Ap< + £ ( & - + (-<*u)tku\ (53) 
« = 1 1=1 3 = 1 
and the variance is 
*L*h = E A V L r . ) + E # £ + E ( A - * * ) 2 4 , + « S 4 „ ] ( 5 4 ) 
8=1 8 = 1 3 = 1 
where 
i = currencies included in the S D R 
s = currencies included in the S D R less k ( currency k is the numeraire). 
Alternatively, under an E C U peg and invoicing basket, the percentage change 
in the real revenues equation becomes 
9 9 4 
r v o r l = E A ( n v o r 0 ~ E AP» + E ( & ~~ ac)(kc + (-ayy)Zkyy] (55) 
8 = 1 8=1 C=l 
and the variance would be 
= E t f V U ) + [EpyP, + E(& - «<)2°L + < 4 4 J (se) 
i=l 8=1 C=l 
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where 
i = currencies included in the E C U 
c = currencies of the trading partners which are included in the E C U . 
Note that as expected, there would be no variations in the exchange rate be-
tween the basket in which oil is invoiced, and that to which the domestic currency 
is pegged, since they are the same baskets. However, if oil is invoiced in one basket 
of currencies, whilst the domestic currencies of the G C C member states are pegged 
to another, then different expressions are obtained for rvor^ and its variance. 
1.2.C. Real Value of Oil Revenues im Case 3 
In addition to the domestic authorities fixing the value of their currency in terms of 
a basket and invoicing oil in terms of the same basket, there exists the possibility of 
pegging the domestic currency to a basket which is different from the one in which 
oil is invoiced. In the present context, there are three potential combinations of 
these baskets summarized as follows: 
I) Oil is invoiced in a trade-weighted basket, while the domestic currency is 
pegged to either the S D R or the E C U basket. 
II ) Oil is invoiced in an S D R basket, while the domestic currency is pegged to 
a trade-weighted or an E C U basket. 
I I I ) Oil is invoiced in an E C U basket, but the domestic currency is pegged to 
either a trade-weighted or an S D R basket. 
Accordingly, the equations for the percentage change in the real value of oil 
revenues and their variances are summarized as follow ( the components were 
derived earlier ): 
1.1) Invoicing oil in a trade-weighted basket, pegging to SDR 
6 5 4 
rvorl = £ e , { n v o r i + e 3 d r / b ) - [£PjPj + E ( & ~ + ( " < * « ) & « ] ( 5 7 ) 
1=1 J = l 3=1 
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and the variance is 
i = l j'=l s=l 
where 
i = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket 
j = currencies included in the SDR 
s = currencies included in the S D R less k 
k = numeraire ( dollar ). 
I. 2) Invoicing oil in a trade-weighted basket, pegging to E C U , 
6 9 4 
rvorl = J 2 9 i ( n v o r * + eecu/b) - [ E t a + E ( & ~ a c ) & c + ( ~ a y y ) ^ y y ] 
i = l j=l c = l 
and the variance is 
= hh*U + <CJ + ( E / K + E(& - aC)VL + « Y ] 
1=1 j-l c = l 
where 
i = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket 
j = currencies included in the E C U 
c = currencies of the trading partners which are included in the E C U 
k = numeraire. 
I I . 1) Invoicing oil in SDR, pegging to a trade-weighted basket 
5 6 
rvorl = E 0.(^07% + e b / a d T ) - [E to! 
1=1 j=i 
and the variance is 
1=1 J = l 
where 
i = currencies included in the S D R 
j — currencies included in the trade-weighted basket. 
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II.2) Invoicing oil in SDR, pegging to E C U 
5 9 4 
rvorh3 = ^6i(nvori + e e c u / a d T ) - ( E & ' P i + E ( & ~ a c ) & c + {-ctyy)€kyy\ 
i=l j=l c=l 
and the variance is 
5 9 4 
'h ~ = E ^ U + < u / i d r ) + + E ( & - * c )
2 4 c + « 
i=l j = l c=l 
where 
i = currencies included in the S D R 
j = currencies included in the E C U 
c = currencies of the trading partners which are included in the E C U . 
I I I . 1) Invoicing oil in E C U , pegging to a trade-weighted basket 
9 6 
rvor3h = E ^ . ( n v o r i + efc/ec-u) - EA'PJ 'I 
1=1 j=l 
and the variance is 
^ 3 = E ^ 2 ( ^ , + < e J + [ E ^ < ] 
1=1 j = i 
where 
i= currencies included in the E C U 
j = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket. 
III .2) Invoicing oil in E C U , pegging to S D R 
9 5 4 
rvor3h = Y ^ e i { n v o r i + tsdr/ecu) - E + E ( & ~ a « ) ^ * » + (~au)tku] 
1=1 1=1 3=1 
and the variance is 
< K = X X ( * ; U + < d r / e c u ) + l t % < + E ( & - « * ) 2 4 , + " ? ! * ? „ , ] 
1=1 > = 1 3=1 
where 
i = currencies included in the E C U 
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j = currencies included in the SDR 
s = currencies included in the SDR less k. 
Note that rvor^ represents the percentage change in the real value of oil revenues 
in terms of the domestic currency, defined in case 3. 
To sum up, the model is designed to account for the fact that the GCC member 
states peg their currencies and may invoice oi l in currencies other than the dollar. 
Thus, the objective of the present chapter is to analyze the effects of the various 
currency pegs and the alternative currencies that could be used to invoice oi l , using 
the standard deviation in the real value of oi l revenues as a measure of potential 
risk involved. 
This concludes the description of the model and presents some interesting equa-
tions to be estimated. There appear to be two major issues of significant concern 
to the authorities i n the GCC countries. Firstly, what is the optimal currency(s) 
peg wi th a view to minimizing the imported component of inflat ion. Secondly, 
would that choice provide the least variabil i ty in the real value of oil revenues, 
or would another invoicing scheme be more optimal. These issues w i l l be tested 
empirically i n the next chapter, w i th additional results as well as data used in 
estimation, tabulated in Appendix 1. 
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Appendix V . A 
Derivation! of the Basket Peg i n the T w o Count ry Case 
For the basket currency peg, Connolly (1982) has indicated the steps which 
may be adopted in order to define the domestic imported rate of inflation, in the 
two-country model. Thus, in what follows a basket peg w i l l be derived for this 
case, making use of Connolly's note (7). Assume we have two countries, 1 and 2, 
whose currencies are included in the basket. Then, the exchange rate of each of 
these currencies vis-a-vis the domestic currency, h, and the inflat ion rate i n both 
countries can affect the domestic rate of inflat ion. This imported component of 
domestic inflat ion rate is given by: 
Ph = <*\(P\ + eh/i) + OL2{V2 + eh/2) 
where 
# i + <*2 = trade shares w i t h country 1 and country 2 
a i + a 2 = 1. 
However the currencies of the two trading partners are related to each other 
through the PPP relationship, which is given by: 
Ch/l ~ = P2 - Pi + £12 
and the basket peg is given by 
Pi^h/i + = 0 
where 
ft +& = !. 
So we can define 
eh/2 = e/i/i - P2 + P i ~ 62-
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However, i f we substitute this definition for e/,/2 in the basket peg, we get 
ftefc/i + /32(eh/l -P2+P1- £12) = 0 
solving for e^/i, gives 
e* / i (A + 02) = P2P2 - 02Pi + 
making use of the fact that the sum of the basket weights is unity, we get: 
Cfc / i = P2P2 - P2P1 + 02^12-
A t this stage we need to get an expression for e h / 2 as well. This can be obtained 
simply by substituting the expression for e^/i in the PPP condition. Thus 
= Pi ~ P2 ~ f l 2 + < V i 
e/,/2 = Pi ~ P2 - £12 + P2P2 - P2P1 + ^2(12-
Now a substitution of e^/i and e/,/2 in the imported component of domestic inflation 
rate, is possible. Such a step would yield: 
Ph = + P2P2 - faPi + /J262) + <*2(P2 +Pi-
P2 - 62 + 02P2 - P2P1 + /S2&2) 
mul t ip lying out and making use of the definition of the sum of trade shares is unity, 
implies: 
Ph = Pi(<*i - G i f t + 0C2- a2(32) + £u(ai02 ~<*2 + OL2p2) + atfap* + a i / 3 2 p 2 (1) 
which can be factored out as: 
Ph = - Ih) + "2(1 - 02)} + 02P2 + 62[(<*i + a2)P2 - ct2\ (2) 
note that (1 — /32) = 0i, and again using the sum of trade shares, hence 
Ph = Pi((*\0i + <*20i) + P2P2 + ^(02 ~ aa) 
Ph = Pl[0l{<*l + 0t2)] + 02P2 + t\2{02 ~ OC2) 
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which gives, i f summation operator used: 
2 
j= l 
and the variance would be: 
»=i 
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V L Empirical Estimation of the Model 
Empirical analysis of the model using alternative schemes of currency invoicing 
of oi l is presented in this chapter. I t may be worth recapping the main purpose 
of the model. As defined in the previous chapter, the model aims to f ind the op-
t imal combination of the choice of currency(s) for invoicing oil and the optimal 
currency(s) peg for the GCC member states sampled. The objective of the author-
ities is to f ind the combination of invoicing currency for oil and pegging scheme 
that wi l l minimize the variance of the percentage change in the real value of oil 
revenues in terms of the domestic currency. 
However, since this real value is a function of the variance of the weighted 
imported inflat ion rate, i t may be more convenient to analyze this variance first, 
then use i t to define, i n conjunction w i t h the variance of the nominal value of 
oil revenues expressed in foreign currency(s), the variance of the real value of oil 
revenues in terms of the domestic currency. 
Thus, w i th in each section of the chapter, the equation to be estimated is stated 
at the beginning. Then, the variance of the weighted imported inflat ion rate is 
determined. Finally, the various components of the equation for the variance of 
the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currency are pooled together. 
A historical review of the behavior of exchange rates, prices, money supply and oil 
revenues is presented in the first section of the chapter. The objective of this is to be 
acquainted w i t h the development of these variables over time and their variability, 
as well as to recognize possible relationships amongst them. In the second section, 
single currency invoicing of oil is examined, and the optimali ty condition is checked 
throughout. However, wi th in that section, alternative currency peg schemes, single 
and basket, are examined. The th i rd section analyzes the performance of baskets 
of currencies as alternatives to a single currency invoicing scheme, assuming single 
currency pegs. Pegging and invoicing in the same basket is the subject of the 
four th section. Section five discusses the results of pegging the domestic currency 
to one basket, whilst invoicing oil in terms of another. This explores both single 
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currency and basket pegs, and their contribution to the variance of the domestic 
currency's real value of oil revenues. Toward the end of the chapter, summary 
tables of the findings are presented. 
V I . 1. His tor ica l Perspective 
Since the end of the Bretton Woods agreement, some of the GCC member states 
have chosen to peg their currencies to the dollar, whilst others preferred a less re-
stricted commitment. The exchange rate arrangements adopted by these countries 
are based on the nature of the currency invoicing of their oil revenues. Although 
this may have reduced uncertainty in the domestic currency's value of oil revenues, 
i t failed to insulate domestic prices f rom changes in the exchange rates between 
the currency to which the domestic currency is pegged and the domestic country's 
trading partners. During the period f rom 1971 unt i l 1987, the purchasing power 
of oil revenues has exhibited l i t t le stability, as the dollar's relative value changed 
and oil exports fell . In the next sections, a historical record of the exchange rates, 
price indices, rates of money growth and oil revenues w i l l be discussed, before the 
results of the empirical estimation of the model are presented. 
A. Behavior of Exchange Rates 
Despite the move towards a floating exchange rate regime that has emerged 
since the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements, the U.S. dollar has pre-
served most of its appeal to traders. In addition, i t has continued to be used as a 
reserve currency as well as a benchmark to which movements in other currencies 
are compared. For the GCC currencies, this may be inferred f rom Table (16), 
which examines the rate of variations of the exchange rates of the domestic cur-
rencies w i t h respect to the currencies of the industrial countries considered in the 
model, as well as relative to the SDR and the ECU. 
Overall, the variance of the percentage change in the rate of exchange of the 
currencies of the GCC member states relative to the dollar has been more stable 
than the exchange rate of the currencies of the GCC's relative to the currencies 
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ECU data covers only the periods f r o m 1979 to 1987 
E ( B D / i ) defined as units of BD per unit of i . 
Table 16: Means and standard deviations of the exchange rates of the GCC's 
currencies vis-a-vis others (1971-1987) 
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of the other five western economies as well as the SDR and the ECU. This is not 
coincidental and may be at tr ibuted to the actual pegging of at least four of the 
member states' currencies to the dollar. 
Data in Appendix 1 show that for Bahrain and Oman the dollar has remained 
the currency to which the domestic currencies have shown l imited f lexibi l i ty since 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement. The Bahraini dinar, B D , has been 
fixed rigidly at $ 2.6596 since 1980. Similarly, the riyal Omani, RO, was officially 
pegged to the dollar at an exchange rate of RO 0.3454 f rom 1973 un t i l 1985. Re-
cently, in 1986, this exchange rate was raised to RO 0.3845, which was seen as a 
move to counter the decline i n oil revenues and its subsequent effects on the domes-
tic economy, and also to encourage exports and restrain imports. In an interview 
w i t h officials at the Central Bank of Oman, the view was expressed that although 
pegging the RO to the dollar is based on the fact that oi l revenues are invoiced 
in dollars, the decline in these revenues, both i n terms of nominal and real values, 
has induced the Omani authorities to devalue the domestic currency. Moreover, 
the devaluation is expected to increase the nominal value of oil revenues in terms 
of the domestic currency, thus easing pressures on government budgets. Further-
more, the devaluation would have a positive impact on the balance of payments via 
reducing real domestic income and imports, thus lowering the demand for foreign 
exchange. A devaluation would also affect the GCC economies through another 
channel, the labor market. These economies depend largely on foreign labor 4 6 ; 
thus a_devaluation would affect the remittances of foreign labor,-by reducing the 
amount of foreign exchange transferred abroad 4 7 . 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, U.A.E. , have both pegged their curren-
cies to the dollar since 1980. The rates have been defined at $ 0.27473 and $ 0.2724, 
respectively. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have had a more distant official relation-
4aPercentage of expatriates in labor force estimated in 1988 to be: 55.00, 81.00, 53.70, 83.00, 
72.00, and 91.20 percent, in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. , 
respectively. Source: Gulf Economic and Financial Report, vol. 4, no. 10 (Manama: Gulf 
International Bank, December 1989). 
•"Personal interview with M. Kalmoor, Director of the Research and Statistics Department, 
Central Bank of Oman, Ruwi, Sultanate of Oman, February 28, 1990. 
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ship to the dollar. Aside f rom Oman, which devalued its currency by more than 
ten percent in 1986, the Kuwai t i dinar, K D , and the Saudi riyal, SR, have exhib-
ited greater fluctuations in their value relative to the dollar than any other GCC 
country. Nevertheless, K D has been pegged to an unknown customized basket of 
currencies, which is thought to be defined according to trade shares. However, the 
analysts hypothesize that the weight of the dollar is as much as 70 percent 4 8 . A 
part of the field work conducted by the researcher included an attempt to explore 
the nature of these weights. Officials at the Central Bank of Kuwait argue that, al-
though the basket is weighted according to to ta l trade shares, w i t h considerations 
awarded to the currency diversification of investment abroad, the dollar retains 
a large weight due to the fact that oi l revenues are denominated i n dollars, and 
most domestic exports are invoiced in dollars. When asked about that weight, the 
officials declined to reveal i t , arguing that the purpose of this policy is to minimize 
speculations about the moves of the central bank in the exchange rate market, 
which can have substantial impact on a currency for which the market is t h i n 4 9 . 
Judging f rom the standard deviations in Table (16), i t may be argued that the 
SR has been floating more freely than the currencies of the other member states. 
In contrast to variations of the currencies of the member states relative to the 
dollar, variations relative to the SDR have been much greater. However, as can 
be expected, the standard deviation of the percentage change of the exchange rate 
of K D relative to the SDR is lower than that of the other GCC member states. 
This may be at tr ibuted to the practice of the Kuwai t i government of pegging to a 
basket i n which the five currencies that are included in the calculation of the SDR 
are represented. 
W i t h respect to the currencies of the other western economies and the ECU, 
the standard deviations of the exchange rates tabulated in Table (16) are greater 
than those for the dollar or the SDR. The standard deviation recorded its highest 
4 8 Henry Azzam, editor, Gulf Financial Market (Manama:Gulf International Bank, 1988), p. 
257. 
4 9Personal interview with A. Al-Gharably, and F . Shalaby, Director of the Economic Depart-
ment, and Economic Advisor, respectively. Central Bank of Kuwait, Kuwait, February 15, 1990. 
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value for the exchange rate w i t h respect to the ECU. Considered individually, 
the currencies of all GCC member states have depreciated against the mark, yen, 
and the SDR, w i t h their greatest loss in value to the Japanese currency ( this 
may be explained by the fact that the dollar has lost ground to the yen lately). 
However, as can be inferred f rom the mean values, the currencies of the GCC 
member states have appreciated against the Bri t ish pound and the Ital ian lira, 
although the appreciation against the latter has been greater. 
I t is evident that the figures i n Table (16) support the fact that the dollar has 
continued to be used as a reserve currency and a currency which is seen to promote 
confidence in the currencies of the GCC member states. Thus, four of the GCC 
countries, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the U .A.E . continue to peg their currencies 
to the dollar, and the SR is believed to be moving in that direction ( the exchange 
rate, as can be seen f rom Appendix 1, has been fixed for the last two years ) . This 
move has been justif ied by officials at the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency on the 
grounds that, due to the decline i n oi l revenues, and increasing pressures on both 
government budgets, and the SR to decline in terms of i t relative value, a move to 
a dollar peg has been a policy of minimizing variability in the domestic currency's 
value of oil revenues 5 0. The Kuwai t i dinar is the only currency of the GCC countries 
that is not fixed rigidly to the dollar as a single currency peg. However, even for 
Kuwait , which pegs to a trade-weighted basket, other alternative baskets have not 
appealed to the monetary authorities in the country. In general, several factors 
may be thought of as favoring" a dollar peg" compared to alternative pegs such as 
the SDR and the ECU. Firstly, although the GCC countries would like to have 
their exports invoiced in terms of their currencies, in order to avert the exchange 
risk involved i f exports are denominated in terms of other currencies, oil revenues 
are dollar-denominated. A possible hedge for this exposure is seen in pegging the 
domestic currencies of these oil exporting countries to the currency in which oil 
is invoiced, i.e. the dollar. Thus, a peg to the dollar diminishes the uncertainty 
of the relative value of oi l revenues which consequently provides planners w i t h 
5 0Personal interview with A. Al-Naim, Director of Economic and Research Department, Saudi 
Arabia Monetary Agency, Riyad, Saudi Arabia, February 17, 1990. 
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greater certainty about government budgets. Secondly, the dollar can easily be 
converted into any other currency to be used as a medium of exchange by both the 
public as well as the private sectors, and to settle payments. Thirdly, pegging to a 
single currency requires lower reserve holdings of various currencies; holding higher 
levels of reserves may prove to be a diff icul t task for these developing economies. 
Fourthly, the SDR and E C U baskets lack the prime role of money, i.e. a medium 
of exchange by the public. 
Thus, the dollar continues to be viewed as a confidence-promoting peg relative 
to the ad hoc baskets such as the SDR, ECU and trade-weighted baskets. 
B. Behavior of Price Indices 
The feature of openness which has characterized the economies of the GCC 
member states, and their dependence on imports to meet the domestic demand for 
durable and nondurable goods, have exposed them to price shocks which can be 
transmitted via trade in the fo rm of a higher prices of imports. 
Limitations on the data on price indexes prevent the analysis f rom covering 
all GCC member states. Such data are not available for Oman and the U . A . E 5 1 
and are very l imited for Qatar; notably none are available for the mid 1970's when 
inflat ion was sweeping the globe. Thus for Qatar, average inflation of about 3.84 
percent was recorded over the years extending f rom 1979 to 1986, w i t h a standard 
deviation of 2.79 percent. However, inclusion of the early years of 1970's may 
have affected the-average rate of inflat ion in Saudi-Arabia, which approached"5.83 
percent, w i t h a standard deviation of about 10.81 percent. 
Looking at annual inflat ion rates, i t might be expected that price indices 
( whether consumer price or producer price indices ) would reflect the pattern 
of fluctuations in the prices of imported goods. Moreover, w i t h the increases in 
oil revenues recorded in the last decade, the occurrence of a higher inflation rate 
might been expected in view of increasing aggregate demand, accompanied by 
l imited domestic supplies. However, there are some possible reasons for observing 
5 1 T h e authorities in Oman will start publishing data on Consumer Price Index from 1990. 
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lower inflation rates i n the GCC countries than those prevailing in the countries of 
their trading partners, or their counterparts among other oil exporting countries. 
The average rates of inflat ion in Kuwait and Bahrain were 5.71 and 7.43 per-
cent, respectively. However, as can be deduced f rom Table (17), the standard 
deviation of the inflat ion rate in Bahrain was more than twice that of the Kuwait . 
Nevertheless, the degree of variability i n the Saudi inflat ion rate was higher than 
its counterparts in the other GCC countries. In fact, the Saudi's standard devia-
t ion was double the mean of standard deviations of all rates of the GCC member 
states for which data was available. 
I t may be argued that the consumer price index in most developing countries, 
including the sampled GCC's, does not respond to a similar index in an industri-
alized country. Several arguments can be presented to jus t i fy this phenomenon. 
In general, i n the GCC member states, consumer foodstuffs are highly subsidized 
and many of them are rationed at government-controlled prices; however, the in-
dex includes these items. Moreover, the public sector provides many services free 
of charge, which nevertheless are included in the consumer price index. These 
services include free education at all levels and free medical care ( although some 
countries have begun to charge nominal prices for the provision of the latter ) . 
I n addition, the decisive role of the government as the owner and price setter of 
many important goods produced domestically, such as steel bars, flour and wheat 
has shifted financial resources to these sectors in order to subsidize prices. This 
policy is aimed at supporting the infant industries and depressing imports. Fur-
thermore, i t may be argued that the weights of the consumer price index (CPI) in 
these countries have changed l i t t le although consumption patterns have. A l l CPI's 
and their weights were developed during periods when these economies were start-
ing to develop, where necessities seemed more important and were thus awarded 
greater weights. However, as manufactured goods, for which prices have risen, 
become more important to consumers, their weights remain biased downward in 
the CPFs; consequently, inflat ion rates are also biased. For example, the base year 
for measuring inf lat ion in Qatar has been the C P I weights set in 1979, and 1978 
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Year Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia 
1972 4.80 n.a. n.a. 4.44 
1973 13.42 8.06 n.a. 15.29 
1974 21.80 12.09 n.a. 19.38 
1975 15.09 9.08 n.a. 29.58 
1976 20.30 5.05 n.a. 27.54 
1977 16.38 9.51 n.a. 10.74 
1978 14.60 8.34 n.a. -1.57 
1979 2.200 6.74 n.a. 1.77 
1980 3.77 6.72 6.61 3.66 
1981 10.70 7.13 8.15 2.66 
1982 8.52 7.44 5.55 -0.58 
1983 2.92 4.64 2.75 -0.58 
1984 0.32 1.14 1.09 -1.18 
1985 -2.67 1.45 1.82 -3.34 
1986 -2.32 0.96 1.63 -3.03 











Data are not available for Oman and the U.A.E . 
n.a.: Not available 
S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 17: Inf lat ion rates in the GCC countries (1972-1987), % 
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in Kuwait . 
Prices of imported goods are expected to be affected by the degree of pass-
through of exchange rate fluctuations to the domestic market. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the nature of the market in which importers sell. Thus, facing 
low price elasticity for imports, a monopolist is expected to be able to shift prices 
to consumers more than a competitive supplier can. Field work was conducted to 
investigate this aspect of the problem. Results obtained f rom importers sampled 
reveal that about 81.8 percent of importers pass-through exchange rate fluctuations 
to the domestic market, where some have argued that their abi l i ty to engage in this 
behavior depends on the level of competition exhibited in the domestic market. 
Unfortunately, the lack of a consistent measure of prices has hidden the impact of 
the monopolistic feature of the GCC domestic economies, which, one may argue, 
should have resulted in higher domestic prices of imports, although i t did not. 
These economies are characterized by a family-based enterprises, which tend to be 
authorized distributors of distinctive imported goods, and control a vast sector of 
the market share. I t would not be uncommon to find a single importer engaged 
in importat ion of goods of a similar ( or different ) nature to be the sole and only 
distributor of these goods by law. The author's findings reveal that in the GCC 
economies, monopoly is protected by government legislation and in some cases i t 
was found that a large number of these monopolists are themselves the authorized 
distributors of hundreds of imported goods, which can be of the same nature ( such 
as several brand names of medicaLdrugs_J. I f the impact of this feature could-be 
tested, i t would show how the pass-through effect worked in one direction, raising 
prices, while declines in prices of imported goods have a tendency not to be passed 
to the domestic consumer 5 2. 
Nevertheless, these factors, which have possibly contributed to price stability 
in the GCC member states, have also been assisted by changes in the economic 
5 2 I t may be argued that, because of this feature and their ability to pass increases to domestic 
consumers, there is a less demanding incentive for importers to use any type of risk covering, 
since the latter involves costs. When asked about covering for possible risk in imports, about 70 
of the sampled importers have shown no tendency to do that, whereas 21 percent have. 
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conditions at home. The domestic economies of the GCC member states have 
entered a stage of recession as a result of declining oil prices and revenues. This 
has greatly depressed housing rents and salaries, and reduced the price of land. 
Furthermore, as consumer spending declines, sellers have preferred to reduce their 
profi t margins to accommodate increases in the prices of imports, rather than 
shift ing the rises to consumers 5 3. 
However, the potential price instabili ty in the GCC should not be exaggerated. 
Instead, their imported rates of inflat ion should be related to those of countries 
f rom which they import most of their consumed goods. Inflat ion in the GCC 
countries may deviate f rom that of their trading partners only during the periods 
of oil booms, such as the period f rom 1975 to 1980. 
C. Behavior of Momey Supply 
The rise in oil revenues f rom 1973 to 1980 has resulted in sharp increases i n 
national income in the GCC member states. However, as sole owners of the oil 
resource, the domestic governments had the option of allocating the earned foreign 
exchange amongst the alternative domestic and foreign channels. A deviation 
f rom the theoretical implication that a rise in international reserves leads to an 
increase in domestic money supply was clearly recognized in these economies. I t 
may be argued that the domestic governments d id not have to issue any additional 
stock of the domestic currency in order to acquire the reserves. Reserves were 
simply earned f rom oil sales. Moreover, large quantities of_the foreign exchange 
received were recycled abroad in the fo rm of investment in the industrial countries, 
because the local financial sector was not capable of absorbing those sums of foreign 
exchange. Nevertheless, i t can be said that holding of foreign reserves, instead of 
channeling them in the domestic market was essential to these countries in order to 
stabilize their currencies. ( This is v i ta l for countries which peg their currencies. ) 
Needless to say, the holding of international reserves by the GCC member 
5 3 Gulf Economic and Financial Report, vol. 3, no. 1 (Manama: Gulf International Bank. 
January 1988), p. 6. 
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Year Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
U.A.E. 
1972 18.35 n.a. n.a. 36.09 33.92 n.a. 
1973 12.55 8.29 3.93 15.70 30.09 n.a. 
1974 38.08 24.41 60.34 29.99 36.19 98.37 
1975 23.36 26.36 32.56 51.12 59.77 37.92 
1976 50.03 31.42 33.28 43.62 51.00 64.16 
1977 15.70 25.13 22.72 27.65 43.09 -7.52 
1978 12.37 21.77 10.99 14.30 24.19 12.31 
1979 2.33 12.85 6.54 9.18 12.83 3.60 
1980 24.08 23.34 27.76 15.67 16.01 25.55 
1981 33.21 30.22 32.69 34.82 28.51 21.23 
1982 6.57 7.87 22.17 13.63 18.39 14.53 
1983 7.75 4.33 17.81 -0.92 10.19 7.70 
1984 -1.83 2.44 14.08 19.87 5.85 25.44 
1985 8.73 -0.90 14.45 8.79 1.14 6.23 
1986 -2.02 2.48 -7.59 10.59 8.84 4.29 















S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 18: Money growth rates in the GCC countries (1972-1987), % 
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states did not mean that development plans were renounced. As oil revenue rose, 
government spending followed suit. Expenditure on housing, factories and services, 
as well as cash transfers were increased substantially. It is through this path that 
a proportion of international reserves led to rising growth rates of money. 
Annual data on money supply, as measured by M2 ( M l plus quasi money, i.e. 
savings, time and all foreign currency deposits ), are given in Appendix 1, while the 
annual growth rate of M2 is tabulated in Table (18). It is evident from the table 
that Bahrain and Kuwait have had the lowest average and the minimum standard 
deviation in money growth. For Kuwait, this stability may have contributed to 
the stability of the rate of inflation in the country, as tabulated in the previous 
section. However, if this argument is accepted, then it may be said that the 
instability incurred in Bahrain's inflation rate was not totally explained by the 
behavior of money supply in the country. 
The rate of growth of money supply reached it's climax around the mid 1970's 
for all GCC member states. This was a direct result of increasing government 
spending as a way of raising personal income, and because of government com-
mitments to establish the missing infrastructure. However, the highest mean rate 
of money growth and standard deviation of money were detected for the U.A.E, 
which may be attributed to the substantial rise in government spending in the 
earlier years of the boom in oil revenues. 
Clearly, changes in money supply have been very sensitive to oil revenues and, 
consequently, to government spending. Hence it may be argued that money supply 
is affected to some extent by an exogenous variable, i.e. the earnings of foreign 
currencies from oil sales. 
D. Behavior of Oil Revenues 
The GCC economies depend on oil revenues as the major source of income; 
thus development plans tend to be influenced by changes in revenue. Although 
production is assumed to be constrained by agreements ( such as those agreed 
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upon by members of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries, OPEC ), or 
world demand, prices have demonstrated their ability to have a great impact on 
oil revenues. 
Figures (4) to (9) reflect an upsurge in the dollar value of oil revenues during 
times when oil prices rose. This is evident in 1974, which reflects a high percentage 
change for all GCC member states; the highest value 172 percent was recorded for 
Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, as international markets began to absorb the impact 
of the rise in prices and the 1973-1974 oil embargo, alternative sources of energy 
were sought and the ultimate emergence of producers outside OPEC released some 
of the pressures both on quantity produced and prices. Since then, the GCC's oil 
revenues have been fluctuating, although less than the rates recorded previously. 
A partial recovery in revenues was reported in 1980, when the price of oil rose 
and reached more than $ 30.00. This resulted mainly from the Iraq-Iran war. 
However, this rise was short lived, and when prices collapsed in 1986, a barrel of 
oil was sold for less than $ 10.00. Undoubtedly, oil revenues have declined sharply 
since 1980, and are not expected to revive, at least not in the foreseeable future. 
As Table (12), cited in Chapter V has shown, government budgets rely on oil 
revenues as a major source of income. However, in recent years, this source has 
not lived up to the expectations of the authorities in the GCC member states, 
forcing them to run deficits in their annual budgets, just when they were thought 
to be suppliers of funds. Even with these governments efforts to curb spending and 
to allocate funds more efficiently, deficits have persisted. A relationship between 
oil revenues, government spending and the situation of the budget, is depicted for 
each country in Tables (19) to (23). 
Consider Bahrain, which is represented in Table (19). As oil revenues decreased 
in 1975, a deficit emerged in 1976. It seems that when there is a reduction in oil 
revenues in a particular year, its likely impact on government expenditure and the 
budget situation is experienced at a later date. This may be observed by exam-
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expenditure achieved almost zero growth rate in 1984, with a deficit of about 15.6 
million Bahraini dinar. 
A rise in oil revenues recorded for Kuwait in 1979, resulted in large surpluses, 
although government spending rose. However, a contrasting effect of oil revenues 
on spending and the budget can be seen in 1980, 1981 and 1983. In 1981, the 
accumulated surpluses from past years helped to improve the budget situation, in 
spite of the reduction in oil revenues. However in 1982, just a year after a surplus 
of more than 3 billion Kuwaiti dinars, a deficit of more than 730 million dinars 
was evident. Similar behavior persisted, with the worst deficit emerging in 1986, 
when oil revenues slumped by more than 47 percent. 
Table (21) reports the Omani situation, where development plans started late, 
as oil production began in the late 1960's. Thus, it is not be unlikely that deficits 
may persist, or increase at times when improvements or declines in oil revenues 
are smaller than those experienced by other GCC member states. For example, a 
decline of only 7.14 percent in 1982, accompanied by a rise of only 13.49 percent in 
government expenditures, resulted in a deficit of more than 175 million RO. The 
year 1986 proved to be the worst in terms of its impact on the budget situation. A 
reduction of more than 64 percent in oil revenues, which is substantial for any of 
the GCC economies, resulted in doubling the deficit to a record high. The short-
lived revival in 1987 improved revenues and the deficit, although it was added to 
by the decline in government spending. The latter decline may be explained by 
the government's effort to retire some of its deficit, by shifting some of the rise" in 
revenues to that direction. 
As shown in Table (22), the comparative decline in oil revenues between 1980 
and 1981 resulted in slicing the Qatari surpluses by more than half. Moreover, as 
oil revenues recorded downward trends, for example in 1986, government spending 
responded with almost no change, while more than half the annual budget was 
financed by debt. 
The situation for Saudi Arabia is not much better. A surplus of more than 111 
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Year % Oil revenues % Govt. Exp. Budget situation 
1975 -9.56 51.64 16.70 
1976 16.70 53.05 -4.20 
1977 21.18 23.92 12.60 
1978 5.27 16.25 -11.20 
1979 29.51 -11.42 49.80 
1980 44.88 22.02 128.50 
1981 19.01 18.11 156.40 
1982 -21.04 21.18 180.50 
1983 -19.57 12.18 -44.60 
1984 4.750 0.651 -15.60 
1985 -10.48 -5.750 32.90 
1986 -21.47 -2.670 -35.30 
1987 -0.175 -16.92 -4.00 
Source: Tables (41) and (42) in Appendix 1. 
Figures for the budget situation are in millions 
of the domestic currency. 
Govt. Exp.: Government expenditures. 
Table 19: The relationship between oil revenues and government's budget in 
Bahrain (1975-1987) 
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Year % Oil revenues % Govt. Exp. Budget situation 
1975 -23.62 13.98 1,887.0 
1976 9.372 12.75 1,513.8 
1977 -1.56 25.42 1,134.2 
1978 5.98 -0.78 1,753.8 
1979 57.64 22.059 4,544.6 
1980 3.720 19.91 3,187.8 
1981 -25.40 22.05 988.0 
1982 -43.94 1.501 -735.0 
1983 9.702 -5.63 -936.4 
1984 7.382 4.732 -673.0 
1985 -2.205 -19.65 -717.1 
1986 -47.46 -12.49 -1,014.2 
1987 16.468 -6.516 -2.70 
Source: Tables (41) and (43) in Appendix 1. 
Figures for the budget situation are in millions 
of the domestic currency. 
Govt. Exp.: Government expenditures. 
Table 20: The relationship between oil revenues and government's budget 
Kuwait (1975-1987) 
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Year % Oil revenues % Govt. Exp. Budget situation 
1975 23.65 34.82 -36.20 
1976 8.185 16.64 -75.70 
1977 0.425 -10.17 78.40 
1978 -4.28 0.200 -51.10 
1979 35.90 9.572 103.7 
1980 42.17 37.04 34.20 
1981 29.41 25.71 97.90 
1982 -7.14 13.49 -175.30 
1983 2.497 10.60 -183.70 
1984 -7.32 13.75 -286.60 
1985 18.18 14.26 -333.5 
1986 -64.01 -8.67 -692.20 
1987 24780 -17.67 -130.70 
Source: Tables (41) and (44) in Appendix 1. 
Figures for the budget situation are in millions 
of the domestic currency. 
Govt. Exp.: Government expenditures. 
Table 21: The relationship between oil revenues and government's budget in Oman 
(1975-1987) 
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billion SR in 1980 has vanished within two years, and was replaced by a deficit 
of more than 23 billion SR. It is not a coincidence that oil revenues had shown 
their worst decline in 1983, with a reduction of more than 54 percent. Since then, 
with the exception of 1987, expenditure has declined continuously, although not 
by enough to prevent the budget from registering deficits of more than 60 billion 
Saudi riyals. 
Table (24) depicts similar findings for the United Arab Emirates, where a close 
relationship between oil revenues, government spending and the budget situation 
is evident. Although the authorities continued in 1981 to benefit from the rise in 
oil revenues in 1980, as both government spending and the budget increased a year 
later because oil revenues declined by about 16 percent, the balance of the budget 
was almost reversed and a deficit of more than 3.87 billion dirhams was recorded. 
Consequently, oil revenues are important in terms of their impact on both 
government expenditures and the budget situation, where the latter would affect 
the reserve, and can generate public debt as a means of financing expenditure. 
Financing deficits has been accomplished either through domestic borrowing, 
drawing from reserves, or through international borrowing. However, with increas-
ing pressure on the domestic currencies, there has been little attempt to finance the 
deficits through money creation. The mid 1980's have witnessed the introduction 
of government bonds and treasury bills in most of the GCC member states. I t is 
known that Kuwait and- Saudi Arabia are leading the stage in public borrowing. 
I t may be argued, however, that if no limit is set and strictly enforced on the 
maximum amount of outstanding borrowing, the stage could be set for a spiral 
of increases, where at a time of maturity of a certain amount of debt, new bonds 
are issued to repay the outstanding loans, and spending is expanded further. So 
far, the authorities have found a means of financing spending, with debt being 
transferred across generations. However, one may dispute the potential impact of 
this behavior on wealth ( Barro 1974 ). 
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Year % Oil revenues % Govt. Exp. Budget situation 
1975 -13.33 101.0 1,833 
1976 21.13 9.132 3,118 
1977 -7.68 23.09 837.0 
1978 15.65 -12.26 1,752 
1979 45.74 24.49 3,820 
1980 39.08 27.95 8,066 
1981 -1.79 29.86 4,500 
1982 -26.49 -15.55 815.0 
1983 -29.20 19.59 -6,439 
1984 35.00 -23.18 1,437 
1985 -22.30 -15.99 19.00 
1986 -72.84 0.567 -4,549 
1987 6.493 15.78 -5,572 
Source: Tables (41) and (45) in Appendix 1. 
Figures for the budget situation are in millions 
of the domestic currency. 
Govt. Exp.: Government expenditures. 
Table 22: The relationship between oil revenues and government's budget in Qatar 
(1975-1987) 
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Year % Oil revenues % Govt. Exp. Budget situation 
1975 -18.94 63.35 65,064 
1976 26.71 84.76 13,257 
1977 12.86 26.75 14,331 
1978 -13.27 4,154 9,007 
1979 42.32 52.33 23,200 
1980 54.99 22.99 111,500 
1981 8.506 18.50 83,300 
1982 -41.27 -15.51 2,460 
1983 -54.69 -5.74 -23,768 
1984 -22.55 -6.19 -44,853 
1985 -26.39 -16.20 -50,439 
1986 -37.67 -29.17 -60,944 
1987 14.064 23.312 -60,715 
Source: Tables (41) and (46) in Appendix 1. 
Figures for the budget situation are in millions 
of the domestic currency. 
Govt. Exp.: Government expenditures. 
Table 23: The relationship between oil revenues and government's budget in Saudi 
Arabia (1975-1987) 
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Year % Oil revenues % Govt. Exp. Budget situation 
1975 7.281 45.50 616.0 
1976 20.63 61.68 958.0 
1977 11.15 86.02 927.0 
1978 -5.942 29.61 -1,148 
1979 39.99 17.66 731.0 
1980 40.72 49.43 4,276 
1981 -4.28 33.65 3,794 
1982 -16.19 6.802 -3,879 
1983 -20.36 -20.29 -2,483 
1984 -7.819 -4.00 -2,842 
1985 -3.519 1.708 -414.0 
1986 -43.67 -17.59 -551.0 
1987 14.962 -0.826 " -1,984 
Source: Tables (41) and (47) in Appendix 1. 
Figures for the budget situation are in millions 
of the domestic currency. 
Govt. Exp.: Government expenditures. 
Table 24: The relationship between oil revenues and government's budget in the 
U.A.E. (1975-1987) 
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E . Exchange Rates, Inflation Rates, and Money Supply in Industrial 
Countries 
Economic changes in the industrial countries have many implications for the 
economies of the GCC member states. In general, appreciation or depreciation of 
the currencies of the former countries can affect the GCC member states' wealth 
and their expected stream of income, denominated in the currencies of their trad-
ing partners5 4. For example, appreciation of the dollar against the other partners' 
currencies will raise the relative value of wealth held in dollars, while lowering that 
of wealth denominated in the depreciating currencies. Moreover, pegging the do-
mestic currency to the currency of a trading partner will inflict losses or gains in the 
relative price of the domestic currency in terms of a third currency, whenever this 
latter currency's price changes in terms of the dollar. In addition, since exchange 
rate changes can affect the price of exports and imports, they are of importance to 
the GCC member states which export to, and most importantly, import from the 
six industrial countries considered in the present model. Consequently, terms of 
trade can be affected by changes in exchange rates amongst industrial countries. 
Over the sampled periods, as Table (25) reveals, the dollar has depreciated on 
average against the mark, yen and the International Monetary Fund basket, the 
SDR. However, its biggest relative loss was against the Japanese currency, where it 
depreciated by about 5.84 percent. In contrast, the dollar appreciated against the 
Italian lira by about 4.23 percent, and against the British pound by 1.94 percent. 
Furthermore, the U.S. currency recorded gains against The French franc and the" 
European unit of account of about 0.14 and 1.26 percent, respectively. 
Measurement of the possible risk present in these exchange rates reveals that 
the standard deviation of the SDR price of the dollar was the lowest. This is 
explicable by the fact that the SDR basket is weighted heavily in terms of the 
U.S. dollar. On the contrary, the most volatile exchange rate was that of the ECU 
against the dollar. This can be justified if we look at variations in the sampled 
5 4 Such potential consequences were discussed in Chapter IV. 
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Exchange rate Average change Standard deviation 
E(ff/$) 0.1366 14.60 
E(dm/$) -4.537 14.13 
E(U/$) 4.233 14.06 
E(yy/$) -5.849 14.13 
E(uk/$) 1.939 14.83 
E(SDR/$) -1.67 7.38 
E(ECU/$) 1.262 18.09 
ff (franc), dm (mark), 11 (lira), yy (yen), uk (pound), 
SDR (SDR) and ECU (ECU). 
Table 25: Average change and standard deviation amongst exchange rates 
of major industrial currencies, the SDR and the ECU baskets vis-a-vis the 
dollar (1971-1987), except for the ECU (1979-1987), % 
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European currencies against the dollar. These variations are partially embodied in 
the variability of the ECU-dollar exchange rate, since these currencies are weighted 
in the ECU accordingly. 
Inflation rates in the trading partners of the GCC member states may produce 
changes similar to those seen for the exchange rates. Rising prices in Italy, for 
instance, will put an upward pressure on export prices; hence imports of the GCC 
member states from Italy may experience price rises. These rises can add to the 
inflation rate imported by the GCC member states. 
The strong German currency has contributed to the low inflation rates expe-
rienced in Germany. Table (26) shows that Germany recorded an average rate 
of inflation of about 3.88 percent and a standard deviation of only 2.12 percent. 
Examining the average rates for the other countries, it is clear that the Italian and 
the British rates were the highest. However, there was less dispersion in these rates 
than was experienced by Japan, where the Japanese rate of inflation averaged 6.35 
percent, with a standard deviation of about 7.09 percent. 
The relevance of foreign money supply to the GCC member states is embod-
ied in the implied effects that changes in the money supply have on inflation and 
exchange rates in the industrial countries. Changes in money supply have a di-
rect effect on interest rates in both groups of countries due to the need to remain 
competitive. Likewise, money growth is linked to changes in prices. It is widely ac-
knowledged by the mainstream schools of economic thought, Monetarists, Keyne-
sians and Rational Expectationists, that expansionary monetary policy will cause 
the price level to rise, thus generating inflation. Consequently, this inflation can 
be transmitted to the GCC member states via trade. Realizing these potential 
impacts, Table (27) summarizes the behavior of money supply in the six industrial 
countries sampled in the model. 
The growth rates of money in Italy, France and the U.K. were above the average 
for the group. Moreover, the variance of these rates has been relatively large, with 
the U.K. taking the lead; its growth rate averaged about 14 percent, even when 
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Year France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. 
1972 5.99 5.46 5.75 4.74 7.00 3.40 
1973 6.91 6.71 10.30 11.07 8.82 5.92 
1974 12.90 6.67 17.38 20.81 14.64 10.38 
1975 11.10 5.77 15.66 25.24 21.77 8.79 
1976 9.24 4.29 15.56 8.95 15.38 5.65 
1977 8.87 3.55 15.67 7.86 14.64 6.30 
1978 8.78 2.66 11.48 4.10 7.93 7.33 
1979 10.13 4.08 13.75 3.62 12.68 10.64 
1980 12.55 5.23 19.23 7.47 16.48 12.66 
1981 12.57 6.10 16.38 4.78 11.24 9.89 
1982 11.16 5.13 15.24 2.72 8.23 5.89 
1983 9.18 3.25 13.67 1.92 4.50 3.19 
1984 7.14 2.39 10.26 2.16 4.83 4.21 
1985 5.60 2.17 8.78 2~02 5^ 89 3742 
1986 2.50 -0.24 7.09 0.60 3.40 1.92 















S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 26: Inflation rates in industrial countries (1972-1987), % 
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Year France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S. 
1972 17.81 13.13 16.49 22.06 24.57 12.15 
1973 13.68 8.42 21.06 15.55 24.34 6.34 
1974 16.41 6.97 14.61 10.89 12.17 5.23 
1975 14.62 10.83 21.87 13.50 6.89 11.94 
1976 11.58 7.28 10.07 12.66 10.94 12.81 
1977 21.51 9.84 20.06 10.52 9.07 10.04 
1978 10.69 9.76 20.73 12.30 13.58 7.42 
1979 12.18 5.02 16.44 8.05 11.77 6.01 
1980 7.48 4.45 12.78 6.62 16.94 6.81 
1981 9.98 3.61 9.70 10.19 24.49 4.55 
1982 10.11 6.65 16.23 7.30 10.76 8.36 
1983 10.38 5.54 12.83 6.66 12.05 15.09 
1984 7.88 5.45 10.23 6.68 11.69 8.67 
1985 6.01 7.72 9.91 8.49 10.70" 9;i3 
1986 6.05 6.31 7.82 8.88 20.31 8.61 















S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 27: Money growth rates in industrial countries (1972-1987), % 
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Italy was considered. In contrast, the monetary authorities in Germany have 
implemented a restrictive money supply rule compared to the other countries, if 
variance in the money growth rates is used as well as the average rate of growth, 
as a measure. German money growth averaged 7.02 percent, and the standard 
deviation in this rate was 2.55 percent. Accordingly, it may be argued that the 
U.S. has followed a similar monetary rule to that adopted by Germany, where 
the U.S. rate averaged about 8.18 percent, with a standard deviation of only 3.21 
percent. These rates may be compared to the rates of real economic growth in 
the industrial countries, as measured by their respective gross domestic product 
or gross national product. Table (30) in Appendix 1 shows the annual real growth 
rates for the six industrial countries over the sampled years. In general, Japan 
recorded the highest average rate of growth compared with the other industrial 
countries, averaging about 4.21 percent. On the other hand, the U.K. growth 
rate was the lowest, averaging 2.03 percent. However, the most stable rate was 
that of France, which had a standard deviation of 1.45 percent. The German real 
growth rate of output has kept itself within the general average of all the countries, 
averaging 2.14 percent, with a standard deviation of 1.96 percent. 
In summary, the increasing openness of the economies of the GCC member 
states since the early 1970's has enhanced the interactions between these economies 
and the industrial countries. It also revealed the importance of the choice of the 
exchange rate regime followed by the GCC member states . Therefore, empirical 
testing of the-model-will incorporate .some of_potential effects of policies in the 
more advanced countries on the Gulf economies. 
V I . 2 . Al te rna t ive Single Currency Invoic ing of O i l 
Assuming that oil can be invoiced in a foreign currency, the domestic currencies of 
the GCC economies may be pegged to a single currency, either the same currency 
in which oil is invoiced or another currency, or may be fixed in terms of a basket of 
currencies. Aside from fluctuations in demand for and supply of oil, which affect 
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quantity and price, oil revenues are received in a foreign currency(s), thus intro-
ducing an element of exchange risk. This risk is measured by the variance in the 
exchange rate between the domestic currency of each of the GCC member states 
and the currency(s) in which oil is invoiced. It is only when the currency(s) of in-
voicing and pegging coincide that the exchange risk factor is eliminated. However, 
as we have stressed before, i f the authorities in the GCC economies are concerned 
about the purchasing power of their oil revenues, then the variances in the ex-
change rates between the currencies of the GCC economies and those of their 
trading partners, must be examined. 
Assume that oil is invoiced in a single currency, j , where j ^ h. Then the 
variance which would need to be minimized is 
= Vlvarj + < „ + [ < ] • ( 6 9 ) 
It can be implied that if the domestic currency, h, is pegged to currency j in 
which oil is invoiced, the variance of the exchange rate between h and j vanishes. 
Although data on nominal value of oil revenues in any currency can be found by 
using the exchange rate factor, it is the right-hand-side bracket which requires 
estimating. 
There are six possible single currency pegs or invoicing schemes available in 
the present analysis. The following estimation examines every combination of 
these currencies. However, the analysis begins by examining the performance of 
each single currency peg alternative, then uses those results to substitute for the 
variance of the price level in the above equation. 
A. Single Currency Pegs 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the choice of a peg will be assessed accord-
ing to the contribution of each alternative currency peg to the standard deviation 
in the rate of inflation that the domestic country expects to import. 
Based on the rate of inflation in country j , the basic equation of the domestic 










Ph =domestic inflation rate 
Pj = inflation rate in country j 
oti = trade share with country i 
£ji = deviations from purchasing power parity 
<T5? = variance in the domestic inflation rate 
Vn 
a2p. = variance in country j 's inflation rate 
a?(r|.. = weighted variance of deviations from purchasing power parity, j ^ i. 
The results of the empirical estimation of equation (71) are provided in Tables 
(28) and (29). It is worth noting that the choice of peg is affected by: a) the rate of 
inflation in the country to whose currency the domestic currency is pegged; b) the 
adjusted trade shares ( Tables (5) to (10), in Appendix 1 ), whether import shares 
or total trade shares are used; c) deviations in exchange rates from purchasing 
power parity, as estimated for this peg in Table (11) in Appendix 1. 
Based on the standard deviation in inflation rates in the industrial countries, 
the French franc has emerged as the optimal choice of peg for Bahrain, whether 
total trade or import shares are considered. During the periods sampled, France 
maintained a more stable rate of inflation, although the average rate was higher 
than that of Germany, the U.S. or Japan. The standard deviation of the Japanese 
inflation rate was 7.09 percent, whereas i t was only 3.18 percent for France. The 
ability of the franc to provide an optimal currency peg compared to the mark 
may be attributed to the fact that the weighted deviations from purchasing power 
parity between the mark and the yen were much higher than those between the 
franc and the yen. This has affected the suitability of the mark, although by 
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Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
Dollar 9.27 9.70 10.61 10.77 9.06 10.95 
(6.86) (7.49) (9.77) (9.80) (6.22) (10.41) 
Yen 3.43 3.85 4.76 4.93 3.21 5.11 
(8.61) (8.23) (7.92) (7.53) (8.71) (7.44) 
Franc 9.41 9.83 10.75 10.91 9.19 11.09 
(6.40) (6.51) (8.03) (8.11) (6.27) (8.74) 
Mark 4.74 5.16 6.07 6.24 4.52 6.42 
(6.49) (6.62) (8.55) (8.53) (6.34) (9.21) 
Lira 13.51 13.93 12.52 15.01 13.29 15.19 
(8.08) (7.95) (10.16) (10.30) (7.23) (10.99) 
Pound 11.21 11.64 12.55 12.71 11.00 12.89 
(7.99) (8.25) (9.43) (9.81) (7.99) (10.40) 
OCi = to tal trade s lares 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Table 28: Mean and standard deviation of the imported weighted inflation 
under alternative single currency pegs (1971-1987), % 
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Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
Dollar 8.53 9.52 8.98 9.20 8.76 9.31 
(6.30) (7.06) (8.00) (7.07) (5.94) (7.02) 
Yen 2.69 3.67 3.13 3.35 2.91 3.47 
(9.27) (8.25) (9.52) (8.64) (8.90) (8.48) 
Franc 8.67 9.66 9.11 9.34 8.90 9.45 
(5.95) (6.29) (6.01) (5.48) (6.00) (5.79) 
Mark 4.00 4.98 4.44 4.67 4.23 4.78 
(6.06) (6.33) (6.78) (5.71) (6.05) (5.95) 
Lira 12.77 13.75 12.52 13.44 13.00 13.55 
(7.54) (7.97) (7.82) (7.23) (7.42) (7.43) 
Pound 10.47 11.64 10.92 11.14 10.70 11.25 
(7.41) (8.05) (6.56) (6.96) (7.63) (7.30) 
ati = import shares 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Table 29: Mean and standard deviation of the imported weighted inflation 
under alternative single currency pegs (1971-1987), % 
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only a small amount, as can be seen from Table (29). Furthermore, the mark has 
fluctuated against the dollar more than the franc, which added to the rise in the 
domestic inflation rate in the pegging country when the equation was estimated for 
the mark. The lira and the pound did not fulf i l l the optimality criterion basically 
because of the increasing variability in the inflation rate in Italy and the U.K., as 
well as their greater fluctuations relative to all other currencies of the industrial 
countries. Moreover, if trade shares, whether total or import, are examined, it is 
found that Bahrain's trade with France is very limited compared to that with the 
U.S., the U.K. and Japan. However, as explained earlier, this has done little to 
reduce the optimality of the franc peg. 
Estimation of the model for Kuwait promotes further the use of the franc 
as a single currency to which the Kuwaiti dinar might have been pegged. As 
a result of smaller deviations from purchasing power parity and low variance in 
the French inflation rate, the Kuwaiti rate of inflation would have experienced a 
standard deviation of 6.51 and 6.29 percent, using total trade and import snares, 
respectively. It was found from calculations involved in the estimation that the 
most important factor that may have reduced the optimality of the mark was the 
level of deviation from purchasing power parity between the mark and the yen on 
the one hand, and the mark and the lira on the other, weighted by their respective 
trade shares. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the pound and the yen 
have failed to meet the optimality condition due to the large variations in their 
own rates of inflation, and the pound has experienced deviations from purchasing 
power parity. In fact, had the Japanese rate of inflation been stable, it would have 
provided the optimal single currency peg for Kuwait. 
A peg to the yen proved to be optimal for Oman when total trade shares were 
used. This was aided by the large share of trade conducted between Oman and 
Japan; about 57 percent of Oman's trade in 1986. Consequently, the standard 
deviation in the domestic rate of inflation was low once equation (71) was esti-
mated for the yen. Evidently, the large total trade share had a negative effect on 
total weighted deviations from purchasing power parity, which in turn would have 
202 
reduced variability in the imported domestic rate of inflation had the RO been 
pegged to the yen. In spite of importing about 43 percent of total imports from 
the U.K., the pound would have not provided the optimal currency peg for Oman, 
when import shares were substituted in the estimated equation. The U.K. rate of 
inflation had a large standard deviation, which favored a more stable currency, in 
this case the franc. 
The question of the choice of the optimal single currency peg for Qatar exhibited 
a similar pattern to that found for Oman. Considering total trade shares, the yen 
gave rise to the lowest standard deviation in the domestic inflation rate, while 
the franc was the favored currency when import shares were used. The standard 
deviation in the former case was 7.53 percent declining to about 5.48 for the latter. 
This is basically due to the substantial decline in the share of imports from Japan 
compared to the total trade conducted with Japan for the same period. The 
share of trade, total and import, with Japan would affect the standard deviation 
in the domestic inflation rate if the dollar was adopted as a single currency peg. 
Deviations from purchasing power parity between the U.S. and Japan were large; 
moreover, when trade-weighted deviations were considered, the dollar's optimality 
declines. 
The consequences of these weighted deviations and the major role trade shares 
can play are clearly evident in the choice of the single currency peg for Saudi Ara-
bia. Considering the low variability in the U.S. rate of inflation and the relatively 
smaller shares of Japanese trade with Saudi Arabia, a dollar peg would have pro-
vided an optimal peg. Consequently, had the Saudi riyal been pegged to the dollar, 
variability in the domestic rate of inflation would have been about 6.22 and 5.94 
percent, using total trade and import shares, respectively. 
Furthermore, the Japanese yen emerged as the optimal choice for the U.A.E., 
using total trade shares, despite the less stable inflation rate in Japan. This result 
was a consequence of the large share of total trade conducted between the U.A.E. 
and Japan. However, the sensitivity of this result can be seen when import shares 
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were used. Estimation of equation (71) for the latter case led to abandoning the 
yen in favor of the franc. Once import shares were used, standard deviation in the 
domestic inflation rate was found to be 5.79 and 8.48 percent, with the franc and 
the yen pegs, respectively. 
Thus the results of the estimation of equation (71) reflect the crucial role devia-
tions from purchasing power parity can play. This claim is supportive for the franc 
which proved to be an optimal choice in many cases. In addition, the variability 
in the rate of inflation in the industrial countries emerged as an important source 
of variations in the inflation rates in the GCC member states. 
As argued in Chapter I I I , a unified peg chosen by a group of countries may 
promote trade among them. However, the findings in the present chapter do not 
provide a unique single currency to which the GCC member states could have 
pegged their currencies, and continue to meet the requirement of the optimality 
criterion. Needless to say, there is no single currency peg that is optimal under the 
alternative trade shares, when inflation in the industrial countries is considered. 
The one exception is the dollar for Saudi Arabia. 
These findings may also be substituted in equation (69) for the variance of the 
real value of oil revenues, where the estimation is restricted, at this stage, to oil 
being invoiced in a single currency5 5. 
- 2 . 1 . Invoicing and-Pegging to the Same Currency 
Consider the case where oil is invoiced in the same currency to which the domestic 
currency is pegged. Results of the estimation of equation (72) are reported in 
Tables (30) to (35). However, under the above mentioned invoicing and pegging 
scheme, standard deviations can be read from each table where the currency of 
invoicing coincides with the currency of pegging. 
5 5 Note that total trade shares equal the percentage of total trade conducted with each of the 
trading partners, with no regard to the currency invoicing of that trade. Lipschitz (1979) has 
argued that a peg may be chosen according to the total trade invoiced in a currency. Some 
estimation of this alternative is provided in Appendix VI.A at the end of the present chapter. 
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j = currency in which oil is invoiced, and to which the domestic currency, h, is 
pegged 
i = currencies of the trading partners, however j ^ i. 
For Bahrain, the dollar provided the least amount of variability with a stan-
dard deviation of about 34.9 percent, considering total trade, and 34.78 percent, 
if import weights were used to weight movements from PPP. On the contrary, 
the Japanese yen yielded the least stable standard deviation of about 50 percent. 
For Kuwait, the pound demonstrated the smallest contribution to the variance of 
the Kuwaiti dinar real value of oil revenues, where the standard deviation would 
have been about 37.90 percent. However, the yen has continued to introduce the 
largest standard deviation, which reached about 45.26 percent. The dollar pro-
vided the optimal currency for both pegging and invoicing for Oman, Qatar and 
the U.A.E. For Oman, it contributed about 39.42 and 39.02 percent, considering 
total and import weights, respectively. This can be compared to the yen, which 
would have resulted in a standard deviation of about 46 percent. For Qatar, the 
dollar remained the optimal choice; the yen would have increased variations in the 
domestic currency real value of oil revenues by more than 50 percent. Measuring 
the optimality of the dollar for the United Arab Emirates gave a standard devi-
ation of about 40 percent, which was slightly lower than that which would have 
resulted from the adoption of a pound pegging and invoicing alternative. The 
pound yielded an optimal choice for pegging the Saudi riyal, as well as invoicing 
Saudi oil. Using total weights, the lira would have resulted in large deviations, 
whilst the yen would have been the least optimal choice had import weights been 
used. 
A major factor that has contributed to the results was the covariance between 
oil revenues expressed in terms of the numeraire, and the exchange rates between 
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total and import refer to a;. 
Table 30: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a peg to the franc and alternative single currency invoicing 
(1971-1987), % 
206 



























































































total and import refer to a,. 
Table 31: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a peg to the mark and alternative single currency invoicing 
(1971-1987), % 
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total and import refer to aj . 
Table 32: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a peg to the lira and alternative single currency invoicing 
(1971-1987), % 
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total and import refer to o^ . 
Table 33: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a peg to the yen and alternative single currency invoicing 
(1971-1987), % 
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total and import refer to a,. 
Table 34: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a peg to the pound and alternative single currency invoicing 
(1971-1987), % 
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total and import refer to a,. 
Table 35: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a peg to the dollar and alternative single currency invoicing 
(1971-1987), % 
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the numeraire and the other currencies in which oil may be invoiced and to which 
the domestic currency is pegged. For example, the exchange rate between the 
dollar and the yen, where the yen has emerged as the least optimal currency, has 
moved in the same direction as have oil revenues in terms of the numeraire. The 
covariance between these two series has been found to be positive and about 513.38. 
Although the pound did not constitute an optimal choice, it resulted in a standard 
deviation in the Bahraini dinar's value of oil revenues that was lower than that 
obtained with the yen. This may be explained by the negative covariance between 
the pound's relative value of the numeraire and oil revenues in terms of the pound 
( -59.60 ). The optimality of the pound for Kuwait may be explained in a similar 
fashion. The above covariance was found to be -308.18, which has reduced the 
standard deviation of the Kuwaiti dinar value of oil revenues. 
To sum up, the covariances have played a major role in determining the opti-
mality of the choice of currency for invoicing oil, and to which the currencies of 
the G C C member states may be pegged. 
The tabulated results were subjected to statistical testing to measure the signif-
icance of the differences between the variances. Indeed it is the difference between 
the highest and the lowest variance in each combination that was subjected to test-
ing, because this represents the two extremes. ( These extremes are reported in 
the summary Tables (65) to (72) for each combination at the end of this chapter ). 
The null_hypothesis postulates equal variances, whereas the alternative states that 
the opposite is true 5 6 . As reported in Table (36), with a level of significance as-
sumed to be 5 percent, there appears to be no evidence to support the alternative 
hypothesis 5 7. 
5 6 T h e test is: F = a\fo\, which is distributed as an F distribution, with a/2, and n\ — l , n 2 — 1, 
degrees of freedom. The test is cited by: W. Daniel and J . Terrell, Business Statistics: Basic 
Concepts and Methodology. 4th edition (Boston: Hughton Mifflin Company, 1986), p. 269. 
"Tabulated F-value for the whole data range, 1971-1987, is 2.86 ( nx = 16,n 2 = 16 ). For the 
E C U data range, 1979-1987, F-value is 4.99 ( nx = 8 ,n 2 = 8). 
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Country Calculated F-value Critical F-value 
Bahrain 1.432 2.86 
Kuwait 1.194 2.86 
Oman 1.181 2.86 
Qatar 1.170 2.86 
Saudi Arabia 1.147 2.86 
United Arab Emirates 1.156 2.86 
Source: The calculated F-values were derived from Table (65), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 36: Calculated and critical F-values when the domestic currencies are pegged 
to and oil is invoiced in the same single currency (1971-1987) 
2.2. Invoic ing in One C u r r e n c y and Pegging to Another 
On the other hand, consider an alternative scheme where the currency of invoicing 
differs from that of pegging. Then the equation to estimate is 
°Lrh = °L*k + < y i + K +1 (73) 
J = 1 
where 
j = currency to which h is pegged 
k = currency in which oil is invoiced 
i = currencies of the trading partners, however j ^ i. 
There is overwhelming evidence to support a peg to the dollar, while invoicing 
oil in the pound ( results may be read from Tables (30) to (35) ). Moreover, a yen 
invoicing combined with a lira peg provided the worst choice for all countries. For 
the Saudi riyal, this choice would have resulted in less stability in the variance of 
the real value of oil revenues than would any other currency. It would have also 
resulted in a standard deviation of about 61 percent. 
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However, an effect of covariances, similar to that described above, is present. 
Currencies which have shown positive and large covariances with respect to the 
numeraire currency and the value of oil in terms of the numeraire have suffered 
more in terms of their optimality. In particular, this applies to the yen and the 
lira. Meanwhile, the large negative covariance between the pound's nominal value 
of oil revenues, and the exchange rate between the numeraire currency, the dollar, 
and the pound, has contributed to the optimality of pegging the currencies of the 
G C C countries to the dollar, whilst invoicing oil in the British pound. 
Statistical inference may be employed to determine the significance of the dif-
ferences in the contribution of each combination to the variance in the real value 
of oil revenues. Explicitly, looking over the previous six tables, it may be argued 
that the differences in the standard deviations are ' small' , and may be considered 
insufficient to induce a policy change in selecting a currency in which oil is to be 
invoiced, or a currency to which the domestic currency is pegged. 
As reflected by Table (37), similar conclusions to those obtained in the previ-
ous section, were arrived at when testing of differences of variances was conducted. 
Consequently, if statistical evidence is to be accepted, the choice of any combina-
tion of single currency pegs and invoicing would be accepted to the authorities in 
the G C C countries. 
.-2.3. Invo ic ing j n . a . S i n g l e . . C u r r e n c y and Pegging to a Basket 
Single currency pegs may not seem optimal for the individual G C C member states. 
Different single pegs may discourage intra-GCC trade as a result of variations in the 
exchange rates of the currencies to which the currencies of the G C C member states 
are pegged. Furthermore, with diversified trade patterns, prices in the domestic 
markets may be more volatile to exchange rate fluctuations among the G C C ' s 
trading partners. Alternatively, a trade basket has been viewed as being better if 
diversified trade patterns were allowed for. A basket peg can dampen the effects 
of deviations from purchasing power parity amongst trading partners. Moreover, 
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Country Calculated F-value Critical F-value 
Bahrain 1.433 2.86 
Kuwait 1.265 2.86 
Oman 1.221 2.86 
Qatar 1.174 2.86 
Saudi Arabia 1.141 2.86 
United Arab Emirates 1.227 2.86 
Source: The calculated F-values were derived from Table (66), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 37: Calculated and critical F-values when the domestic currencies were 
pegged to one currency and oil is invoiced in another (1971-1987) 
if trade shares are used as an indicator upon which the basket weighting scheme 
is based, then fluctuations amongst the currencies of trading partners, marked 
by similar fluctuations between the domestic currency and those of the trading 
partners, would have an offsetting effect on the average domestic price changes. 
B. Trade-Weighted Basket Peg 
This view is tested empirically for the G C C member states where, first, total trade 
shares are used to select the weights of the basket, and second, an import-weighted 
basket is estimated. 
Utilization of trade shares as alternative weights will allow us to rewrite equa-
tions (70) and (71) as 
PH^EfrPi (74) 
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and the variance is estimated according to 
< = E A 2 < (75) 
2=1 
where 
i = trading partners included. 
It is worth mentioning that since trade-weighted baskets set f3m = a m , devia-
tions from purchasing power parity no longer induce any influence on the domestic 
price level or its variability. Consequently, a peg to a basket of currencies of trading 
partners will allow the G C C member states to import a trade-weighted average of 
inflation rates and price stability from their trading partners. The results of the 
estimation are reported in Table (38), where the weights used are those provided 
in Tables (5) to (10) of Appendix 1. 
The evidence reveals that the use of import shares as a weighting scheme sub-
stantially reduces the standard deviation in the imported element in the domestic 
rate of inflation. Examining the stability of the rate of inflation in the industrial 
countries, it can be argued that countries which trade more with Japan and the 
U . K . would be importing a more unstable rate of inflation than countries that 
conduct less trade with these two industrial countries. For example, Saudi Arabia 
which relatively trades less with Japan and the U.K. than most of the other G C C 
member states, has experienced the least instability in the imported rate of infla-
tion. Applying total trade shares, the standard deviation in the rate of inflation 
was only 2.38 percent; using import shares reduced the same deviation to about 
2.11 percent. 
However, countries like Oman, Qatar and the U . A . E . would have imported a less 
stable rate of inflation than Saudi Arabia. This is explained by the trade patterns 
of these countries with respect to Japan and the U .K. For example, the weighted 
averages of variability imported from Japan and the U .K. by Oman would have 
been 16.29 and 5.30, respectively, if total trade weights were used. Note that when 
import shares were substituted in the estimated equation, the standard deviation 
reduces to only 2.80 percent. This increase in stability is explained by the decline 
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Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U . A . E . 
Total trade 
shares 
Mean 7.34 7.88 7.60 7.52 7.70 7.30 
S.D. 2.67 2.96 4.24 4.31 2.38 4.67 
Import shares 
Mean 7.59 7.47 8.24 8.01 7.76 7.90 
S.D. 2.09 2.77 2.80 2.42 2.11 2.55 
S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 38: Imported weighted inflation based on a trade-weighted basket peg 
(1971-1987), % 
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of the weight of the yen in the basket and the consequent rise of the weights of the 
more stable ( less susceptible to inflation ) currencies, such as the mark and the 
dollar. For Qatar, the effect of the yen is clearly present in the results, once total 
trade shares were used, where Japan's share was about 60 percent. However, when 
import shares were used, the instability in the domestic rate of inflation declines to 
about 2.42 percent. This may be attributed to the decline in exports from Japan 
to Qatar, which now account for only 25 percent the total goods imported by this 
country. A similar argument can be presented for the U . A . E . , where the standard 
deviation in the rate of inflation would decline from 4.67 using total trade shares 
to about 2.55 percent if import shares were used. 
Moreover, baskets that are based on import shares would have contributed 
greater stability to the domestic rate of inflation in all G C C member states, when 
the rates of inflation in the trading partner countries were used in the estimation 
of the model. Table (38) shows only minor violations to this conclusion. 
C. Special Drawing Rights Basket Peg 
Defined as a weighted average of a basket of five currencies, the S D R will provide 
a common peg for the G C C member states. Such a peg may reduce the variability 
in the cross exchange rates amongst the G C C member states, and can contribute 
to the aim of coordinating monetary policy, which is viewed as a target by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Further modification of the" basic equations""of"this section, 
(70) and (71), will be necessary to allow for the fact that not every currency of 
the trading partners is represented in the weighting scheme of the SDR. Although 
reviewed every five years, the current S D R configuration includes the franc, dollar, 
mark, pound and the yen. Although the weights of these currencies vary as bilateral 
exchange rates amongst the included currencies change, the initial weights and 
number of units of each currency were reported in Table (14) in Chapter V. 
Since the Italian currency is not included in the S D R weight, equations (70) 
and (71) can be extended and modified to take this fact into account. Accordingly, 
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the equations to be estimated are 
Ph = PusPus + PukPuk + PdmPdm + PyenPyen + P f f P f f + (Puk ~ <*uk) 
£uauk ~\~ (Pdm ®dm)£usdm (Pyen &yen)£uayy ~t" ( P f f ^ / / ) 
tuoff + (-Ctlfitvall (76) 
or conventionally 
5 4 
= J2 PiPi + J2 ( A n - a m ) & m - (77) 
j = l m=l 
and the variance can be expressed as 
i = l m= 1 
where 
i = the currencies included in the S D R 
m = the currencies included in the SDR, excluding k 
k = the numeraire, the dollar in the present analysis. 
The implied mean and standard deviation in the domestic inflation rate for the 
G C C member states with the S D R peg, are tabulated in Table (39). In general, 
efficiency is lost when the S D R weighting scheme is used relative to the efficiency 
obtained when import shares were used in the estimation. Presumably, this result 
was not unexpected, because S D R weights do not shield the domestic rate of infla-
tion from disturbances caused by deviations from purchasing power parity amongst 
the trading partners. Since Pm does not equal ctm in the estimated equations, ef-
ficiency was expected to be lower for the S D R peg than for the trade-weighted 
basket peg. As argued by Crockett and Nsouli: 
In general, one can say that the case for pegging to the S D R will be 
stronger, the smaller the deviations of the SDR basket from the import-
weighted basket and the greater the level of intra-regional trade that 
will occur 5 8 . 
5 8 A. Crockett, and S. Nsouli, " Exchange Rate Policies for Developing Countries, " Journal of 
Development Studies, (January, 1977), p. 133. 
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Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U . A . E . 
ctj =total 
shares 
Mean 7.78 5.59 9.12 9.28 9.28 7.57 
S.D. 3.73 5.04 7.13 7.29 3.64 8.06 
ctj =import 
shares 
Mean 7.04 5.60 7.49 7.71 7.08 6.07 
S.D. 3.22 4.04 5.19 3.66 3.08 3.80 
S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 39: Imported weighted inflation based on a peg to the SDR (1971-
1987), % 
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Table (39) depicts the standard deviation in the domestic inflation rate resulting 
from an SDR peg. Thus, under the SDR basket peg, the high instability in the rate 
of inflation experienced in the some industrial countries would be transmitted to 
the rate of inflation in the G C C member states. It is therefore not surprising that 
the standard deviation in the price level has increased across the G C C countries. 
Remarkably, the Saudi standard deviation continues to be the smallest, followed 
by that of Bahrain. Examination of the differences between SDR weights and 
trade shares, as expressed in Tables (12) and (13) in Appendix 1, shows that these 
differences are small in absolute value for the most stable currencies. 
For countries which have the greatest differences with respect to the pound and 
the yen, as do Oman, Qatar and the U . A . E . , the standard deviation in the domestic 
inflation rate was high, with values of 7.13, 7.29 and 8.06 percent, respectively, 
when differences between total trade shares and SDR weights were applied. 
The weighting scheme involved in the S D R may be viewed as narrow for coun-
tries which trade more with partners whose currencies are not weighted in the 
SDR. Furthermore, the particular representation of a currency in the SDR basket 
may not closely reflect the domestic country's trade patterns. For example, for 
countries which trade heavily with Japan, the S D R assigns low weight to the yen; 
thus, pegging to the S D R will partially insulate the domestic economy from fluctu-
ations in the yen price of other currencies. Consequently, the domestic price level 
is expected to be more variable, as the evidence suggests from the results reported 
in this section. 
D. European Currency Unit Basket Peg 
This unit was created in January 1, 1979 as a part of the European Monetary 
System, E M S . Although it does not serve the main purpose of money, the E C U is 
aimed to be a numeraire for the exchange rates between the member states, who 
receive E C U ' s in exchange for gold and dollar reserve in the European Monetary 
Co-operation Fund, E M C F . 
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The weights of the national currencies included as of September 17, 1984 are 
listed in Table (15) of Chapter V. Although the unit is designed to be used by the 
monetary authorities in the participating countries, the evidence shows that there 
has been an increasing use of private E C U ' s , that is ECU-denominated financial 
means aside from those defined in the context of the EMS. For example, a study by 
the I M F noted that in 1982, ECU-denominated time deposits and saving accounts 
emerged. Furthermore, in 1983 a credit card based on the same denomination 
appeared, and in the same year the World Bank denominated some bonds in 
E C U 5 9 . Consequently, the model is estimated next assuming the G C C member 
states peg their national currencies to this basket. Before we report the results of 
the estimation, three issues require further attention. First, the assumption that 
the G C C member states trade with only six industrial countries will be preserved. 
Second, the weighting scheme of the E C U is defined for only nine members, i.e. 
before the inclusion of Greek drachma in the E C U . Third, the dollar continues to 
be used as the numeraire currency with which deviations from purchasing power 
parity with respect to other trading partners are measured. 
The significance of the first and third assumptions is contained in the compar-
ison of the performance of the alternative pegs, thus using the same trade shares 
and numeraire. The second assumption is activated for convenience, because the 
inclusion of the money supply and price levels of Greece would bias the results 
more than its exclusion. If it was included, then the variance in its inflation rate 
and money growth "rate would have been included for the whole-sampled period;-
however, it was not a member of the E M S until 1986. 
Examining the performance of inflation rate and the rate of money growth in 
the ECU-member countries and the other trading partners ( Japan and the U.S. for 
all G C C member states ), as reported in Tables (40) and (41), reveals a discrepancy 
in the standard deviations. With respect to the variability in the inflation rate, as 
measured by its standard deviation, the Italian and the Irish rates have recorded 
5 9 T h e Role of the SDR in the International Monetary System, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 51 
(Washington: IMF, March 1987), p. 48. 
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Country Mean Standard deviation 
Belgium 5.40 2.68 
Denmark 7.15 3.22 
France 8.00 4.00 
Germany 3.03 2.34 
Ireland 10.17 6.14 
Italy 11.91 5.43 
Luxembourg 5.09 3.47 
Netherlands 3.30 2.69 
U.K. 7.33 4.50 
Japan 2.72 2.38 
U.S. 5!60 3.74 
Table 40: Mean and standard deviation of the inflation rates in the E C U 
member states, Japan and the U.S. (1980-1987), % 
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Country Mean Standard deviation 
Belgium 6.55 2.25 
Denmark 12.77 5.87 
France 9.03 2.78 
Germany 5.69 1.27 
Ireland 9.85 4.72 
Italy 10.75 3.10 
Luxembourg 10.04 12.70 
Netherlands 5.36 1.67 
U.K. 15.75 5.21 
Japan 8.17 1.60 
U.S. 8.11 3.47 
Table 41: Mean and standard deviation of the money growth rate in the 
ECU member states, Japan and the U.S. (1980-1987), % 
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the least stability, 5.43 and 6.14 percent, respectively. Furthermore, the means 
of their inflation rates were the highest, with values of about 11.91 percent in 
Italy, and about 10.17 percent in Ireland. As has been so throughout the sampled 
periods, the German inflation rate is found to have the least degree of instability, 
and the lowest average. Moreover, the exclusion of the mid 1970's from the sample 
has drastically reduced the instability in the Japanese inflation rate. The average 
of this rate declined from 6.35 percent in the first sample, to about 2.72 percent 
when the 1980's were considered. Similarly, the standard deviation declined by 
more than twice its value in the early sample relative to the present sample, i.e. 
from 7.09 to 2.38 percent. However, for the other industrial countries included in 
all of the estimations of the model, the standard deviation in the inflation rate has 
been slightly higher for the U.S., Italy, Germany and France. 
Based upon the introduction of the ECU as an alternative peg, and taking 
into consideration the assumptions outlined in the beginning of this section, the 
relevant average inflation rate equation is 
9 4 
Ph = YlPiPi + (An ~ Ofm)£fcmi + (-^yyHkyy (79) 
i = l m = l 
Similarly, the variance is estimated according to 
1 = 1 TO=1 
where 
i = the currencies included in the ECU. . _ ._. 
m = currencies of the trading partners which are members of the ECU 
k = numeraire, the dollar . 
In general, an ECU basket peg has proved to be inferior to trade-weighted 
baskets or the SDR basket pegs. The results of the estimation are reported in 
Table (42). 
It can be argued that countries which conduct most of their trade with curren-
cies which are not represented in the ECU, such as the yen, have suffered the most 
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Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
ati =total 
shares 
Mean 8.60 9.19 9.98 10.15 8.52 10.51 
S.D. 7.55 8.37 11.25 11.22 7.20 12.05 
oti =import 
shares 
Mean 7.68 8.85 7.87 8.11 8.10 8.43 
S.D. 6.15 7.57 8.51 6.74 6.37 7.16 
S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 42: Imported weighted inflation based on a peg to the ECU (1979-
1987), % 
226 
in terms of optimality for a given variability in deviations from purchasing power 
parity. For example, using the ECU-total trade weight difference, the weighted 
deviations from purchasing power parity of the dollar with respect to the yen con-
tributed about 76.8 percent to the imported variability in Oman's rate of inflation. 
However, once the smallest import share with Japan was used, the same deviation 
declined to 10.74 percent. On the contrary, the share of imports to Oman from 
the U.K. is large, but the weight of the pound in the ECU is comparably small. 
Consequently, the contribution of deviations from purchasing power parity of the 
pound to the standard deviation in Omani inflation rate was large. 
For Qatar and the U.A.E., for whom total trade with Japan was about 60 and 
65 percent, respectively, the ECU peg has resulted in less stable inflation rates. 
Another factor that has added to the increased the level of domestic inflation rates 
of the GCC member states, is the divergence of ECU assigned weight from trade 
shares. The German mark is given about 33 percent of the total ECU weight, 
but the GCC member states conduct less trade with Germany, thus the difference 
between the ECU weight and the trade share is large. Consequently, the domestic 
inflation rate would be less stable, since weighted deviations from purchasing power 
parity are not penalized. For Bahrain, the ECU peg is more optimal than for 
the other GCC member states, when import shares were applied. This may be 
attributed to Bahrain's smaller share of imports from Japan, only 16.66 percent, 
Moreover, the Saudi standard deviation, using total trade difference was only 7.20 
percent, enhancing further the importance of trade shares with members oLthe 
ECU and the other trading partners. 
Thus, the ECU seems to introduce greater variability in the domestic price 
level, relative to trade-weighted baskets, when foreign inflation rates are used. To 
sum up, this demonstrates the importance of trade weights in the selection of a 
basket peg. Thus a basket which is composed of a greater number of currencies 
by no means implies greater efficiency. Table (43) summarizes the various results 
of the model under the alternative currency pegs and shows which peg yields the 
least variability in the inflation rate in the GCC member states. 
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1 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
Single peg 




























Import basket 2.09 2.77 2.80 2.42 2.11 2.55 
Total basket 2.67 2.96 4.24 4.31 2.38 4.67 
SDR peg 
ai = total 3.73 5.04 7.13 7.29 3.64 8.06 
ai = import 3.22 4.04 5.19 3.66 3.08 3.80 
ECU peg 
ai — total - 7.55 - 8.37- 11.25 11.22 7.20 12.05-
ai = import 6.15 5.57 8.51 6.74 6.37 7.16 
Al l figures are denned as standard deviation. 
Table 43: Summary of results of the weighted imported inflation rate based 
on alternative pegs 
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These findings may also be substituted in equation (69) to estimate the con-
tribution of each basket peg to the total variations in the domestic currency's real 
value of oil revenues. 
Alternatively, even though oil is invoiced in a single currency, the currencies 
of the economies of the GCC can be pegged to baskets of currencies. If this were 
the case, then the variance of the exchange rate between the currency in which oil 
is invoiced and the currencies included in the baskets would affect the optimality 
of this scheme. In the present analysis, the domestic currencies may be pegged to 
a total trade-weighted basket, an import-weighted basket, the SDR basket or the 
ECU basket. 
The equation to be estimated if the domestic currency is pegged a trade-
weighted basket is 
>=i 
where 
j = currency in which oil is invoiced 
b = a trade-weighted basket to which h is pegged 
i = currencies included in b. 
On the other hand, a single-currency invoicing scheme combined with a peg to 
the SDR, yields 
* U = oL*'+ < d r / j + + E(A - + «?,oL " ( 8 2 ) 
1 = 1 3=1 
where 
sdr = SDR-weighted basket 
j = currency in which oil is invoiced 
s = member currencies in the SDR, less k 
k = numeraire; the dollar is used in this analysis. 
Note that for the numeraire, = 0, which is why the index on the second 
229 
summation sign is 4, excluding the U.S., which is used as the numeraire, and Italy, 
since the lira is not included in the SDR. 
A peg to the ECU, when oil is invoiced in currency j , implies the following 
equation is be estimated: 
*lorh = o\VOT] + + £ 0lal + - a c) 24 c + (83) 
1=1 c = l 
where 
i = member currencies in the ECU 
c= currencies of the trading partners which are included in the ECU. 
Estimation of the model under these alternatives yielded those results reported 
in Tables (44), (45) and (46). 
Invoicing in the dollar has proved superior for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar, what-
ever is adopted as the basket peg. From examination of the standard deviations of 
aTvorh
 u n < l e r these baskets ( excluding the ECU for the time being ), similar values 
may be deduced for each country under the alternative baskets. For example, the 
standard deviations for Bahrain were in the region of 34 percent in all three cases. 
The pound would have resulted in the smallest variations for Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, whether total trade-weighted, import-weighted or the SDR baskets were 
considered. For the U.A.E., the dollar has emerged as the optimal choice if import 
weights were used as the basis for the peg. Moreover, the yen has remained in a less 
advantageous position, contributing larger variations thariTaH the other currencies 
except the lira, which yielded less optimal results for two countries. 
A peg to the ECU would have not changed the optimal currencies by a great 
deal; however, the mark has emerged as the least optimal currency for all countries 
except Oman, for which the lira was the source of greatest instability, leading to 
a standard deviation of about 45 percent. The yen would have provided less 
instability in the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currencies of 
Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., although only if the total trade weight and the ECU 
weight difference were used for the latter country. For Saudi Arabia, a peg to the 
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total and import refer to o^. 
Table 44: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil rev-
enues with a peg to a trade-weighted basket and alternative single currency 
invoicing (1971-1987), % 
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total and import refer to a .^ 
Table 45: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with an SDR peg and alternative single currency invoicing (1971-
1987), % 
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total and import refer to Q j . 
Table 46: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with an ECU peg and alternative single currency invoicing (1979-
1987), % 
233 
yen would have resulted in standard deviations of 36.49 and 36.34 percent, using 
the total trade and the import weight differences, respectively. It is worth noting 
that, a comparison between the three baskets mentioned previously, namely the 
total trade-weighted, the import-weighted, and the SDR baskets, and the ECU 
basket, may not be wise at this stage. This is because a different data range 
was used for the ECU basket relative to that used for the other three baskets 
( estimation over the same range is conducted later for some cases ). 
The optimality of an invoicing currency combined with a pegging basket, de-
pended on the variance of the nominal value of oil revenues in terms of that cur-
rency, the variance between this currency and the currencies in the basket, and 
the variance of the weighted inflation rate. However, the first factor was found to 
be of great importance. Note that the variance of this factor is affected by the 
covariance between the numeraire ( the dollar ) and the currency in which oil may 
be invoiced. 
Consider the case of the dollar, which was found to be the optimal currency for 
invoicing the oil exports of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the U.A.E. The standard 
deviation of real value of oil revenues in Bahraini dinars is lower under a dollar 
than under a yen invoicing scheme. Moreover, an import-weighted peg would 
have contributed about 4.36 percent to the variance of 0^.VOTh, compared to 7.12 
percent if the BD had been pegged to a total trade-weighted basket. Another 
contribution associated with the choice of a peg is evident in the total variation 
between the currency of invoicing and the basket, 0* , where j is the invoicing 
currency. Thus, although is lower than that under the dollar, the dollar 
provided an optimal invoicing currency, because the yen was positively related to 
the value of oil revenues expressed in dollars. This may be more evident for Oman. 
In that case, the variance between the yen and the basket was only 10.92 percent, 
whilst its counterpart in terms of the dollar was about 79 percent. Not surprisingly, 
the dollar was superior to the yen, due to large variations in the variance of oil 
revenues in terms of the yen. 
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Country Calculated F-value Critical F-value 
Bahrain 1.430 2.86 
Kuwait 1.204 2.86 
Oman 1.190 2.86 
Qatar 1.181 2.86 
Saudi Arabia 1.069 2.86 
United Arab Emirates 1.173 2.86 
Source: The calculated F-values were derived from Table (67), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 47: Calculated and critical F-values under alternative single currency invoic-
ing combined with basket, trade-weighted and SDR-weighted, pegs (1971-1987) 
The covariance terms have reduced the variance in the real value of oil rev-
enues for the U.A.E., although not sufficiently to favor the pound over the dollar. 
Nevertheless, the variance of oil revenues in terms of the pound was 1,537 percent 
compared to 1,530 in terms of the dollar. Moreover, cr^i/uk was 22 percent, lower 
than the value of 38 percent recorded for the dollar. This has resulted in a close 
race between the dollar and the pound, with the two currencies implying a stan-
dard deviation in the dirham's real value of oil revenues of about 39.58 and 39.68 
percent, respectively. 
However, there is no statistical evidence to favor one combination of peg and 
invoice over another. Clearly, from the calculated and the critical F-values given 
in Tables (47) and (48), none of the differences between the estimated variances is 
significant. 
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Country Calculated F-value Critical F-value 
Bahrain 1.418 4.99 
Kuwait 1.251 4.99 
Oman 1.264 4.99 
Qatar 1.312 4.99 
Saudi Arabia 1.198 4.99 
United Arab Emirates 1.348 4.99 
Source: The calculated F-values were derived from Table (68), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 48: Calculated and critical F-values under a single currency invoicing and a 
peg to the ECU (1979-1987) 
VI.3. Invoicing in. Alternative Baskets and Pegging to a Single Currency 
The results arrived at from estimation of the model concerning the alternative 
single currency and basket of currencies pegs may be utilized to determine the 
optimality of pegging oil in a basket of currencies. The standard deviations of 
the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues for these baskets are reported in 
Tables (49), (50), and (51). 
Invoicing in a trade-weighted basket, while the domestic currency is pegged to 
j , yields the following equation to estimate6 0: 
<£~. = £ 0K°lOr, + < J + [ < . + £ a2m<rlJ (84) 
»=1 m = l 
where 
i = currencies of the trading partners 
j = currency to which h is pegged 
8 0Refer to Appendix V L B for further explanation of some technical aspects of the calculations 
of variances. 
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m = currencies of the trading partners, less j 
b = trade-weighted basket. 
Alternatively, invoicing oil in the SDR, while h is pegged to j , requires estima-
tion of the following equation: 
° U = E ^ U + < / s d r) + K + E «l«U (ss) 
»=1 m = l 
where 
i = currencies included in the SDR 
m = currencies of the trading partners, less j 
j = currency to which h is pegged. 
However, i f oil is invoiced in the ECU basket, while h is pegged to j , then 
oLrh = E ^ lor, + < / e c u ) + K + t «1°IJ (86) 1=1 m = l 
where 
i = currencies included in the ECU 
m = currencies of trading partners less j 
j = currency to which h is pegged. 
From examination of the fulfillment of the optimality condition under a total 
trade-weighted basket ( h is pegged to a single currency ), it may be observed 
that the dollar has emerged as an optimal single peg for all member states of the 
GCC except Qatar, for which the pound was more optimal. For instance, a dollar 
peg would have resulted in a standard deviation of about 20.65 percent, compared 
to a standard deviation of 22.08 percent if the lira was the currency to which the 
Bahraini dinar was pegged. Alternatively, if an import weighted basket was used to 
price oil, the overall variations would have declined for all countries. In particular, 
the decline would be drastic for Qatar and the U.A.E., where standard deviations 
were cut by more than 10 percent in most cases. Moreover, the decline in the 
standard deviations for invoicing in an import-weighted basket relative to a total 
trade-weighted basket, was smallest for Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with 
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total and import refer to a<. 
Table 49: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with invoicing in a trade-weighted basket and single currency pegs 
(1971-1987), % 
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total and import refer to a j . 
Table 50: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a single currency peg and invoicing in an export-weighted 
basket (1971-1987), % 
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total and import refer to a;. 
Table 51: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a single currency peg and invoicing in an SDR basket (1971-
1987), % 
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a value of no more than 1 percent in some cases. On the other hand, a peg to the 
yen would have resulted in the largest variations for all countries, except Kuwait. 
For Qatar, a peg to the franc, whilst oil is invoiced in an import-weighted basket, 
would have contributed the smallest amount of variation, about 22 percent, with 
the largest recorded under a peg to the yen. 
Oil may be invoiced in the SDR, where weights are fixed for some years. Con-
sideration of this alternative yielded drastic changes in the optimality of currencies 
used as single pegs. The dollar has retained its optimality for Bahrain, resulting 
in a standard deviation of about 19.63 percent; the yen has remained the least 
appealing alternative single currency peg for this country. The franc has emerged 
as an optimal alternative for Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, with standard deviations 
of 21.07, 21.96 and 24.29 percent, respectively ( using the total trade weights as 
the basis of differencing ). Of three countries, it is Kuwait that has the smallest 
difference in the standard deviations resulting from the more optimal currency peg, 
the franc, compared to that derived from a peg to the yen, the least optimal. Com-
paring the three baskets, an import-weighted basket invoicing scheme would have, 
in general, resulted in an optimal choice with less regard to the single currency peg 
adopted by each member country. 
Table (50) cites the results obtained from the model assuming that oil is paid 
for according to an export-weighted basket. It may be observed from the results 
that there is a rise in the standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in 
terms of the domestic currency for every country, under any single currency peg, 
except a peg to the yen ( both total and import weights for PPP ), and a peg 
to the pound ( import weights for PPP ). Moreover, for some countries, like the 
U.A.E., variations resulting from this basket have almost doubled. 
Invoicing oil in the European Currency Unit may constitute an alternative to 
other baskets. The value of the ECU is targeted by the participating countries, 
thus its relative market value may be viewed as more stable. Table (52) presents 
the results under an ECU invoicing scheme. 
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total and import refer to o .^ 
Table 52: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a single currency peg and invoicing in an ECU basket (1979-
1987), % 
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A peg to the dollar would provide a standard deviation of 16.58 percent in the 
real value of oil revenues for Bahrain, thus yielding an optimal peg, if am — import 
shares. A slight gain in optimality would favor a franc peg relative to a peg to 
the mark, if am = total trade shares. However, the mark leads to the minimum 
standard deviation for Kuwait. For Oman, the franc provides the least instability 
in the real value of oil revenues expressed in terms of riyal Omani. It is for the 
U.A.E. where the franc is more appealing, resulting in a standard deviation of 
only 14.06 and 12.48 percent, for am = total trade weights, and import weights, 
respectively. 
To sum up, of these baskets, and apart from the ECU, an import-weighted 
basket invoicing scheme has proved to be an optimal combination with the dol-
lar for Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The franc peg provided the smallest 
amount of variability in the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues, if com-
bined with an import basket invoicing policy, for Qatar and for Oman, and using 
a denomination scheme which is based on the SDR. For the U.A.E., a peg to the 
dollar would be an optimal choice, if the SDR is used to determine the weight of 
currencies according to which oil would be invoiced. 
Analysis of the contribution of the various factors to the real value of oil rev-
enues in the domestic currencies of the GCC member states, has revealed several 
points. It was found that for Saudi Arabia, the variance of the imported weighted 
rate of inflation under a dollar peg, was smaller than under other single currency 
pegs. In addition, the import-weighted variations in the nominal value of oil rev-
enues in other currencies, have been relatively large. Moreover, differences between 
trade shares and basket weights have, in many cases, shown a substantial impact 
on the optimality of several currencies. This may be attributed to the large weight 
the SDR assigns to the dollar, which in turn, led to a rise in the contribution of 
variations in the dollar's nominal value of oil revenues to the total variance of the 
domestic currency's real value of oil revenues. The evidence on the optimal com-
bination for Kuwait supports this argument. A large import share from Japan has 
diminished the optimality of an import-invoiced basket for the U.A.E., and favors 
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the SDR basket. This share has raised the imported variations in the percentage 
of oil revenues denominated in yen ( about 174.5 percent ), compared to only 45.89 
percent, with the SDR basket. For Oman, the relatively low standard deviation 
in the RO's real value of oil revenues, if the riyal was pegged to the franc, with oil 
invoiced in the SDR may be attributed to a large extent to the smaller variance in 
the imported weighted inflation, a value of 36.12 percent, compared to 64 percent 
recorded for the numeraire currency. 
Less optimal results were recorded under an invoicing scheme based on export 
shares. A major contribution to this conclusion has to do with the effect of export 
shares. Indeed, since a large percentage of oil exports was directed to Japan, the 
instability in the nominal of oil revenues in terms of the yen would have been 
manifested in the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues. Thus for the 
member countries of the GCC which export most of their oil to Japan, such as 
Oman ( 89.02 percent ), Qatar ( 76.65 percent ) and the U.A.E. ( 87.99 percent ), 
the loss in terms of optimality would have been great had they invoiced oil in terms 
of an export-weighted basket. 
Testing the significance of these findings reveals little support for a policy of 
favoring a combination of the above invoicing schemes and single currency pegs, 
over another scheme. As shown in Table (53), the evidence does not support the 
alternative hypothesis. 
VI.4. Invoicing in and Pegging to the Same Basket 
An alternative combination of choosing an invoicing and pegging scheme would 
involve invoicing oil in the same basket to which the domestic currency is pegged. If 
the basket adopted is trade-weighted, then the variance in the domestic currency's 
real value of oil revenues would be 
^ = E ^ U ) + [ E / 5 . H 2 . ] ( 8 7 ) 
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Country Calculated F-value Critical F-value 
Bahrain 1.866 2.86 
Kuwait 1.240 2.86 
Oman 2.049 2.86 
Qatar 1.909 2.86 
Saudi Arabia 1.184 2.86 
United Arab Emirates 2.259 2.86 
Source: The Calculated F-values were derived from Table (69), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 53: Calculated and critical F-values under alternative basket invoicing 
schemes and single currency pegs (1971-1987) 
where 
i = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket 
Pi = represent total trade shares and import shares, however, estimated for the 
two cases separately. 
Moreover, if the GCC member states adopt the SDR basket for invoicing oil 
and pegging the domestic currency, then the variability in the domestic currency's 
real value of oil revenues is" given by 
5 5 4 
„2 _ V 
TVOTh E#(°2~r4) + E t f *1 + 5 > - + " K , J ( 8 8 ) 
1 = 1 >=1 3=1 
where 
i — currencies included in the SDR 
s = currencies included less k. 
However, pegging and invoicing in terms of the ECU would yield 
t=i 
* U = t ^ l o r , ) + [jlfiol + £ ( & " « c ) V L + J (89) 
1=1 c = l 
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where 
i = currencies included in the ECU 
c = currencies of the trading partners which are included in the ECU. 
Comparison of the performance of total trade-weighted, import-weighted, SDR-
weighted and ECU-weighted baskets leads to preference for an import-weighted 
basket. 
Tables (54) and (55) summarize the results of the estimation under each al-
ternative basket. If the ECU is set aside for the present, the evidence ranks an 
import-weighted basket first, providing a standard deviation of 17.22, 19.87 and 
21.00 percent, for Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, respectively. The SDR basket 
emerges as the only exception for Oman ( am = import shares ). Table (55) shows 
the standard deviation in the real value of oil revenues expressed in terms of the 
domestic currencies of the GCC member states, if oil is invoiced in the ECU basket 
and the domestic currencies are also pegged to the ECU. It is worth noting that 
although the range over which the estimation for the ECU basket was shorter than 
that used for the other baskets ( the ECU was introduced in 1979 ), in general 
the improvement in optimality is relatively small. Nonetheless, the ECU reduces 
the standard deviation for Saudi Arabia to about 19.65 percent, compared to a 
value of 24.09 percent for optimality derived under the import-weighted basket. 
For Qatar, the ECU basket introduced greater instability in the real value of oil 
revenues. 
A comparison of the total trade-weighted, import-weighted and the ECU bas-
kets over the same data range, is cited in Table (55). The estimation was con-
ducted over the period from 1979-1987 ( however one observation was lost in defin-
ing percentage change ). It can be inferred that the import-weighted basket has 
out-performed the other two baskets, with reference to the postulated optimality 
criterion. For Saudi Arabia the import-weighted basket provides a standard devi-
ation of 15.89 percent, compared to 19.65 percent recorded under the ECU basket. 
246 
Country Total trade basket Import basket SDR basket 
a, = total a, =import 
Bahrain 20.18 17.22 18.96 18.87 
Kuwait 20.89 19.87 20.51 20.29 
Oman 27.97 20.98 21.50 20.94 
Qatar 31.62 21.00 23.90 23.05 
Saudi Arabia 25.41 24.09 27.97 27.90 
U.A.E. 30.53 19.02 21.99 20.18 
Table 54: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues based on invoicing and pegging to the same basket (1971-1987), % 
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Country Total basket Import basket ECU basket 
(Xi = total a, = import 
Bahrain 13.72 13.18 17.19 16.62 
Kuwait 13.55 12.92 16.46 16.06 
Oman 23.00 18.53 21.78 20.50 
Qatar 27.10 19.51 24.09 22.35 
Saudi 
Arabia 16.89 15.89 19.94 19.65 
U.A.E. 18.04 12.45 19.01 16.36 
Table 55: Standard deviation of the domestic-currency's real value of oil 
revenues based on invoicing and pegging to the same basket (1979-1987), % 
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Furthermore, for the U.A.E. and Bahrain, the import-weighted basket resulted in 
standard deviation of less than 13 percent, compared to more than 16 percent 
obtained under the ECU basket. 
The gain in terms of optimality with invoicing and pegging to an import-
weighted rather than the ECU and the total trade-weighted basket, is attributed 
to a large degree to trade shares, as well as basket weights. It may be argued that 
the large degree of risk associated with the ECU is caused by large variations in 
the nominal value of oil revenues in terms of the mark. However, since the mark 
retains a weight of 33 percent in the ECU, the positive covariation between oil 
revenues in terms of the dollar and the exchange rate between the mark and the 
numeraire was large and reflected heavily in the domestic currency's real value of 
oil revenues. Moreover, the variance of the weighted imported rate of inflation, is 
larger under the ECU peg relative to other basket pegs. 
Furthermore, for countries which conduct most of their international trade 
with Japan, a total trade-weighted basket peg and invoicing alternative would 
have resulted in greater risk in terms of the domestic currency's real value of 
oil revenues. For example, the empirical estimation of this alternative peg and 
invoicing basket gave contributions of 441.34, 658.32 and 301.94 percent to the risk 
measure for Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, respectively. Meanwhile, 
for Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which conduct a smaller share of their 
total trade with Japan compared to the three above mentioned countries, the 
transmission channel has been narrower, and consequently smaller differences were 
observed in terms of the standard deviation in the domestic currency's real value 
of oil revenues, between a total trade-weighted basket, and an import-weighted 
basket. The highest contribution caused by the yen was only 104.07 percent, 
recorded for Saudi Arabia. 
Despite these differences in the contribution of individual currencies to the 
total variability in the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues, testing the 
significance of differences between the variances under alternative combinations of 
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Country Calculated F-value Critical F-value 
Bahrain 1.177 2.86 
Kuwait 1.051 2.86 
Oman 1.335 2.86 
Qatar 1.505 2.86 
Saudi Arabia 1.161 2.86 
United Arab Emirates 1.605 2.86 
Source: The calculated F-values were derived from Table (70), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 56: Calculated and critical F-values under invoicing in and pegging to the 
same basket (1971-1987) 
pegging and invoicing in the same weighted basket reveals no violations of the null 
hypothesis. ( This hypothesis states that variances are equal. ) Tables (56) and 
(57) report the calculated and the critical F-values. 
VI.5. Invoicing im One Basket and Pegging to Another Basket 
In addition to invoicing oil in the same weighted basket that the domestic currency 
is pegged to, the GCC member states may argue for invoicing oil in a basket, whilst 
their currencies would be pegged to another basket. In this case, there are several 
possibilities for combining alternative baskets, with the objective of minimizing 
any of the following variances, depending on the chosen combination of invoicing 
and pegging. The variances are 
* U = E 0K°lor, + < d r / b ) + E + 1 > - « s ) 2 ° l + " K J ( 9 ° ) 
» = 1 ] = 1 3=1 
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Country Calculated F-value Critical F-value 
Bahrain 1.304 4.99 
Kuwait 1.274 4.99 
Oman 1.241 4.99 
Qatar 1.389 4.99 
Saudi Arabia 1.254 4.99 
United Arab Emirates 1.526 4.99 
Source: The calculated F-values were derived from Table (71), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 57: Calculated and critical F-values based on pegging to and invoicing in 
the same basket (1979-1987) 
where 
i = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket (total or import weights) 
j = currencies included in the SDR 
s = currencies included in the SDR less k 
k = numeraire, the dollar. 
The above equation would be relevant if oil in invoiced in a trade-weighted 
basket, whilst h is pegged to the~SDR: - - -
However, if oil is invoiced in the same basket, while the domestic currency is 
pegged to the ECU, then the above variance will be 
<Z~h = E0U°U + + + - a C ) 2 4 C + « J (9i) 
i = l )=•! c = l 
where 
i = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket 
j = currencies included in the ECU 
c = currencies of the trading partners which are included in the ECU 
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k = numeraire. 
Alternatively, the domestic currencies may be pegged to a trade-weighted bas-
ket, while oil is invoiced in the SDR. This yields the following equation to be 
estimated: 
* U = E * , 2 ( < U + < / s J + ( 9 2 ) 
«=1 j=l 
where 
i = currencies included in the SDR 
j = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket. 
Pegging to the ECU with oil invoiced in the SDR yields 
^ = + <CU/.J + E / K + E ( a - - C ) 2 4 C + <°IJ (93) 
i = l j=l c = l 
where 
i= currencies included in the SDR 
j = currencies included in the ECU 
c= currencies of the trading partners which are included in the ECU. 
Nevertheless, oil may be invoiced in the ECU basket, but a trade-weighted 
basket may be adopted as a peg. In this case the aim would be to minimize 
- i U = E * , V ; U + < e J + [ X > H 1 ( 9 4 ) 
i=i j=i 
where 
i = currencies included in the ECU 
j = currencies included in the trade-weighted basket. 
Furthermore, the member countries of the GCC may choose to adopt baskets 
in which the weights are predetermined. Thus, adopting the ECU as a basket for 
invoicing oil and the SDR as a pegging choice requires minimizing 
° L , k = E + ) + (E fit, + 1 ( A - « . ) a * L + ° ? « " L 1 (95) 
1=1 7 = 1 4 = 1 
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where 
i = currencies included in the ECU 
j = currencies included in the SDR 
s — currencies included in the SDR, less k. 
Alternatively, if oil is invoiced in a trade-weighted basket which is different than 
a trade-weighted basket to which the domestic currency is pegged, the equation to 
be estimated becomes 
where 
i = currencies included in basket d 
j = currencies included in basket b 
(b and d are different trade-weighted baskets). 
These equations were estimated individually in the search for the combination 
that would minimize variability of the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues, 
arvorh- The results are cited and discussed in this section. Note that the ECU's 
data range is shorter than the others ( the ECU was introduced in 1979 ), and it 
may be that a comparison between alternative baskets, can not always be drawn. 
The estimation is conducted in the first case for the complete data range, 1971 
to 1987, where the results are reported in Tables (58), (59) and (60). 
Overwhelmingly, an invoicing scheme weighted according to import shares from 
each of the trading partners, combined with a peg to a total trade-weighted basket, 
would have resulted in an optimal policy choice. For Bahrain, this choice would 
have yielded a standard deviation of about 16.64 percent, compared to a less stable 
alternative resulting in a standard deviation of 30.8 percent, had invoicing of oil 
been based on export share basket with the BD pegged to the SDR. Note that the 
choice of invoicing oil in an export-weighted basket is less stable, irrelevant to the 
basket peg adopted. For Kuwait, this would have introduced a standard deviation 
of more than 23 percent, compared to only 19.09 percent under the optimal choice 
6 6 
TVOTh nvor 
»=1 7 = 1 
(96) 
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Bahrain 19.48 16.64 30.63 30.64 
Kuwait 19.96 19.09 22.71 22.69 
Oman 26.57 20.21 38.57 38.69 
Qatar 30.28 20.57 37.73 37.68 
Saudi 
Arabia 24.95 23.71 27.23 27.38 
U.A.E. 28.93 18.66 38.17 38.11 
Table 58: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues (1971-1987), % - - - - - - —-
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Country Invoice: SDR basket 
Peg: Total basket 
Invoice: SDR basket 
Peg: Import basket 
Bahrain 18.54 18.43 
Kuwait 19.91 19.88 
Oman 20.73 20.34 
Qatar 23.16 22.68 
Saudi Arabia 27.65 27.61 
U.A.E. 21.05 20.40 
Table 59: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
.revenues (1971-1987), % 
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Country Total Im aort E x sort 
a, — t ^ — m a, ~ t a, = m a, = t a; = m 
Bahrain 19.78 19.69 16.87 16.76 30.89 30.83 
Kuwait 21.49 20.27 19.59 19.36 23.21 23.02 
Oman 27.47 27.03 20.99 20.41 39.35 39.05 
Qatar 31.20 30.56 21.40 20.45 38.86 38.34 
Saudi 
Arabia 25.16 25.09 26.27 26.20 27.59 27.52 
U . A . E . 30.11 29.26 19.79 18.47 39.13 38.48 
m = import shares, t = total trade shares. 
Table 60: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with an S D R peg and alternative invoicing baskets (1971-1987), % 
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mentioned above. Moreover, for Oman, the optimality of an import-weighted 
basket for invoicing combined with a total trade-weighted basket for a peg, led 
to a standard deviation of only 20.21 percent, relative to the least stable choice 
of invoicing in an export-weighted basket while pegging to the SDR, which would 
have greater uncertainty in the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues, 
with a standard deviation of 39.35 percent. A similar conclusion can be drawn 
for Qatar, where the former combination resulted in 20.57 percent, compared to 
about 38 percent implied by the latter basket combination. The statistical evidence 
reveals less discrepancy with respect to the combination of peg and invoicing choice, 
provided export shares were utilized in either basket. For example, invoicing oil in 
an export-weighted basket while pegging to the SDR, and invoicing in an export-
weighted basket, whilst the Saudi riyal is pegged to either an import-weighted or 
a total trade-weighted baskets, would all have resulted in a standard deviation of 
about 27 percent. The choice of the optimal invoicing and pegging combination 
for the U . A . E . has strengthened the optimality of an import-weighted invoicing 
basket, and has further weakened the argument for the least stable alternative, an 
export-weighted basket invoicing scheme combined with an SDR peg. 
It is worth noting that there appears to be no case for reciprocality with respect 
to the findings. That is to say, the tables of results do not lead to the conclusion 
that if an import-weighted basket is optimal for invoicing oil when combined with 
a total trade-weighted basket peg, then invoicing in a total trade-weighted basket 
combined with an import-weighted basket peg, would be optimal^ 
Extending the argument would be possible if the availability of the E C U is 
considered as either an invoicing basket or a basket to which any currency of 
the G C C member states may be pegged. In general, the E C U invoicing scheme 
is optimal if combined with a total trade-weighted basket or an import-weighted 
basket; however, this conclusion may be revised if the estimation over the same 
data range is conducted for the combination of total trade-weighted and import-
weighted baskets. The results of these alternatives are reported in Tables (61), 
(62) and (63). 
257 
First, consider baskets which involve the E C U as either a basket peg or a 
basket in which oil may be invoiced. Results obtained for the various schemes 
were fairly similar for a particular country, if export baskets were excluded. For 
example, the best combination for Bahrain yields a standard deviation of 14.19 
percent, which is not particularly good compared to the highest level of variation 
of about 16 percent ( Tables (61) and (62) ). For Kuwait, similar results may be 
obtained, but with greater absolute differences. An E C U invoicing combined with 
an import-weighted basket peg, resulted in a standard deviation of 12.40 percent, 
which increases at an increasing rate; the highest value of about 16.53 percent 
was recorded for an E C U peg and an SDR invoicing scheme. Furthermore, the 
differences are large for Oman. For example, an E C U invoicing combined with a 
total trade-weighted basket implied a standard deviation of 17.28 percent; that can 
be compared to a standard deviation of more than 25 percent, had the reciprocal 
scheme been adopted by the Omani authorities over the years from 1979 until 1987. 
The optimal choice of invoicing and pegging concluded for Oman emerged as an 
optimal choice for Qatar. The results for Saudi Arabia are quite similar under 
most alternative combinations of baskets. Nonetheless, an export invoicing basket 
is not the least favorable option, this position is taken up by the S D R invoicing 
scheme combined with an E C U pegging scheme. 
To sum up, if oil was invoiced in an ECU-weighted basket, then for the G C C 
countries either a total trade-weighted basket or an import-weighted basket would 
be an optimal peg. In addition, except for Saudi Arabia, an E C U peg would yield 
the least stable variance in the domestic currency's value of oil revenues, if oil was 
invoiced in terms of the percentage of exports the G C C countries transported to 
the six industrial countries. 
An additional comparison may be adopted between the E C U invoicing scheme, 
as reported in Table (61), and the data in Table (63), where the model is estimated 
with the assumption that the data range covering the estimation is compatible with 
that of the E C U . In all cases analyzed, an import-weighted basket invoicing alter-
native combined with a total trade-weighted basket peg has emerged as the optimal 
258 
Country Total basket Import basket S D R basket 
Qj = total ai =import 
Bahrain 14.19 14.26 15.48 15.40 
Kuwait 12.56 12.40 14.32 14.15 
Oman 17.28 17.59 19.74 19.33 
Qatar 20.10 20.12 22.24 21.31 
Saudi Arabia 17.71 17.53 18.48 18.38 
U . A . E . 13.05 13.07 16.42 14.68 
Table 61: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with invoicing in an . E C U basket and pegging to alternative baskets 
(1979-1987), % 
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Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia U . A . E . 




























































Table 62: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues with a peg to the E C U and alternative invoicing baskets (1979-
1987), % 
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Country Invoice: Total basket 
Peg: Import basket 
Invoice: Import basket 
Peg: Total basket 
Bahrain 12.63 12.33 
Kuwait 12.28 11.65 
Oman 21.47 16.25 
Qatar 25.77 18.46 
Saudi Arabia 16.41 15.46 
U . A . E . 15.89 10.86 
Table 63: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues based on alternative invoicing and pegging baskets (1979-1987), % 
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choice. However, the differences, or as they may be called the gains in optimality, 
are not similar across alternative combinations. For Bahrain and Kuwait, they 
are small. On the other hand, these differences are larger for Oman, Qatar and 
the U . A . E . , with Saudi Arabia occupying the middle grounds. A noticeable gain 
in optimality is recorded for the U . A . E . , where the standard deviation was less 
than 11 percent, had the Emirates' dirham been pegged to a total trade-weighted 
basket, whilst oil was denominated in a basket according to shares of imports. 
These results may be subjected to statistical testing to determine whether the 
gains and loses in optimality are significant. It may be argued that if the differences 
are not significant, the opportunity loss from adopting any combination of baskets 
rather than another combination, is relatively small. 
Since a large percentage of total trade is conducted between most of the G C C 
members and Japan, a peg to a total trade-weighted basket would have dimin-
ished the impact of fluctuations in the exchange rate between the yen and the 
numeraire. However, invoicing a large percentage of oil in terms of the yen would 
have the opposite effect on the stability of the domestic currency's real value of 
oil revenues. For example, consider Saudi Arabia. Had oil been invoiced in a total 
trade-weighted basket, where the weight of the yen is relatively large, then a vari-
ance of 95.51 percent of the variance of the nominal value of oil revenues, in terms 
of the yen, would be added to the total variations in cr^ O T h . Alternatively, under 
the optimal choice, i.e. pegging to the total trade-weighted basket and invoicing 
in an import-weighted basket, that variance would have declined to 55.55 percent. 
Similar conclusions would have emerged for the lira and the dollar. Moreover, if 
import invoicing is combined with the E C U peg, the relatively large import shares 
of the yen, lira and dollar, would have contributed more instability in the welfare 
function. This latter scheme of invoicing and pegging would have introduced larger 
variances into the sum of total variations in the KD's real value of oil revenues. 
For example, the E C U peg combined with import-weighted invoicing, would have 
resulted in the yen contributing an individual variance of about 95.31 percent to 
a total variance of 170.48 percent. 
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Bahrain 1.856 2.86 1.622 4.99 
Kuwait 1.215 2.86 1.537 4.99 
Oman 1.947 2.86 2.155 4.99 
Qatar 1.900 2.86 1.936 4.99 
Saudi Arabia 1.166 2.86 1.349 4.99 
U . A . E . 2.097 2.86 2.470 4.99 
Source: The calculated F-values were derived from Table (72), 
cited at the end of this chapter. 
Table 64: Calculated and critical F-values assuming a peg to one basket and an 
invoice in another 
More evidence favoring a total trade-weighted peg combined with an import 
weighting scheme for invoicing oil may be seen in the breakdown of total variations 
in the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues, for countries which conduct 
most of their total trade with Japan. An invoicing policy based on total trade 
shares combined with an import-weighted basket peg, would have raised total 
variations substantially, with the yen alone-contributing variances of 596.90 and 
388.86 percent for Qatar and Oman, respectively. This may be compared to only 
103.42 and 52.97 percent, had the Qatari riyal and the riyal Omani been pegged 
to a total trade-weighted basket, with oil invoiced in an import-weighted basket. 
Table (64) reports the calculated F-values and the critical F-value, using the 
least and the most stable variances, assuming the domestic currency is pegged to 
one basket, whilst oil is invoiced in another ( 5 percent level of significance ). It is 
worth noting, however, that none of the differences between the extreme variances, 
as cited in Tables (65) to (72), was found to be statistically significant. 
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To conclude, amongst the factors which can affect the optimality of a combina-
tion, the covariance between the exchange rate of the numeraire currency and the 
currency in which oil is invoiced, and the nominal value of oil revenues expressed in 
the numeraire has proven to be the most important. Moreover, for basket pegs and 
invoicing, trade shares have a decisive role in transmitting the impact of instability 
in covariances, as well as the deviations from PPP. The role of the variance of the 
imported weighted inflation, has been less significant, although for the E C U , this 
factor is vital. Amongst the alternative combinations considered for the optimal 
currency for invoicing oil and the currency peg for pegging the domestic currencies 
of the G C C member states ( single invoicing and basket invoicing, single peg and 
basket peg alternatives ), the results of the estimation favor an invoicing scheme 
which is based on import shares, combined with a peg to a total trade-weighted 
basket. 
These findings support the generally cited argument that if the domestic cur-
rency is to be pegged, then trade-weighted baskets have the tendency to yield 
optimal results for the domestic economy. Furthermore, testing this hypothesis in 
the oil market has strengthened the choice of a trade-weighted basket as a basis 
for invoicing oil. 
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Country Lowest variability Highest variability 
Bahrain dollar(aj =m)=34.78 yen(a,- =m)=49.83 
Kuwait pound(a^ =m)=37.91 yen(a^ =m)=45.27 
Oman dollar(a< =m)=39.02 yen(aj =m)=46.10 
Qatar dollar(aj =m)=43.56 lira(oi =t)=50.99 
Saudi Arabia pound(aj =m)=53.51 lira(a; =t)=61.38 
U . A . E . d o l l a r ^ =m)=39.74 yen(oji =m)=45.95 
m, t, refer to import and total trade weights. 
Table 65: Standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in terms of the 
domestic currency based on invoicing and pegging to the same currency (1971-
1987), % 
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Country Lowest variability Highest variability 
Peg Invoice Peg Invoice 
Bahrain dollar pound(ai =m)=36.20 lira yen(c*i =t)=51.90 
Kuwait dollar pound(a s =m)=37.71 lira yen(a,- =m)=47.71 
Oman dollar pound(c<i =m)=39.84 lira yen(a, =t)=48.67 
Qatar dollar pound(ai =m)=45.56 lira yen(a a =t)=53.50 
Saudi Arabia dollar pound(aj =m)=53.29 lira yen(ai =m)=60.85 
U . A . E . dollar pound(aj =m)=39.84 lira yen(a; =t)=48.91 
m, t, refer to import and total trade weights. 
Table 66: Standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in terms of the 
domestic currency based _on invoicing in one currency and pegging to another 
(1971-1987), % 
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Country Lowest variability Highest variability 
Invoice Peg Invoice Peg 
Bahrain dollar S D R ( a , =m)=34.62 yen SDR(a , =m)=49.53 
Kuwait pound S D R ( a , =m)=37.59 yen SDR(a i =t)=45.29 
Oman dollar S D R ( a , =m)=38.77 yen SDR(a i =t)=46.16 
Qatar dollar S D R O , =m)=43.35 yen SDR(a , =t)=51.22 
Saudi A. pound import basket=53.27 lira SDR(aj =t)=56.99 
U . A . E . dollar import basket=39.53 yen SDR(aj =t)=46.37 
m, t, refer to import and total trade weights. 
Table 67: Standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in terms of 
the domestic currency based on invoicing in one currency and pegging to a 
basket ("trade-werghted"vs. SDR,'1~9"71-T987) , %~ 
267 
Country Lowest variability Highest variability 
Invoice Peg Invoice Peg 
Bahrain dollar E C U ( a i =m)-25.47 mark E C U ( a , =t)=36.12 
Kuwait pound E C U ( a , =m)=27.28 mark E C U ( a , =t)=34.13 
Oman pound ECU(a< =m)=35.05 mark ECU(c*. =t)=44.31 
Qatar pound E C U ( a , =m)=38.37 mark E C U ( a , =t)=50.35 
Saudi A. yen E C U ( a , =m)=36.34 mark E C U ( a i =t)=43.54 
U . A . E . pound ECU(ai =m)=26.93 mark E C U ( a , =t)=36.31 
m, t, refer to import and total trade weights. 
Table 68: Standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in terms of the 
domestic currency based on invoicing in a single currency and pegging to the 
E C U (1979-1987), % 
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Country Lowest variability Highest variability 
Invoice Peg Invoice Peg 
Bahrain import dollar = 18.21 export lira = 33.98 
Kuwait import dollar = 20.90 export pound = 25.92 
Oman SDR(m) franc = 21.31 export lira = 43.68 
Qatar import franc = 22.00 export lira = 42.01 
Saudi A. import dollar = 24.72 export lira = 29.29 
U . A . E . SDR(m) dollar = 19.22 export lira = 43.43 
m: refers to import shares. 
Table 69: Standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in terms of 
the domestic currency based on invoicing in a, basket and pegging to a single 
currency (1971-1987), % 
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Country Lowest variability Highest variability 
Bahrain import basket = 17.22 total trade basket = 20.28 
Kuwait import basket = 19.87 total trade basket = 20.89 
Oman SDR(m) = 20.94 total trade basket = 27.97 
Qatar import basket — 21.00 total trade basket = 31.62 
Saudi Arabia import basket = 24.09 SDR(t )= 27.97 
U . A . E . import basket = 19.02 total trade basket = 30.53 
m, t: refer to import and total trade shares, respectively. 
Table 70: Standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in terms of 
the domestic currency based on invoicing in and pegging to the same basket 
(1971-1987), % 
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Country Lowest variability Highest variability 
Bahrain import basket — 13.18 E C U ( t ) = 17.19 
Kuwait import basket — 12.92 E C U ( t ) = 16.46 
Oman import basket = 18.53 total trade basket = 23.00 
Qatar import basket = 19.51 total trade basket = 27.10 
Saudi Arabia import basket = 15.89 E C U ( t ) = 19.94 
U . A . E . import basket = 12.45 E C U ( t ) = 19.01 
t: refers to total trade shares. 
Table 71: Standard deviation of the real value of oil revenues in terms of 
the domestic currency based on invoicing in and pegging to the same basket 
(1979-JL987), % 
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E C U ( t ) 
export 
20.00 
E C U ( t ) 
export 
" 17.91 
E C U ( t ) 
export 
- 35.03" 
E C U ( t ) 
export 
35.42 
E C U ( t ) 
SDR(t) 
20.86 
E C U ( t ) 
export 
26.68 
m, t, refer to import and total trade shares, respectively 
S.D.: Standard deviations. 
Table 72: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil 
revenues based on a peg to one basket and invoicing in another, % 
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Appendix V I . A 
Adjmstimg Total Trade Weights 
Lipschitz (1979) suggested that choice of a peg may be biased if a country 
adopts a weighted basket peg, in which weights correspond to trade flows only. In 
some cases, this may provide a less optimal peg, particularly if trade is invoiced in 
a vehicle currency ( a third currency ). In the present thesis, consideration of the 
G C C member states's trade would require adjusting total trade shares accordingly. 
After interviewing exporters, importers and bankers, the author found that 
most of the exports of these countries consist of either crude oil, or related com-
modities such as petrochemicals. Moreover, these commodities are invoiced in 
dollars, with no regard to the direction of trade flows. Thus, while imports remain 
invoiced in the exporters' currency, it may be argued that total trade with France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the U . K . can be adjusted to equal import shares from 
these countries. That is because only imports are invoiced in the currencies of 
these countries. Meanwhile, exports to these countries are invoiced in terms of the 
U.S. dollar. As a result, the following procedure is adopted. 
Total trade with the U.S. = £?=i x j £?=i U + mua. 
Total trade with France = m / / / £ f = i < « -
Total trade with Germany = m j m / ]C?=i 
Total trade with Italy = rrm/ Y^=i *«• 
Total trade with Japan = m y y / U . 
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Country Franc Mark Lira Yen Pound Dollar 
Bahrain 3.06 11.82 5.12 10.91 17.14 52.11 
Kuwait 5.15 8.45 5.92 21.71 7.74 51.04 
Oman 3.09 5.84 2.46 10.09 20.36 58.26 
Qatar 4.25 4.75 2.96 8.16 8.99 70.90 
Saudi Arabia 4.81 6.23 5.85 11.19 8.90 63.01 
U . A . E . 3.41 5.29 4.01 11.31 9.29 66.69 
Table 1: Adjusted total trade shares according to currency of trade denomination 
(1986), % 
Total trade with the U.K. = mukj £ ? = 1 1 { . 
where 
rrii = import shares of the G C C from these countries 
ti = total trade share of the G C C with these countries. 
Resulted weights are reported in Table (1), whilst Tables (2) and (3) cite some 
results from the estimation of the model for several cases. However, based on these 
results, there appear to be no significant differences in the optimal choice. 
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Country Invoice in and peg 
to the same currency 
Invoice in a currency 





























































S.D.: Standard deviation. 










Bahrain 14.14 14.46 12.84 
Kuwait 14.82 14.80 12.52 
Oman 21.15 21.46 17.84 
Qatar 26.99 27.36 19.39 
Saudi A. 23.93 24.02 15.89 
U . A . E . 17.44 17.83 12.25 
Table 3: Standard deviation of the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues 
(1979-1987), % 
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Appendix V L B 
A Note 01 the Calculation! of Some Exchamge Rates 
Since the dollar is assumed to be the numeraire, certain adjustments were 
taken into consideration when calculating variability between the numeraire and 
the other currencies of the industrial countries. 
Since variability between the dollar and any of these currencies has already 
been included in converting oil revenues from dollars, into the other five curren-
cies, then the following variance 
jus 
(i = franc, mark, lira, yen, and pound) 
drops out if any share of oil revenues is expressed in these five currencies, and 
the combination of the invoicing and pegging schemes requires finding the above 
variance as one of its components. For example, if oil is invoiced in an import-
weighted basket, whilst the domestic currency is pegged to a single currency, say 
the franc, then the variance of the domestic currency's real value of oil revenues will 
be defined so that, when measuring how the basket behaves vis-a-vis the franc, the 
variance of the exchange rate between the franc and the dollar, which is a member 
of the basket, is left out. 
However, when a basket peg and invoicing is adopted as an alternative scheme, 
the following adjustment has been applied to the measurement of variability of 
exchange rates. 
If the domestic currency is pegged to a basket, whilst oil is invoiced in an 
alternative ( another basket ), then assuming the required calculations involve 
finding the o \ I J S , where b is the basket to which h is pegged, and ff is a member 
currency of the basket in which oil is invoiced ( ff can be a member of b, however, 
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the variance would be zero ), then 
dm"e If ' d m / f t + Ala 
uk"e ut/ff - [(i - / & ) < . „ , ] 
where 
dm — mark 
11 = lira 
yy = yen 
uk = pound 
us = dollar 
/3{= basket weight of currency i 
i = the trading partners. 
The objective of this adjustment is to isolate some of the variability associated 
with using the dollar as the numeraire, when it is also included in the basket 
to which the currency is pegged. The last term in the above expression would 
remove the variability of the dollar/franc exchange rate, adding only the weighted 
variability of this exchange rate, as would be implied by a peg to a basket in which 
the domestic currency behaves against the franc by (3US of the behavior of the dollar 
vis-a-vis the franc. 
This procedure was applied to all similar variances, i.e. those involving the 
mark, lira;"yen and the pound. 
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VIIo Comclusioiris a n d R e c o m o K B m d a t i o i i s 
Throughout the historical development of the international monetary system, 
countries in the world have failed to insulate themselves from potential shocks, 
whether these are political or economic in nature. Consequently, the various at-
tempts to manage the world monetary arena, one may argue, were primarily de-
signed to minimize rather than eliminate such shocks. The vulnerability of any 
economy to these disturbances depends on several factors; the size of the economy 
is, however, prominent. It is because of this feature that the potential impacts of 
external shocks are likely to be felt more in developing than developed countries. 
In an attempt to minimize the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on their do-
mestic economies, most developing countries have adopted a pegged exchange rate 
regime. This type of policy has the drawback of eliminating an instrument which 
may be needed by the authorities to influence the domestic economy. However, 
some countries have adhered to a selected peg ( which may be a single currency, 
or, alternatively, a basket of currencies ), thus fixing the relative value of their cur-
rencies to other currency(s). Although this would eliminate the variability of their 
currencies with respect to the currency(s) of the peg, fluctuations may manifest 
themselves in other variables. One possible channel for these fluctuations is the 
foreign price level. Changes in this price level can affect the cost of imports ( both 
goods and inputs ), thus contributing to the domestic rate of inflation. The impact 
of instability in the foreign price level is seen to be greater when the currency of a 
developing country is pegged to a single currency and there is a diversified pattern 
of imports. To rectify the drawback of a single currency peg, an alternative peg, 
to a trade-weighted basket of currencies, has been suggested. Although the latter 
regime has been shown to be superior, most peggers have not been persuaded by 
it. 
In addition to its influence on the prices of imports, a peg may have conse-
quences for the value of revenues from exports. One may argue that, as long as 
exports are denominated in a currency which differs from that used for imports, 
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potential impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on the domestic economies of de-
veloping countries cannot be eliminated by choosing a peg. The experience of the 
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council exemplifies this. The Gulf Co-
operation Council was established in 1980 with six members including: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
These countries are small and open, and revenues from oil exports constitute the 
bulk of their foreign exchange earnings. Although their currencies are effectively 
pegged to the dollar ( only the Kuwaiti dinar is not totally pegged to the dollar ), 
their imports are not totally invoiced in terms of the dollar. As a result, the value of 
oil revenues in the domestic currency is insulated from exchange rate fluctuations; 
however, the purchasing power of these revenues is not. This is because the imports 
of the G C C member states are invoiced in a variety of currencies, whereas their 
domestic currencies are pegged to the dollar. To sum up, their income is in dollars, 
while their expenditures are not. For the authorities, this has posed a dilemma 
which is more persistent during periods in which the dollar is depreciating relative 
to the currencies of the countries from which the G C C member states import. 
Thus, it has been the purpose of this thesis to analyze the alternative possibil-
ities for choosing the optimal currency or currencies for invoicing oil, recognizing 
the fact that the G C C member states prefer a pegged exchange rate regime. This 
has led to exploration of the optimality of choice of a peg, and to testing empir-
ically the optimality of this_peg as an invoicing scheme for oil compared to other 
alternatives. This has been done according to the contribution of an invoicing 
scheme to the stability of the real value of oil revenues, expressed in terms of the 
domestic currencies of the G C C member states. 
A. Sunimary amd Comclmsioes 
After introducing the problem and its significance in Chapter I , the remaining 
body of the thesis was divided as follows. Chapter I I examined the historical 
development of the international monetary system. It included a review of the 
operation of the exchange rates under the Gold Standard, which was character-
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ized by relative stability. Although adherence to this regime collapsed in the early 
1930's, an attempt was made in the Bretton Woods agreement to reinforce the 
newly emerging exchange rate regime by incorporating an anchor, for which gold 
was reinstated. Due to the increasing complexities of the world economic environ-
ment, and the ability of some members to shift burdens of the system to others, 
the Bretton Woods agreement collapsed in the early 1970's, paving the way for 
other minor attempts to restore confidence in an international monetary system. 
However none has succeeded. 
As a consequence of the feature of interdependence associated with the ad-
justable par value system of Bretton Woods, many authors have revived the dis-
cussion of flexible exchange rate systems, arguing that they eliminate the inter-
dependence amongst the world economies. In this respect, exchange rates would 
respond to balance of payments disequilibria, hence diminishing the need for the 
authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market. The advantages and dis-
advantages of flexible versus fixed exchange rate regimes were also discussed. 
Other economists have considered the case when a particular number of coun-
tries join in a currency area with the purpose of establishing an optimum currency 
area between them. This area is characterized by fixed exchange rate between the 
currencies of the member countries, while they would float jointly vis-a-vis the 
other currencies in the world. A survey of current exchange rate regimes leads us 
to conclude that only_the. European Monetary System could qualify as a candidate 
for this exchange rate practice, leaving most of the developing countries as peggers. 
A theoretical review of literature relating to the optimum currency peg was 
presented in Chapter I I I . It identified several welfare functions upon which a peg 
may be based. The review included discussions of alternative models, and their 
recommended pegs. It was found that there is neither a universal currency peg 
capable of yielding an optimal solution under the alternative proposed welfare 
functions, nor a common objective to be fulfilled by a peg. Rather a peg was likely 
to be chosen independently by individual countries, while its outcome was found 
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to be influenced to a large extent by trade shares, stability of monetary policy in 
trading partners and fluctuations amongst the currencies of the trading partners. 
Chapter IV examined the literature on currency invoicing of international trade. 
The main objective of this was to become acquainted with the potential impact 
of the practice of currency invoicing of contracts on the domestic economy, and to 
identify the determinants of the choice of currency invoicing of a trade contract. 
It was concluded that, exchange risk is an essential component of risk which the 
chosen invoicing schemes attempt to avoid. However, the potential impact of this 
risk on the volume of trade was neither accepted by all researchers ( in the light of 
their findings ), nor was it easily distinguished from other types of risk. Although 
the forward market provides a possible means of covering exchange risk, it by no 
means eliminates all types of risk involved in international trade. Thus, as it was 
reported, the use of forward covering was limited in international trade. 
The analytical framework was presented in Chapter V . In order to understand 
the motives behind the current pegging schemes and their relationship to the issue 
of invoicing oil in the G C C member states, field work was conducted in the Gulf. 
Interviews and questionnaires have contributed positively to the building of the 
model. A distinctive feature of the model is its integrative approach to the issue. 
Since the problem simultaneously involves the choice of the currency peg and 
the choice of currency invoicing for oil, the model was designed to take account 
of this. The presentation of the methodology examined alternative possibilities 
for invoicing oil, ranging from a single currency to weighted baskets of currencies. 
Alternative schemes of pegging the domestic currencies of the countries of the G C C 
were examined. Since these countries rely heavily on oil revenues, it was proposed 
that a stabilization of the real value of oil revenues could serve as a welfare function. 
The percentage change in the real value of oil revenues was defined as a weighted 
sum of the percentage change in the nominal value of oil revenues expressed in 
terms of a particular currency(s), deflated by an import-weighted price index. It 
was argued that this would determine the purchasing power of oil revenues. 
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The estimation of the model and the analysis of findings were presented in 
Chapter V I . The analysis began by presenting several important economic vari-
ables in the G C C economies and examined their development over the sampled 
periods, which extended from 1971 until 1987. Examination of the relationship 
between oil revenues and government expenditures revealed a close and a positive 
correlation. This may be explained by government ownership of the oil sector, and 
the consequent reliance on oil revenues as the major source of government financ-
ing of the public sector. However, this ownership has resulted in the public sector 
playing a fundamental and a dominant role in the economy, where the impact of 
instability in the oil sector filters easily through to the economy. 
On the empirical front, several estimations were conducted. However, all were 
centered around the hypothesis of testing the relationship between the alternative 
schemes of pegging the domestic currencies of the G C C countries and the choice 
of the optimal currency invoicing for oil. Stated differently, given that the G C C 
countries peg their currencies to a single currency or alternative baskets of curren-
cies, would the same choice or an alternative scheme prove optimal for invoicing 
oil. The analysis examined annual data from 1971 to 1987, and tested the follow-
ing schemes: 1) Pegging the domestic currencies to a single currency, whilst oil 
is invoiced in the same currency. 2) Pegging the domestic currencies to a single 
currency, with oil assumed to be invoiced in another currency. 3) Pegging the 
domestic currencies to a weighted-basket of currencies ( which included import-
weighted, total trade-weighted, SDR-weighted", and ECU-weighted baskets ), while 
oil is invoiced in a single currency. 4) Pegging the currencies of the G C C countries 
to a single currency, whilst oil is invoiced in a weighted basket of currencies ( same 
possibilities as above ). 5) Pegging the currencies of the G C C member states to 
the same weighted basket in which oil is invoiced. 6) The domestic currencies are 
pegged to one basket, whilst oil is assumed to be invoiced in another. 
As it can be inferred from the various alternatives, several possibilities exist 
within any of these schemes. This was considered in the same chapter and a 
summary of the findings may be presented accordingly. 
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1) When oil was assumed to be invoiced in the same currency to which the 
domestic currencies were pegged, the evidence favors the dollar for Bahrain, Oman, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, whereas the pound fulfilled the optimality 
condition for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
2) When oil was assumed to be invoiced in one currency, while the domestic 
currencies were pegged to another, a peg to the dollar combined with an invoice 
of oil in the pound has proved to be optimal for all members of the G C C . 
3) Considering a peg to a basket of currencies, while oil was assumed to be 
invoiced in a single currency, mixed results were obtained, depending on whether 
the E C U basket was considered or not. If the E C U was excluded ( due to the 
shorter observation points ) and estimation was conducted over the period 1971-
1987, an invoice to the dollar combined with a peg to the SDR, was found to 
be optimal for Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. Moreover, a dollar invoicing scheme 
fulfilled the optimality criterion when it was combined with a peg to an import-
weighted basket, for the U . A . E . For Saudi Arabia, the same pegging scheme would 
have to be complemented with a pound invoicing policy. 
4) If oil was assumed to be invoiced in a basket of currencies, while the choice 
of the currency peg was limited to a single currency, variability in the domestic 
currency's real value of oil revenues would have been minimized if oil was invoiced 
in an import-weighted basket, while a peg to the dollar was adopted by Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabian For Qatar, an import-weighted basket would provide 
an optimal solution if it was supplemented by a peg to the franc. For Oman, 
an S D R invoicing scheme would have to be combined with a peg to the franc to 
yield optimal results, whereas it would have to be combined with the dollar for the 
U . A . E . 
5) Considering the whole data range, there was conclusive evidence for an 
import-weighted basket as the optimal choice, if the invoicing basket was the same 
as the pegging basket. A minor gain in terms of stability was found for Oman 
if the S D R basket was adopted. However, when estimation was conducted over 
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the period 1979-1987, the case for the import-weighted basket was strengthened 
further, yielding overwhelmingly optimal results for all G C C countries. 
6) An invoicing basket scheme for oil which differed from that adopted for the 
purpose of pegging the domestic currencies indicated the superiority of an import-
weighted basket for invoicing, combined with a peg to a total trade-weighted bas-
ket. Indeed, this has proven to be the optimal policy whether the estimation 
covered the full data range or that from 1979 to 1987. Moreover, as trade shares 
were adjusted according to the percentage of trade invoiced in a particular cur-
rency rather than the direction of trade, the above choice continued to fulfill the 
optimality condition. 
Stability in the real value of oil revenues in terms of the domestic currencies 
of the G C C countries was found to be influenced by several factors, such as trade 
shares, deviations from purchasing power parity and inflation rates in the countries 
of the trading partners. However, a prominent role was played by the degree and 
magnitude of covariations between the nominal value of oil revenues, defined in 
terms of the numeraire currency and the exchange rate(s) between the candidate 
currency(s) and the numeraire. Large and negative covariances increased the at-
tractiveness of one currency over another. They also affected the optimality of 
one basket compared with another. For a basket scheme, these covariations were 
basically transmitted via basket weights and via the differences between basket 
weights and trade shares. 
Although the findings have revealed varying levels of instability whenever al-
ternative schemes were implemented, statistical evidence does not provide support 
to favor one choice over another. When the hypothesis of equality of variances was 
examined at a 5 percent level of confidence, there was no basis for rejecting this 
hypothesis for any set of variances. 
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B. Recommemdatioiiis 
At present, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council practically peg 
their currencies to the dollar, with the exception of Kuwait, which pegs to a total 
trade and investment-weighted basket of currencies. However the dollar retains 
the largest weight. Judging the findings of the present thesis in terms of the 
contribution of each alternative peg to the total instability of the weighted imported 
rate of inflation, one may find evidence to support alternative arrangements. Single 
currency pegs did not minimize the imported weighted rate of inflation, an outcome 
which may be explained by the diversified patterns of imports of the G C C member 
states. Alternative basket pegs which are defined in terms of trade weights have 
minimized the weighted imported inflation rates, relative to those that would have 
been experienced had a single currency peg been adopted. The empirical findings 
of this thesis found an import-weighted basket to yield superior results, compared 
to other baskets. 
This conclusion supports that hypothesized in the literature, for example Crock-
ett and Nsouli (1977). Justification for this rests on the characteristics of an 
import-weighted basket, which results in the domestic countries importing an av-
erage rate of instability of the inflation rates existing in the trading partners, 
whereas deviations from purchasing power parities amongst their currencies are 
eliminated. 
A total trade-weighted basket would have resulted in a greater instability in 
the domestic rates of inflation, an outcome which may be attributed to the level of 
instability in the rates of inflation in the countries with whom total trade shares 
were large. 
Moreover, the optimality of the S D R and the E C U baskets was questioned as 
a result of their inability to insulate the domestic economies of the G C C member 
states from deviations from purchasing power parity. 
However, does this imply that the case for abandoning a dollar peg is worth 
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pursuing ? We would be in a better position to answer this question when the choice 
of currency invoicing for oil has been examined. This matter is now discussed. 
As a matter of tradition or of leadership, oil has been invoiced in dollars, a 
situation that has found little support in the present analysis. As has already been 
mentioned, a peg to a total trade-weighted basket, combined with an invoicing 
scheme for oil which is based on import shares, would have minimized the insta-
bility in the real value of oil revenues expressed in terms of individual currencies of 
the G C C member states. Consequently, adopting this alternative is recommended. 
However, once the results were subjected to statistical testing, one scheme could 
not be preferred to another. Based on the statistical evidence, it may be argued, 
therefore, that there is no justification for adopting an alternative invoicing scheme 
for oil, as well as an alternative choice of pegging. But if the levels of instability 
as measured by the standard deviation of the real value of oil emerging under the 
various alternatives considered in the present research are compared, there would 
be incentives to replace the current arrangements. For example, while the optimal 
choice of invoicing and pegging yielded almost half the standard deviation im-
plied by other combinations, statistical testing showed no significant differences. 
Whether one should or should not rely on statistical methods in assessing the 
findings is an open question. 
Nonetheless, even if the authorities were to engage in a policy shift of pegging 
and Jnvoicing, several points are worth considering. Firstly, would any country 
be willing to allow its currency to play such a major role in international trade 
as that currently played by the dollar ? Secondly, are the G C C countries in a 
position that allows their decisions to be honored in the international market ? 
Above all they are small, but have a huge oil reserves. Thirdly, what would be the 
consequences of a shift in policy on the confidence in the domestic currencies, as the 
peg scheme is altered, and on the world demand for oil as the currency of invoicing 
is changed ? One may expect the latter to be a function of the world elasticity of 
demand for oil. Fourthly, a departure from the current invoicing-pegging policy 
into an alternative scheme which assigns weights to the pegging choice which differ 
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f rom that assigned to the invoicing of oi l , can disrupt the financial balance existing 
between oil revenues and government's planned expenditures. To elaborate further, 
currently oil is invoiced in dollars and all GCC countries peg to the dollar. This 
has been viewed as a means of minimizing uncertainty about the nominal value of 
oil revenues in terms of the domestic currencies. The current policy may also be 
justified on financial grounds. A peg to the dollar is seen to minimize the need for 
the authorities to alter policies so frequently, since they would have to replicate 
the behavior of variables via which demand for the dollar is affected. For example, 
following the interest rate of the U.S. may be easier or more efficient than following 
the behavior of several interest rates, which would have to occur if a basket peg 
was adopted. Moreover, the U.S. economy is considered to be the largest in the 
world, and the financial market for the dollar is widely available. Thus, i f oil 
revenues are received in dollars, and the dollar is used as a common anchor for 
most international trade ( the trade which is not denominated in dollars ), i t may 
be wise to keep oil invoiced in dollars. 
A basket invoicing scheme would result in most countries defining oil in terms of 
various compositions of currencies, for which a common anchor would be diff icult to 
define in a dynamic setting. Moreover, since oil is considered to be a homogenous 
commodity under a nonunique basket, there would be no assurances that importers 
would be paying the same price. This problem may be more complicated once the 
variation of trade shares across time is allowed for. 
The evidence provided by the present work would have to be supplemented 
by further research and analysis of this issue itself, as well as of related matters. 
In particular, several points are worth noting. Firstly, the forecasting abil i ty of 
the model. Secondly, the reaction of oil importers had oil been invoiced in alter-
native schemes. Thirdly , the impact of alternative invoicing policies on govern-
ments' revenues in the GCC. Fourthly, what would be the impact of invoicing oil 
in nonunique baskets on the monopolistic behavior of a group of exporters, such as 
a cartel ? Fi f th ly , the applicability of the model to other countries or other com-
modities would either enhance its importance, or would call for an improvement in 
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its structure; nonetheless, either is equally an integral part of the learning process 
of the profession. 
These questions are beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, wi th in the 
terms of the model examined here, i t is clear that there is a case for the adoption 
of a peg to a total trade-weighted basket, combined wi th an invoicing scheme for 
oil which is based on import shares; while i t has been found that a total trade-
weighted basket may import greater inflationary impulses than an import based 
one, the welfare approach here focuses upon stability in the real value of oil revenues 
and for this to be achieved the tota l trade-weighted/import-weighted combination 




This appendix includes the descriptive data and the data used in the estimation 
of the model. The sources of the data are either cited at the end of the tables, 
or referred to in the references listed below. Data reported are for: exchange 
rates, adjusted trade shares, differences between trade shares and the SDR and 
the ECU, deviations f rom PPP, weights of the currencies included in the SDR 
and the ECU, money supply, consumer price index, real growth rates, variances of 
various exchange rates, oil revenues, percentage change in oi l revenues and total 
government revenues, are included. 
Sources of data ( A l l data are annual) 
A ) Consumer Price Index, line 64 of the International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
Yearbook 1988. For each country the data were derived f rom country page. 
B) Money supply, line 351 ( Money plus Quasi-Money ), IFS, Yearbook 1988. 
Country page data were used for each country. For Luxembourg line 351 is not 
available, therefore the sum of lines 24 and 25 was used. 
C) Trade shares, derived f rom country page of the IFS, Directions of Trade Statis-
tics Yearbook 1988. The world total used was that of line 001 ( DOTS world 
total ) . 
D) Exchange rates data were obtained f rom IFS Yearbook 1988 for each country, 
w i th the following observed: 
First: GCC member states. 
1) Bahrain, BD/SDR, line ac 
2) Bahrain, BD/dol lar , line ag 
3) Kuwait , K D / S D R , line ac 
4) Kuwait , KD/dol la r , line ag 
5) Oman, RO/SDR, line aa 
6) Oman, RO/dollar, line ae 
7) Qatar, QR/SDR, line ac 
8) Qatar, QR/dollar , line ag 
291 
9) Saudi Arabia, SR/SDR, line aa 
10) Saudi Arabia, SR/dollar, line ae 
11) U.A.E . , Dh/SDR, line aa 
12) U.A.E . , Dh/dollar , line ae 
Second: Industrial countries. 
1) Belgium, franc/dollar, line ae 
2) Denmark, krone/dollar, line ae 
3) France, franc/SDR, line aa 
4) France, franc/dollar, line ae 
5) Germany, mark/SDR, line aa 
6) Germany, mark/dollar, line ae 
7) Ireland, pound/dollar, line ag 
8) Italy, l i ra /SDR, line aa 
9) Italy, l ira/dollar , line ae 
10) Luxembourg, franc/dollar, line ae 
11) Netherlands, guilder/dollar, line ae 
12) U.K. , pound/SDR, line ac 
13) U .K. , pound/dollar, line ag 
14) U.S., dollar/SDR, line sa 
15) U.S., do l la r /ECU, line ea 
E) Reference to sources for other data are cited at the bot tom of tables. 
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Notes on the calulations procedure 
i) In general, the dollar has been used as the numeraire currency due to the 
role of the dollar in the international financial sector and its use in denomination 
of trade flows. Thus, i t was used to determine the cross exchange rates between 
the various currencies. 
i i ) The percentage change in a variable was found according to the following 
log approximation method: 
Percentage change in X = 100. * [\n(Xt/Xt-i)} 
where 
X = variable which may represnt a series of data. 
i i i ) Most figures were quoted to two decimal places, thus numbers may not 
round to a specific to ta l and squaring a number may not result in the exact squared 
number reported. 
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Year B D / $ K D / $ RO/$ QR/$ SR/$ Dh/$ 
1971 0.3751 0.3289 0.3838 4.3860 4.1500 4.3860 
1972 0.3751 0.3289 0.3838 4.3860 4.1500 4.3860 
1973 0.3974 0.2967 0.3454 3.9474 4.5500 4.0075 
1974 0.3947 0.2896 0.3454 3.9474 4.5500 3.9805 
1975 0.3955 0.2942 0.3454 3.9874 3.5500 3.9970 
1976 0.3956 0.2870 0.3454 3.9584 3.5300 3.9970 
1977 0.3956 0.2801 0.3454 3.9598 3.5050 3.8980 
1978 0.3838 0.2718 0.3454 3.8385 3.3150 3.8380 
1979 0.3770 0.2731 0.3454 3.7049 3.3650 3.7660 
1980 0.3760 0.2713 0.3454 3.6399 3.3250 3.6710 
1981 0.3760 0.2814 0.3454 3.6399 3.4150 3.6710 
1982 0.3760 0.2887 0.3454 3.6399 3.4350 3.6710 
1983 0.3760 0.2926 0.3454 3.6399 3.4950 3.6710 
1984 0.3760 0.3045 0.3454 3.6399 3.5750 3.6710 
1985 0.3760 0.2890 0.3454 3.6399 3.6450_ 3.6710 
1986 0.3760 0.2923 0.3854 3.6399 3.7450 3.6710 
















BD: Bahraini dinar; K D : Kuwai t i dinar; RO: rival Omani 
QR: Qatari rival; SR: Saudi rival; Dh: U.A.E. Dirham 
S.D.: Standard deviation. 




Year BD/sdr KD/sd r RO/sdr QR/sdr SR/sdr Dh/sdr 
1971 0.4762 0.3571 0.4167 4.7619 4.5057 4.7619 
1972 0.4762 0.3558 0.4167 4.7619 4.5057 4.7619 
1973 0.4762 0.3579 0.4167 4.7619 4.2825 4.8344 
1974 0.4833 0.3546 0.4229 4.8330 4.3464 4.8735 
1975 0.4630 0.3444 0.4043 4.6679 4.1324 4.6791 
1976 0.4597 0.3334 0.4013 4.5990 4.1013 4.6206 
1977 0.4806 0.3402 0.4196 4.8100 4.2576 4.7349 
1978 0.5001 0.3541 0.4500 5.0008 4.3187 5.0001 
1979 0.4966 0.3598 0.4550 4.8807 4.4328 4.9611 
1980 0.4795 0.3460 0.4405 4.6425 4.2407 4.6820 
1981 0.4376 0.3276 0.4020 4.2367 3.9749 4.2729 
1982 0.4148 0.3185 0.3810 4.0153 3.7892 4.0495 
1983 0.3937 0.3063 0.3616 3.8108 3.6591 3.8434 
1984 0.3686 0.2984 0.3386 3.5680 3.5043 3.5984 
1985 0.4130 0.3175 0.3794 3.9982 4.0037 4.0323 
1986 0.4599 0.3576 0.4703 4.4524 4.5808 4.4903 
















B D : Bahraini dinar; K D : Kuwai t i dinar; RO: rival Omani 
QR: Qatari rival; SR: Saudi rival; Dh: U.A.E . Dirham 
S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 2: Exchange rates of the SDR in terms of the GCC currencies (1971-
1987) 
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Year FF/$ D M / $ L L / $ Y Y / S U.K./S 
1971 5.2245 3.2685 594.00 314.80 0.3918 
1972 5.1210 3.2015 282.50 302.00 0.4259 
1973 4.7085 2.7030 607.90 280.00 0.4304 
1974 4.4445 2.4095 649.40 300.95 0.4258 
1975 4.4855 2.6223 683.60 305.15 0.4942 
1976 4.9698 2.3625 875.00 292.80 0.5874 
1977 4.7050 2.1050 871.60 240.00 0.5247 
1978 4.1800 1.8280 892.80 194.60 0.4915 
1979 4.0200 1.7315 804.00 239.70 0.4496 
1980 4.5160 1.9590 930.50 203.00 0.4193 
1981 5.7480 2.2548 1200.00 219.90 0.5241 
1982 6.7250 2.3765 1370.00 235.00 0.6194 
1983 8.3475 2.7238 1659.50 232.20 0.6894 
1984 9.5920 3.1480 1936.90 251.10 0.8647 
1985 7.5610 -2,461-0 1678.50 200.00 0,6923 _ 
1986 6.4550 1.9408 1358.10 159.10 0.6782 













FF: French franc; D M : German mark; L L : I tal ian l ira 
Y Y : Japanese yen; U .K. : U .K . pound. 
S.D.: Standard deviation. 
Table 3: Exchange rates of the dollar i n terms of the currencies of the ind 
t r ia l countries (1971-1987) 
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Year SDR/S ECU/$ 
1971 0.9211 n.a 
1972 0.9211 n.a 
1973 0.8289 n.a. 
1974 0.8168 n.a. 
1975 0.8542 n.a. 
1976 0.8607 n.a. 
1977 0.8232 n.a. 
1978 0.7676 n.a. 
1979 0.7591 0.6935 
1980 0.7841 0.7636 
1981 0.8591 0.9215 
1982 0.9065 1.0334 
1983 0.9552 1.2086 
1984 1.0202 1.4106 
1985 0.9104 1.1263 
1986 0.8175 0.9342 







SDR: Special Drawing Rights. 
ECU: European Currency Unit . 
Table 4: Exchange rates of the dollar in terms of the SDR and the ECU 
(1971-1987) 
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U.S. Japan France Germany Italy U.K. Total 
Total Trade 
Actual 292.8 400.2 53.90 173.5 69.30 237.0 1,226.7 
Actual shares 5.99 8.18 1.10 3.55 1.42 4.85 25.09 
Adjusted shares 23.87 32.63 4.39 14.14 5.65 19.32 100.00 
Imports 
Actual 213.7 133.8 37.50 145.0 62.8 210.3 803.10 
Actual shares 8.94 5.60 1.57 6.07 2.63 8.80 33.61 
Adjusted shares 26.61 16.66 4.67 18.06 7.82 26.19 100.00 
Shares are in percentage, while others are in millions dollars. 
Actual to ta l trade w i t h all countries in the world was $ 4,891 (millions) 
and total imports was $2,390 (millions). 
Explanations: Actual shares of to ta l trade may be found by dividing 
actual to ta l trade of each country by total trade w i t h all countries in 
the world. The same applies to imports. However, adjusted shares were 
found by dividing the actual trade by the corresponding sum of 
that column. 
Table 5: Bahrain's trade w i t h the industrial countries (1986) 
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U.S. Japan France Germany Italy U.K. Total 
Total Trade 
Actual 1,002 2,418 460.0 681.0 1,110 567.0 6,238.0 
Actual shares 7.51 18.12 3.45 5.10 8.32 4.25 46.75 
Adjusted shares 16.06 38.76 7.37 10.92 17.80 9.09 100.00 
Imports 
Actual 723.0 1,354 321.0 527.0 369.0 483.0 3,777 
Actual shares 12.83 24.03 5.70 9.35 6.55 8.57 67.03 
Adjusted shares 19.14 35.92 8.50 13.95 9.77 12.79 100.00 
Shares are in percentage, while others are in millions dollars. 
Actual to ta l trade w i t h all countries in the world was $ 13,341 (millions) 
and total imports was $5,634 (millions). 
Explanations: Actua l shares of total trade may be found by dividing 
actual to ta l trade of each country by tota l trade w i t h all countries in 
the world. The same applies to imports. However, adjusted shares were 
found by dividing the actual trade by the corresponding sum of 
that column. 
Table 6: Kuwait 's trade wi th the industrial countries (1986) 
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U.S. Japan France Germany I ta ly U .K . Total 
Total Trade 
Actual 214.2 1,805 106.7 191.4 89.0 764.5 3,171.7 
Actual shares 3.95 33.27 1.97 3.53 1.64 14.08 58.44 
Adjusted shares 6.75 56.94 3.36 6.03 2.81 24.10 100.00 
Imports 
Actual 175.6 319.9 98.0 185.1 78.10 645.8 1,502.5 
Actual shares 6.41 11.67 3.58 6.75 2.85 23.56 54.82 
Adjusted shares 11.69 21.29 6.52 12.32 5.20 42.98 100.00 
Shares are in percentage, while others are in millions dollars. 
Actual total trade w i t h all countries in the world was $ 5,428 (millions) 
and total imports was $2,740 (millions). 
Explanations: Actual shares of total trade may be found by dividing 
actual to ta l trade of each country by total trade w i t h all countries in 
the world. The same applies to imports. However, adjusted shares were 
found by dividing the actual trade by the corresponding sum of 
that column. 
Table 7: Oman's trade wi th the industrial countries (1986) 
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Shares are in percentage, while ot lers are in millions c ollars. 
Actual total trade w i t h all countries in the world was $ 3,201 (millions) 
and total imports was $ 1,095.4 (millions). 
Explanations: Actual shares of total trade may be found by dividing 
actual to ta l trade of each country by to ta l trade w i t h all countries in 
the world. The same applies to imports. However, adjusted shares were 
found by dividing the actual trade by the corresponding sum of 
that column. 
Table 8: Qatar's trade wi th the industrial countries (1986) 
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U.S. Japan France Germany Italy U .K . Total 
Total Trade 
Actual 7,480 7,864 3,234 2,496 3,298 3,013 27,385 
Actual shares 15.95 16.77 6.90 5.32 7.03 6.43 58.40 
Adjusted shares 27.31 28.72 11.81 9.112 12.04 11.0 100.00 
Imports 
Actual 3,794 3,065 1,317 1,706 1,602 2,438 13,922 
Actual shares 17.16 13.86 5.96 7.71 7.24 11.02 62.95 
Adjusted shares 27.25 22.02 9.46 12.25 11.51 17.51 100.00 
Shares are in percentage, while others are in millions dollars. 
Actual total trade w i t h all countries in the world was $ 46,890 (millions) 
and tota l imports was $ 22,114 (millions). 
Explanations: Actual shares of to ta l trade may be found by dividing 
actual total trade of each country by total trade w i t h all countries in 
the world. The same applies to imports. However, adjusted shares were 
found by dividing the actual trade by the corresponding sum of 
that column. 
Table 9: Saudi Arabia's trade w i t h the industrial countries (1986) 
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U.S. Japan France Germany I ta ly U.K. Total 
Total Trade 
Actual 898.0 6,621 495.0 578.0 511.0 1,040 10,143 
Actual shares 4.49 36.49 2.73 3.19 2.82 5.73 55.45 
Adjusted shares 8.85 65.28 4.88 5.70 5.04 10.25 100.00 
Imports 
Actual 543.0 1,147 346.0 537.0 407.0 942.0 3,922 
Actual shares 8.04 16.99 5.13 7.96 6.03 13.96 58.11 
Adjusted shares 13.84 29.25 8.82 13.69 10.38 24.02 100.00 
Shares are in percentage, while others are in millions dollars. 
Actua l total trade w i t h all countries in the world was $ 18,147 (millions) 
and total imports was $ 6,750 (millions). 
Explanations: Actual shares of to ta l trade may be found by dividing 
actual to ta l trade of each country by tota l trade w i t h all countries in 
the world. The same applies to imports. However, adjusted shares were 
found by djviding_the actu^trade_by the cojrcespondjngjsum of 
that column. 
Table 10: U.A.E. 's trade w i t h the industrial countries (1986) 
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FF D M L L Y Y U.K . U.S. 
£///< n.a. -0.21 0.16 -4.12 0.36 2.03 
n.a. (6.75) (11.12) (12.20) (9.22) (13.59) 
0.021 n.a. 0.18 -4.10 0.34 2.05 
(6.75) n.a. (13.06) (13.39) (12.69) (14.61) 
-0.16 -0.18 n.a. -4.28 0.16 1.86 
(11.12) (13.06) n.a. (15.15) (11.76) (15.16) 
4.12 4.10 4.28 n.a. 4.45 6.15 
(12.20) (13.39) (15.15) n.a. (13.42) (14.88) 
-0.32 -0.34 -0.16 -4.45 n.a. 1.76 
(9.22) (12.69) (11.76) (13.42) n.a. (14.55) 
-2.03 -2.05 -1.86 -6.15 -1.70 n.a. 
(13.59) (14.61) (15.16) (14.88) (14.55) n.a. 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Positive value of ^ implies that currency j has appreciated 
relative to currency i . 















Bahrain 0.1539 -0.0166 0.0733 0.0092 -0.1419 0.0782 
Kuwait 0.2286 -0.2092 0.0350 0.0505 -0.0079 0.0977 
Oman 0.3031 -0.629 0.0548 0.0668 -0.3098 0.0520 
Qatar 0.3152 -0.1010 -0.0109 0.0440 -0.1564 0.0909 
Saudi A. 0.1475 -0.0702 0.0254 0.0675 0.0551 0.1151 
U.A.E . 0.2816 -0.1425 0.0318 0.0531 -0.1202 0.1038 
Pi = SDR weight. 












I ta ly 
Pu =0.00 
Bahrain 0.1813 -0.1763 0.0761 0.0486 -0.0732 0.0565 
Kuwait 0.2594 -0.2376 0.0463 0.0808 0.0291 0.1780 
Oman 0.3525 -0.4194 0.0864 0.1297 -0.1210 0.0281 
Qatar 0.3539 -0.4488 -0.0015 0.1416 0.0103 0.0556 
Saudi A. 0.1469 -0.1372 0.0019 0.0989 0.0100 0.1204 
U.A.E . 0.3315 -0.5028 0.0712 0.1330 0.0175 0.0504 
pi = SDR weight. 
Table 13: The differences between SDR weight and total trade shares 
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Currency SDR weight (%) ECU weight (%) 
U.S. dollar 42.0 0.00 
Japanese yen 15.0 0.00 
Pound sterling 12.0 13.3 
Deutsche mark 19.0 33.0 
French franc 12.0 19.8 
Belgian franc 0.00 9.3 
Danish krone 0.00 3.1 
Irish pound 0.00 1.1 
I tal ian l ira 0.00 9.5 
Luxembourg franc 0.00 0.4 
Netherlands 
guilder 0.00 10.5 
Total weight 100.0 100.0 
ECU weights as of September 16,1984, i.e. before the 
inclusion of the Greek drachma. 
Table 14: Weights of the SDR and the ECU used in the estimation 
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Year B D / E C U K D / E C U R O / E C U Q R / E C U SR/ECU D h / E C U 
1979 0.5436 0.3938 0.4980 5.3421 4.8519 5.2932 
1980 0.4924 0.3552 0.4523 4.7668 4.3544 4.8075 
1981 0.4080 0.3053 0.3748 3.9500 3.7059 3.9837 
1982 0.3638 0.2793 0.3342 3.5223 3.3240 3.5524 
1983 0.3110 0.2420 0.2857 3.0116 2.8917 3.0373 
1984 0.2665 0.2158 0.2448 2.5803 2.5343 2.6023 
1985 0.3338 0.2566 0.3066 3.2319 3.2364 3.2594 
1986 0.4024 0.3129 0.4115 3.8961 4.0086 3.9294 
1987 0.4900 0.3517 0.5011 4.7442 4.8812 4.7847 
Table 15: Exchange rates of the ECU in terms of the GCC currencies (1979-
1987) 
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Year Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi A. U.A.E. 
1971 73.140 418.800 n.a. 462.900 3.590 n.a. 
1972 87.880 493.600 44.80 664.100 5.040 n.a. 
1973 99.640 536.300 46.60 777.000 6.810 2,257 
1974 145.83 684.60 85.20 1,048.8 9.780 6,036 
1975 184.22 891.10 118.00 1,748.8 17.780 8,820 
1976 303.83 1,220.1 164.60 2,705.1 29.610 16,754 
1977 355.50 1,568.7 206.60 3,567.0 45.560 15,540 
1978 402.35 1,950.4 230.60 4,115.5 58.030 17,576 
1979 411.87 2,262.7 246.20 4,511.4 65.980 18,222 
1980 524.06 2,875.6 325.00 5,277.1 77.440 23,527 
1981 730.54 3,866.0 450.70 7,475.1 102.99 29,094 
1982 780.21 4,182.7 562.60 8,567.0 123.79 33,646 
1983 843.11 4,367.8 672.30 8,487.7 137.08 36,342 
1984 827.76 4,475T8- 774.00 - 10,354 145.34 46,870 
1985 903.31 4,435.3 894.40 11,305.4 147.01 49,887 
1986 885.17 4,546.9 829.00 12,568.9 160.61 52,076 
1987 968.45 4,762.0 882.00 13,649.9 168.40 54,940 
A l l figures are in millions of domestic currencies except for 
Saudi Arabia, they are in billions of SR. 
Table 16: Money plus Quasi-money in the GCC countries (1971-1987) 
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Year Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia 
1971 32.50 n.a. n.a. 33.00 
1972 34.10 52.40 n.a. 34.50 
1973 39.00 56.80 n.a. 40.20 
1974 48.50 64.10 n.a. 48.80 
1975 56.40 69.50 n.a. 65.60 
1976 69.10 73.10 n.a. 86.40 
1977 81.40 80.40 n.a. 96.20 
1978 94.20 87.40 n.a. 94.70 
1979 96.30 93.50 93.50 96.40 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 111.3 107.4 108.5 102.7 
1982 121.2 115.7 114.7 102.1 
1983 124.8 121.2 117.9 101.5 
_1984 125,2_ 122.6 119.2. 100.3 
1985 121.9 124.4 121.4 97.00 
1986 119.1 125.6 123.4 94.10 
1987 117.0 126.4 n.a. 93.20 
n.a.: ^ot availa ble. 
For the U .A.E . and Oman no comprehensive CPI is published 
1980=100. 
Table 17: Consumer Price Index in the GCC countries (1971-1987) 
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Year U.S. Japan France Germany I ta ly U.K. 
1971 714.200 67,398 408.00 376.90 55,802 20.320 
1972 806.500 84,040 484.00 429.80 65,808 25.980 
1973 859.300 98,188 555.00 467.60 81,240 33.14 
1974 905.500 109,494 654.00 501.40 94,020 37.43 
1975 1,020.4 125,331 757.00 558.80 117,011 40.10 
1976 1,159.9 142,249 850.00 601.00 141,599 44.74 
1977 1,282.5 158,032 1,054 663.20 173,059 48.99 
1978 1,381.3 178,720 1,173 731.20 212,943 56.12 
1979 1,467.0 193,720 1,325 768.90 251,008 63.13 
1980 1,570.5 206,987 1,428 803.90 285.247 74.79 
1981 1,643.7 229,207 1,578 833.50 314,305 95.55 
1982 1,787.1 246,584 1,746 890.90 369.724 106.41 
1983 2,078.3 263,585 1,937 941.70 420,358 120.04 
1984 2,266.6 281,809 2,096 994.50 465,668 134.93 
1985 2,483.4 306,804 2,226 1,074.4 514,188 150.17 
1986 2,706.8 335,307 2,365 1,144.4 556,058 184.00 
1987 2,807.4 372,695 2,731 1,212.8 593,281 222.60 
A l l figures are in billions of domestic currencies. 
Table 18: Money plus Quasi-money in the industrial countries (1971-1987) 
311 
Year U.S. Japan France Germany I ta ly U.K. 
1971 49.10 39.10 42.10 64.10 28.70 30.30 
1972 50.80 41.00 44.70 67.70 30.40 32.50 
1973 53.90 45.80 47.90 72.40 33.70 35.50 
1974 59.80 56.40 54.50 77.40 40.10 41.10 
1975 65.30 72.60 60.90 82.00 46.90 51.10 
1976 69.10 79.40 66.80 85.60 54.80 59.60 
1977 73.60 85.90 73.00 88.70 64.10 69.00 
1978 79.20 89.50 79.70 91.10 71.10 74.70 
1979 88.10 92.80 88.20 94.90 82.50 84.80 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 110.4 104.9 113.4 106.3 117.8 111.9 
1982 117.1 107.8 126.8 111.9 137.2 121.5 
1983 120.9 109.9 139.0 115.6 157.3 127.1 
1984 126.1 112.3 149.3 118.4 174.3 133.4 
1985 130.5 114.6 157.9 121.0 190.3 141.5 
1986 131.1 115.3 161.9 120.7 204.3 146.4 
1987 137.9 115.4 167.3 121.0 214.0 152.5 
1980=100. 
Table 19: Consumer Price Index in the industrial countries (1971-1987) 
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Country 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Belgium 93.80 100.0 107.6 117.0 126.0 134.0 140.5 142.3 144.5 
Denmark 89.00 100.0 111.7 123.0 131.5 139.8 146.4 151.7 157.8 
France 88.20 100.0 113.4 126.8 139.0 149.3 157.9 161.9 167.3 
Germany 94.90 100.0 106.3 111.9 115.6 118.4 121.0 120.7 121.0 
Ireland 84.60 100.0 120.4 141.0 155.8 169.2 178.4 185.2 191.0 
I ta ly 82.60 100.0 119.5 139.2 159.5 176.8 193.0 204.3 214.0 
Luxem-
bourg 94.10 100.0 108.1 118.2 128.4 135.7 141.2 141.6 141.5 
Nether-
lands 93.90 100.0 106.7 113.0 116.2 120.0 122.7 122.0 122.3 
U.K. 84.80 100.0 111.9 121.5 127.1 133.5 141T6 146,4- 152T5 
1980=100. 
Table 20: Consumer Price Index in the ECU-member countries (1979-1987) 
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Year Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland 
1979 1,527.0 150.38 1,325 768.9 3,878 
1980 1,577.5 167.99 1,427 803.9 4,679 
1981 1,677.3 186.21 1,577 833.5 5,183 
1982 1,797.4 206.83 1,747 890.9 5,534 
1983 1,946.7 247.57 1,937 941.7 5,903 
1984 2,034.7 309.79 2,096 994.5 6,433 
1985 2,142.3 366.67 2,226 1,074.4 6,753 
1986 2,366.0 401.19 2,365 1,144.4 7,841 
1987 2,580.6 417.79 2,730 1,212.8 8,532 
A l l figures are in billions of the domestic currencies. 
Table 21: Money supply (M2) in five member countries of the ECU (1979-1987) 
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Year I ta ly Luxembourg Netherlands U.K. 
1979 251,008 138.9 223.61 63.13 
1980 285,247 204.0 236.24 74.79 
1981 314.305 225.6 254.52 95.55 
1982 369,724 330.2 268.13 106.41 
1983 420,358 316.4 281.31 120.04 
1984 465,668 330.9 299.71 134.93 
1985 514,188 409.1 320.11 150.17 
1986 556,058 579.7 337.20 184.00 
1987 593,281 588.6 343.48 222.60 
A l l figures are i n billions of the domestic currencies. 
Table 22: Money supply (M2) in four member countries of the ECU (1979-1987) 
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Currency A = E C U 
weight 
( A - « , ) 
cti = import share 
( A - a , ) 
ai = total trade share 
U.S. dollar 0.00 -26.60 -23.87 
Japanese yen 0.00 -16.60 -32.63 
Pound sterling 13.3 -12.89 -6.02 
Deutsche mark 33.0 14.94 18.86 
French franc 19.8 15.13 15.41 
Belgian franc 9.30 9.30 9.30 
Danish krone 3.10 3.10 3.10 
Irish pound 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Ital ian l i ra 9.50 1.68 3.85 
Luxembourg 
franc 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Netherlands 
guilder 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Table 23: Differences between E C U weights and trade shares ( Bahrain ) 
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Currency Pi = ECU 
weight 
( A -
oti = import share 
{Pi ~ on) 
oti = to ta l trade share 
U.S. dollar 0.00 -19.14 -16.06 
Japanese yen 0.00 -35.92 -38.76 
Pound sterling 13.3 0.510 4.21 
Deutsche mark 33.0 19.05 22.08 
French franc 19.8 11.30 12.43 
Belgian franc 9.30 9.30 9.30 
Danish krone 3.10 3.10 3.10 
Irish pound 1.10 1.10 1.10 
I tal ian l i ra 9.50 -0.27 -8.30 
Luxembourg 
franc 0.40. 0.40 0.40 
Netherlands 
guilder 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Table 24: Differences between ECU weights and trade shares ( Kuwait ) 
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Currency Pi - ECU 
weight 
( A -
a>i = import share 
( A - <*t) 
a, = tota l trade share 
U.S. dollar 0.00 -11.69 -6.75 
Japanese yen 0.00 -21.29 -56.94 
Pound sterling 13.3 -29.68 -10.80 
Deutsche mark 33.0 19.68 26.97 
French franc 19.8 13.28 16.44 
Belgian franc 9.30 9.30 9.30 
Danish krone 3.10 3.10 3.10 
Irish pound 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Ital ian l ira 9.50 4.30 6.69 
Luxembourg 
franc 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Netherlands 
guilder 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Table 25: Differences between ECU weights and trade shares ( Oman ) 
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Currency A - ECU 
weight 
{ f t - « 0 
Qi = import share 
( A - at) 
a, = tota l trade share 
U.S. dollar 0.00 -10.48 -6.61 
Japanese yen 0.00 -25.10 -59.88 
Pound sterling 13.3 -14.34 2.33 
Deutsche mark 33.0 18.40 28.16 
French franc 19.8 6.71 7.65 
Belgian franc 9.30 9.30 9.30 
Danish krone 3.10 3.10 3.10 
Irish pound 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Ital ian l i ra 9.50 0.41 3.94 
Luxembourg 
-franc 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Netherlands 
guilder 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Table 26: Differences between E C U weights and trade shares ( Qatar ) 
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Currency A = E C U 
weight 
( f t -
ati — import share 
(ft - cti) 
c*i = total trade share 
U.S. dollar 0.00 -27.25 -27.31 
Japanese yen 0.00 -22.02 -28.72 
Pound sterling 13.3 -4.21 2.30 
Deutsche mark 33.0 20.75 23.89 
French franc 19.8 10.34 7.99 
Belgian franc 9.30 9.30 9.30 
Danish krone 3.10 3.10 3.10 
Irish pound 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Italian lira 9.50 -2.01 -2.54 
Luxembourg 
franc 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Netherlands 
guilder 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Table 27: Differences between E C U weights and trade shares ( Saudi Arabia ) 
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Currency A = E C U 
weight 
(A - <*) 
aj = import share 
(A - <*••) 
aj = total trade share 
U.S. dollar 0.00 -13.84 -8.85 
Japanese yen 0.00 -29.25 -65.28 
Pound sterling 13.3 -10.72 3.05 
Deutsche mark 33.0 19.31 27.30 
French franc 19.8 10.98 14.92 
Belgian franc 9.30 9.30 9.30 
Danish krone 3.10 3.10 3.10 
Irish pound 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Italian lira 9.50 -0.88 4.46 
Luxembourg 
franc 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Netherlands 
guilder 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Table 28: Differences between E C U weights and trade shares ( U . A . E . ) 
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Currency 
Japanese yen 2.15 0.421 
(15.02) (15.39) 
Pound sterling 2.15 0.421 
(18.33) (19.10) 
Deutsche mark -1.13 1.43 
(18.33) (18.33) 
French franc 3.54 1.14 
(19.63) (18.32) 
Belgian franc 2.09 2.28 
(19.72) (19.64) 
Danish krone 1.59 0.039 
(18.45) (18.06) 
Irish pound 3.08 -1.49 
(17.52) (14.76) 
Italian lira 4.68 -1.63 
(18.29) (15.99) 
Luxembourg franc 2.09 2.59 
- (19.72) (18.98) 
Netherlands guilder -0.86 1.42 
(18.63) (18.77) 
E C U weights are as of September 16,1984. 
Ei/us : Price of the dollar in terms of currency i. 
Cus/i- Deviations from PPP. 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
Table 29: Means and standard deviations of changes in the exchange rates 
of the ECU-currencies and the dollar and deviations from P P P (1979-1987) 
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Year U.S. Japan France Germany Italy U.K. 
1972 4.33 4.12 3.16 8.19 2.18 4.85 
1973 5.29 4.57 6.79 7.59 7.62 5.06 
1974 3.06 0.18 4.05 -1.42 -1.12 -0.53 
1975 -0.27 -1.45 -3.70 2.64 -0.72 -1.26 
1976 4.15 5.42 5.70 4.68 3.75 4.76 
1977 3.16 2.61 1.88 5.19 1.01 4.56 
1978 3.29 3.21 2.64 5.06 3.86 5.15 
1979 3.19 3.87 4.78 5.15 2.11 2.44 
1980 1.61 1.45 3.83 4.18 -2.09 -0.15 
1981 1.16 0.02 1.13 3.60 -0.95 1.91 
1982 2.51 -0.97 0.24 3.03 1.11 -2.58 
1983 0.69 1.87 1.04 3.18 3.48 3.50 
1984 1.30 3.23 3.12 4.95 2.05 6.23 
1985 1.64 2.00 2.79 4.59 3.84 3.34 
1986 2.06 2.42 2.88 2.45 2.89 2.85 
1987 2.15 1.66 3.05 4.29 3.58 2.84 
Source: I F S , Yearbook 1988, country page. For France, line 99br 
; Germany, line 99ar; Italy, line 99br; Japan, line 99ar; 
U.K. , line 99bp; U.S., line 99ar. 
Table 30: Real growth rates in the industrial countries (1972-1987), % 
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Franc Mark Lira Yen Pound Dollar 
Franc 0.00 41.71 111.34 166.71 84.05 213.22 
Mark 41.71 0.00 157.77 165.38 125.66 199.87 
Lira 111.34 157.77 0.00 231.66 144.31 255.71 
Yen 166.71 165.38 231.66 0.00 155.61 199.84 
Pound 84.05 125.66 144.31 155.61 0.00 220.17 
Dollar 213.22 199.87 255.84 199.84 220.17 0.00 
The variances are in terms of percentage. 
The numbers to be read as exchange rates between the currencies 
on the first row and those on the first column. 
Table 31: Variances of various exchange rates (1971-1987) 
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Franc Mark Lira Yen Pound Dollar 
Franc 0.00 23.61 21.43 95.39 106.70 385.56 
Mark 23.61 0.00 14.74 108.57 149.98 336.03 
Lira 21.43 14.74 0.00 90.24 152.80 334.53 
Yen 95.39 108.57 90.24 0.00 46.24 225.69 
Pound 106.70 149.98 152.80 46.24 0.00 354.80 
Dollar 385.56 336.03 334.53 255.69 354.80 0.00 
Belgian franc 11.68 26.91 19.19 91.76 131.65 389.14 
Danish krone 5.83 10.18 9.48 82.76 118.15 340.68 
Luxembourg 
franc 11.68 26.91 19.19 91.76 131.65 389.14 
Irish pound 8.97 18.51 29.97 89.54 101.76 307.26 
Netherlands 
guilder 17.80 0.86 13.51 103.44 140.41 347.29 
Notes in Table (31) apply here. 












Belgian franc 0.00 6.44 0.00 24.76 22.99 
Danish krone 6.44 0.00 6.44 10.40 7.83 
Luxembourg franc 0.00 6.44 0.00 24.76 22.99 
Irish pound 24.76 10.40 24.76 0.00 14.99 
Netherlands 
guilder 22.99 7.83 22.99 14.99 0.00 
Notes in Table (31) apply here. 
Table 33: Variances of various exchange rates (1979-1987) 
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Currencies 1979-1987 (%) 1971-1987 (%) 
Belgian franc 1,197.131 d.a. 
Luxembourg franc 1,197.131 d.a. 
Danish krone 1,175.212 d.a. 
Netherlands guilder 1,226.666 d.a. 
Irish pound 1,079.032 d.a. 
U.S. dollar 541.974 1,170.49 
French franc 1,184.855 1,351.20 
Deutsche mark 1,243.725 1,319.67 
Japanese yen 775.524 2,397.10 
Italian lira 1,215.109 1,560.73 
British pound- 881.821 1t27~1T46 
d.a.: Does not apply. 
Table 34: Variances of Bahrain's oil revenues expressed in alternative cur-
rencies 
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Currencies 1979-1987 (%) 1971-1987 (%) 
Belgian franc 976.60 d.a. 
Luxembourg franc 976.60 d.a. 
Danish krone 976.04 d.a. 
Netherlands guilder 1,091.10 d.a. 
Irish pound 908.23 d.a. 
U.S. doUar 629.43 1,460.78 
French franc 965.52 1,453.10 
Deutsche mark 1,091.41 1,455.73 
Japanese yen 719.52 1,981.57 
Italian lira 1,046.65 1,766.12 
British pound 662.23 1,372.77 
d.a.: Does not apply. 
Table 35: Variances of Kuwait's oil revenues expressed in alternative curren-
cies 
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Currencies 1979-1987 (%) 1971-1987 (%) 
Belgian franc 1,851.91 d.a. 
Luxembourg franc 1,851.91 d.a. 
Danish krone 1,786.40 d.a. 
Netherlands guilder 1,822.43 d.a. 
Irish pound 1,594.40 d.a. 
U.S. dollar 1,087.36 1,458.79 
French franc 1,762.20 1,686.29 
Deutsche mark 1,833.08 1,727.98 
Japanese yen 1,361.32 2,034.63 
Italian lira 1,921.64 1,968.91 
British pound 1,200.90 1,523.90 
d.a.: Does not apply. 
Table 36: Variances of Oman's oil revenues expressed in alternative currencies 
329 
Currencies 1979-1987 (%) 1971-1987 (%) 
Belgian franc 2,308.44 d.a. 
Luxembourg franc 2,308.44 d.a. 
Danish krone 2,268.90 d.a. 
Netherlands guilder 2,382.75 d.a. 
Irish pound 2,082.31 d.a. 
U.S. dollar 1,358.34 1,848.28 
French franc 2,219.91 2,083.66 
Deutsche mark 2,406.16 2,108.46 
Japanese yen 1,835.82 2,525.15 
Italian lira 2,337.21 2,493.94 
British pound 1,819.11 2,026.22 
d.a.: Does not apply. 
Table 37: Variances of Qatar's oil revenues expressed in alternative currencies 
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Currencies 1979-1987 (%) 1971-1987 (%) 
Belgian franc 1,748.62 d.a. 
Luxembourg franc 1,784.62 d.a. 
Danish krone 1,784.19 d.a. 
Netherlands guilder 1,796.90 d.a. 
Irish pound 1,625.43 d.a. 
U.S. dollar 1,319.36 2,870.09 
French franc 1,713.93 2,900.92 
Deutsche mark 1,840.21 2,880.20 
Japanese yen 1,260.71 3,416.37 
Italian lira 1,806.18 3,175.88 
British pound 1,267.07 2,805.47 
d.a.: Does not apply. 
Table 38: Variances of Saudi Arabia's oil revenues expressed in alternative 
currencies 
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Currencies 1979-1987 (%) 1971-1987 (%) 
Belgian franc 1,140.53 d.a. 
Luxembourg franc 1,140.53 d.a. 
Danish krone 1,096.35 d.a. 
Netherlands guilder 1,147.75 d.a. 
Irish pound 970.65 d.a. 
U.S. dollar 622.36 1,530.73 
French franc 1,065.27 1,595.61 
Deutsche mark 1,169.49 1,601.07 
Japanese yen 708.62 2,039.78 
Italian lira 1,156.92 1,868.89 
British-pound 649.19 1,537:99 
d.a.: Does not apply. 
Table 39: Variances of the U.A.E. ' s oil revenues expressed in alternative 
currencies 
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Year Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi A. U .A .E . 
1971 222.30 2,319.52 228.50 326.04 4,014.46 867.077 
1972 242.82 2,378.33 229.80 381.67 5,472.29 1,035.34 
1973 335.40 3,518.46 332.36 607.99 6,356.04 1,735,0 
1974 1,090.08 10.519.7 1,136.07 1,979.27 35,622.5 6,272.08 
1975 990.62 8,306.24 1,439.20 1,732.21 29,475.9 6,745.81 
1976 1,170.74 9,122.42 1,561.96 2,139.78 38,501.40 8,291.97 
1977 1,446.99 8,980.73 1,568.62 1,981.43 43,786.0 9,270.91 
1978 1,525.34 9,535.01 1,502.90 2,317.33 38,343.9 8,736.06 
1979 2,049.06 16,969.6 2,152.00 3,661.33 58,549.8 13,031.9 
1980 3,209.87 17,612.8 3,280.83 5,412.46 101,474.0 19,582.1 
1981 3,881.95 13,661.1 4,402.72 5,316.03 110,483.0 18,760.6 
1982 3,145.24 8,803.25 4,099.02 4,078.64 73,117.9 15,955.6 
1983 2,586.20 9,700.23 4,202.66 3,045.66 42,314.7 13,016.3 
1984 2,712.26 10,443.4 3,905.91 4,322.05 33,770.6 12,037.3 
1985 2,442.31 10r215.6 4,684.71- -3,458.03 25^935T8 11,621.1 
1986 1,970.23 6,378.05 2,469.96 1,668.98 17.793.9 7,508.85 
1987 1,966.77 7,519.87 3,165.41 1,780.96 20.480.9 8,720.78 
Source: I F S , Yearbook 1988, country page. However, for Oman, 
revenues for 1987 were derived from I F S , Yearbook 1989. 
For Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the U . A . E . , data for 
1985-1987 were derived from O P E C Annual Statistical Bulletin, 
1987, p. 6. 
Table 40: Oil revenues of the G C C member states, 1971-1987 (millions of 
dollars) 
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Year Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi A. U . A . E . 
1972 8.82 2.50 0.568 15.75 30.97 17.73 
1973 32.30 39.16 36.90 46.56 14.97 51.62 
1974 117.86 109.52 122.90 118.03 172.35 128.51 
1975 -9.56 -23.62 23.65 -13.33 -18.94 7.28 
1976 16.70 9.37 8.18 21.13 26.71 20.63 
1977 21.18 -1.56 0.425 -7.68 12.86 11.15 
1978 5.27 5.98 -4.28 15.65 -13.27 -5.94 
1979 29.51 57.64 35.90 45.74 42.32 39.99 
1980 44.88 3.72 42.17 39.08 54.99 40.72 
1981 19.01 -25.40 29.41 -1.79 8.50 -4.28 
1982 -21.04 -43.94 -7.14 -26.49 -41.27 -16.19 
1983 -19.57 9.70 2.49 -29.20 -54.69 -20.36 
1984 4.75 7.38 -7.32 35.00_ -22.55 -7.81 
1985 -10.48 -2.20 18.18 -22.30 -26.39 -3.51 
1986 -21.47 -47.10 -64.01 -72.84 -37.67 -43.67 
1987 -0.175 16.46 24.80 6.49 14.06 14.96 
Source: Derived from Table (40) 













1974 117.5 - 67.0 - 50.50 
1975 129.0 9.33 112.3 51.64 16.70 
1976 186.7 36.96 190.9 53.05 -4.20 
1977 255.1 31.21 242.5 23.92 12.60 
1978 274.1 7.18 285.3 16.25 -11.20 
1979 304.3 10.45 254.5 -11.42 49.80 
1980 445.7 38.16 317.2 22.02 128.50 
1981 536.6 18.56 380.2 18.11 156.40 
1982 654.2 19.81 473.2 21.98 180.50 
1983 490.5 -28.79 535.1 12.18 -44.60 
1984 523.0 6.41 538.6 0.65 -15.60 
1985 541.4 3.45 508.5 -5.75 32.90 
1986 459.8 -16.33 495.1 -2.67 -35.30 
1987 414.0 -10.49 418.0 -16.92 -4.00 
Source: Revenues are from lines 81 and 81z, I FS, Yearbook, 1989 
(country page). Expenditures are from the same source, line 82. 
Table 42: Bahraini government total revenues and expenditures in millions 












1974 2,749.9 - 1,162.9 - 1,587.0 
1975 3,224.4 15.91 1,337.4 13.98 1,887.0 
1976 3,033.1 -6.11 1,519.3 12.75 1,513.8 
1977 3,093.4 1.96 1,959,2 25.42 1,134.2 
1978 3,697.7 17.84 1,943.9 -0.78 1,753.8 
1979 6,968.3 63.36 2,423.7 22.05 4,544.6 
1980 6,145.6 -12.56 2,957.8 19.91 3,187.8 
1981 4,675.8 -27.33 3,687.8 22.05 988.0 
1982 3,008.6 -44.09 3,743.6 1.50 -735.0 
1983 2,602.1 -14.51 3,538.5 -5.63 -936.4 
1984 3,037.0 15.45 3,710.0 4.73 -673.0 
1985 2,330.8 -26.46 3,047.9 -19.65 -717.1 
1986 1,675.6 -33.00 2,689.8 -12.49 -1,014.2 
1987 2,517.4 40.70 2,520.1 -6.51 -2.70 
Source: Quarter y Statistical E ulletin, Centra Bank of Kuwait, 
(various issues). 













1974 311.5 - 329.3 - -17.80 
1975 430.3 32.30 466.5 34.82 -36.20 
1976 475.3 9.94 551.0 16.64 -75.70 
1977 576.1 19.23 497.7 -10.17 78.40 
1978 447.6 -25.23 498.7 0.20 -51.10 
1979 652.5 37.69 548.8 9.57 103.70 
1980 829.1 23.95 794.9 37.04 34.20 
1981 1,125.9 30.59 1,028.0 25.71 97.90 
1982 1,001.2 -11.73 1,176.5 13.49 -175.30 
1983 1,124.4 11.60 1,308.1 10.60 -183.70 
1984 1,214.4 7.70 1,501.0 13.75 -286.60 
1985 1,397.6 14.05 1,731.1 14.26 -333.50 
1986 895.0 -44.56 1,587.2 -8.67 -692.20 
1987 1,199.4 29.27 1,330.1 -17.67 -130.70 
Source: Revenues are from lines 81h and 81z, IFS, Yearbook, 1989 
(country page). Expenditures are from the same source, line 82.h. 













1974 5,497 - 1,9731 - 3,566 
1975 7,135 26.08 5,302 101.0 1,833 
1976 8,927 22.40 5,809 9.13 3,118 
1977 8,155 -9.04 7,318 23.09 837.0 
1978 8,225 0.85 6,473 -12.26 1,752 
1979 12,090 38.52 8,270 24.49 3,820 
1980 19,003 45.22 10,937 27.95 8,066 
1981 19,243 1.25 14,743 29.86 4,500 
1982 12,434 -35.93 12,619 -15.55 815.0 
1983 8,911 -40.05 15,350 19.59 -6,439 
1984 13,610 42,35 12,173 -23.18 1,437 
1985 10,393 -26.96 10,374 -15.99 19.00 
1986 5,884 . -56.88 10,433 0.56 -4.549 
1987 12,217 12.16 -5,572 15.78 -5,572 
Source: Revenues are from lines 81, IFS, Yearbook, 1989 (country page) 
Expenditures are from the same source, line 82. However, data for 1983-1987 
are from: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Bahrain and Qatar, 
Country Profile, 1986/1987 and 1989/1990 issues. 













1974 41,705 - 18,595 - 23,110 
1975 100,103 87.55 35,039 63.35 65,064 
1976 95,040 -5.19 81,783 84.76 13,257 
1977 121,198 24.31 106.867 26.75 14,331 
1978 120,407 -0.65 111,400 4.15 9,007 
1979 211,200 56.19 188,000 52.33 23,200 
1980 348,100 49.96 236,600 22.99 111,500 
1981 368,000 5.55 284,700 18.50 83,300 
1982 246,256 -40.17 243,796 -15.51 2,460 
1983 206,418 -17.64 230,186 -5.51 -23,768 
1984 171,510 -18.52 216,363 -6.19 -44,853 
1985 133,565 -25.00 184,004 -16.20 -50,439 
1986 76,498 -.55.73 _ 137,442 -29.17 -60;944 
1987 103,811 30.53 173,526 23.31 -69,715 
Source: Revenues and expenditures data from: Statistical Summary 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (various issues). However, data for 
for 1982-1987 are from: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia, 
Country Profile, 1989/1990. 
Table 46: Saudi Arabian government total revenues and expenditures in 












1974 801.00 - 734.00 - 67.00 
1975 1,773 79.45 1,157 45.50 616.00 
1976 3,102 55.93 2,144 61.68 958.00 
1977 5,995 65.88 5,068 86.02 927.00 
1978 6,984 15.26 6,815 29.61 -1,148.0 
1979 8,863 23.82 8,132 17.66 731.00 
1980 17,608 68.64 13,332 49.43 4,276.0 
1981 22,460 24.33 18,666 33.65 3,794.0 
1982 16,101 -33.28 19,980 6.80 -3,879.0 
1983 13,807 -15.37 16,310 -20.29 -2,483.0 
1984 12,827 -7.36 15,669 -4.00 -2,842.0 
1985 15,525 19.08 15,939 1.70 -414.0 
1986 12,817 -19.16 13,368 -17.59 -551.0 
1987 11,274 -12.82 13,258 -0.82 -1,984.0 
Source: Revenues from IFS, Yearbook 1989, country page, line 81 
plus line 81z. Expenditures are from line 82. 
Table 47: The U.A.E. government total revenues and expenditures in millions 
of dirhams (1974-1987) 
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Country Actual export Actual share (%) Adjusted share (%) 
U.S. 79.10 3.04 18.67 
Japan 266.4 10.25 62.89 
France 16.40 0.63 3.87 
Germany 28.50 1.10 6.73 
Italy 6.50 0.25 1.53 
U.K. 26.70 1.03 6.30 
Total 423.6 16.30 100.0 
Actual total exports in 1986 was $2,599.6 (millions). 
Table 48: Bahrain's export shares (1986) expressed in millions of dollars or 
percentage ~ 
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Country Actual export Actual share (%) Adjusted share (%) 
U.S. 279.0 3.63 11.34 
Japan 1,064 13.83 43.23 
France 139.0 1.81 5.65 
Germany 154.0 2.00 6.65 
Italy 741.0 9.63 30.11 
U.K. 84.00 1.09 3.41 
Total 2,461 31.99 100.0 
Actual total exports in 1986 was $7,696.0 (millions). 
Table 49: Kuwait's export shares (1986) expressed in millions of dollars or 
percentage-
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Country Actual export Actual share (%) Adjusted share (%) 
U.S. 38.60 1.44 2.31 
Japan 1,486 55.51 89.02 
France 8.70 0.32 0.52 
Germany 6.30 0.24 0.38 
Italy 10.90 0.41 0.65 
U.K. 118.7 4.43 7.11 
Total 1,669.2 62.35 100.0 
Actual total exports in 1986 was $2,677.1 (mi lions). 



































Actual total exports in 1986 was $2,136.8 (rnillions). 
Table 51; Qatar's export shares (1986) expressed in millions of dollars or 
percentage 
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Country Actual export Actual share (%) Adjusted share (%) 
U.S. 3,686 14.93 27.38 
Japan 4,799 19.44 35.65 
France 1,917 7.76 14.24 
Germany 790.0 3.20 5.87 
Italy 1,696 6.87 12.60 
U.K. 575.0 2.33 4.27 
Total 13,463 54.53 100.0 
Actual total exports in 1986 was $24,692 (mil ions). 
Table 52: Saudi Arabia's export shares (1986) expressed in millions of dollars 
or percentage 
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Country Actual export Actual share (%) Adjusted share (%) 
U.S. 355.0 3.04 5.71 
Japan 5,474 46.81 87.99 
France 149.0 1.27 2.40 
Germany 41.00 0.35 0.66 
Italy 104.0 0.89 1.67 
U.K. 98.00 0.84 1.58 
Total 11,693 53.20 100.0 
Actual total exports in 1986 was $6,221 (millions). 
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